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Summary of the Three Essays
Introduction
Fiscal policy and government debt are topics that concern millions of citi-
zens at the same time. For example, increases in income taxation or cuts
in government expenditures affect virtually every citizen in a country in one
way or another. If a government accumulates an unsustainable debt burden,
the citizens are the ones who will finally have to bear the consequences in
the form of higher taxes or lower public expenditures. Therefore it should
not be surprising that fiscal policy and government debt have been hotly
debated among economic researchers and practitioners since the beginning
of economic thought. The three essays of this doctoral thesis aim at con-
tributing to this classical debate.
How much government debt should a benevolent government issue? How
does restrained mobility affect income sorting? How is the level of govern-
ment debt determined politically by young and old voters? From the myriad
of possible questions concerning fiscal policy and government debt, these
three questions were selected as topics for the three essays of this doctoral
thesis:
The first essay with the title Wealth Inequality and the Optimal Level of
Government Debt, joint work with Christoph Winter, is concerned with the
question of what the optimal level of government debt should be. Govern-
1
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ment debt has become a major concern in the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 2008-2009. Most non-economists (or even economists) probably think of
government debt as something negative, potentially constraining the scope
of action of a government. This view would suggest avoiding a long-run stock
of government debt. Some authors, however, have found a positive role of
government debt or bonds, as an asset providing a means for saving and
thus liquidity to the financial market (see, for example, Woodford, 1990 or
Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998). But what if many households don’t even
own bonds and therefore do not really benefit from this positive effect? The
Survey of Consumer Finances, for instance, shows for the United States (US)
that 20% of households own no wealth or are even indebted. Furthermore,
a negative effect of government debt when household’s borrowing is con-
strained, besides being a restriction on future fiscal policy, is to crowd out
firms that are searching for funds to borrow. Considering these aspects, it
is an interesting quantitative question whether the negative or the positive
effects of government debt on the economy and the economic well-being or
welfare of households will prevail. To assess this question, it is important to
take into account the high inequality of wealth between households and the
fact that some households own no bonds or assets or are even indebted. This
motivates our reassessment of the quantitative question of what the optimal
level of government debt should be.
Whereas the first essay asks a normative question by analyzing the opti-
mal level of government debt from a Utilitarian perspective, the second and
third essays provide a positive analysis. Here, the goal is not to define an
optimal or ideal state of the world, but to improve our understanding of how
the economic and political decisions of agents are formed and lead to certain
outcomes.
The second essay Homeownership, Mobility and Local Income Redistribu-
tion, joint work with David Stadelmann, is concerned with the question how
2
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restrained mobility affects income sorting. An income sorting equilibrium
arises when households sort themselves into communities according to in-
come classes. Taxes and house prices are endogenous variables influencing
income -orting, but are also influenced by it themselves. A typical result is
that the richest households live in the community with the lowest tax rate
and the highest house prices, the second-richest households in the community
with the second-lowest tax rate and second-highest house prices, and so on.
It is important to study such income sorting as it represents an important
aspect of daily lives of citizens and it determines how much income redistri-
bution is possible at the local level. Therefore, various authors have studied
the underlying factors for income sorting to arise. For example, Hansen
and Kessler (2001) analyze the influence of community sizes or Kessler and
Lu¨lfesmann (2005) and Schmidheiny (2006) the influence of heterogeneity in
preferences for public goods for the existence of income sorting equilibria.
Our contribution in this essay is to analyze the influence of households with
different mobility costs. For this purpose, we use a stylized set-up where we
differentiate between two types of households with respect to their mobility
costs: homeowners with infinite mobility costs and renters with zero mobility
costs. The idea is that homeowners are settled down definitely in a specific
community or, in other words, they do not move anymore. Consequently,
they cannot evade high taxes. In contrast, renters can react to incentives
created by different tax rates in different communities by moving to another
community. Introducing those two groups in a model of endogenous pol-
icy determination, allows to address the question in what way, theoretically,
homeownership or mobility of households can affect income sorting.
The third essay Public Debt in a Political Economy investigates the role
of different factors for the determination of the level of government debt if
government debt is viewed as the outcome of a political process. In contrast
to the second essay, which is concerned with local policies constrained by
potential competition between jurisdictions, the third essay abstracts from
3
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these considerations by focussing on national fiscal policies of public good
provision, income taxation and government debt. But similar to the second
essay, the third essay incorporates the idea that fiscal policies are endoge-
nous, arising from the choice of voters in democratic societies. The political
institution of repeated elections is an important determinant of the level of
government debt. If the government is reelected, government debt provides
a link between those different legislative periods, permitting one generation
to exert an influence on the next generation by setting a specific level of
government debt. Among the first to note this potential strategic behav-
ior of governments over time were Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson
and Svensson (1989). In the spirit of this earlier work, this essay aims at
providing a first step in the direction of a theory of the determination of
government debt in a framework with young and old voters and a national
bond market. The work is inspired by Song et al. (2011), who analyze a
similar framework with a financial market that is open internationally and
where it is assumed that the international market is much bigger than the
local market. It is a well-known puzzle of international macroeconomics that
savings and investment are strongly correlated despite open financial mar-
kets (so called “home bias”). Real-world financial markets therefore seem to
be best characterized as being between the two extremes of completely open
and completely closed. This is the reason for addressing the question of the
determination of government debt for the case of a closed financial market
as well.
Although the three essays of this doctoral thesis treat three clearly distinct
topics (optimal government debt, local income sorting and the political econ-
omy of government debt) with different goals (normative and positive) and
using very different modeling tools, there are nevertheless some conceptual
similarities. One similarity is the consideration of some heterogeneity be-
tween economic agents. In fact, although concerning virtually everyone to
some degree, fiscal policy and government debt often concern some citizens
4
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more than others. A rich person will be more concerned about the price of
a bond than a poor person who cannot afford to buy any bonds. A home-
owner who plans to stay in a community for the rest of his life is affected
by changes in local income taxation differently than a renter who is only
temporarily living there with the possibility of leaving at any moment. A
young voter is differently concerned about a high level of government debt
than an old voter, because he will most probably still live to experience the
consequences of this burden on fiscal policy in his or her country. A common
denominator of the three essays is thus that they deviate from the assump-
tion of a “representative agent”, by allowing for some form of heterogeneity
among economic agents: rich and poor, homeowners and renters, young and
old.
A further common denominator in all three essays is the importance of gen-
eral equilibrium effects and/or strategic effects. In the first essay, whereas
fiscal policy is taken as exogenous, general equilibrium effects play a role
because of the endogeneity of demand and supply in different markets (la-
bor market, goods market, capital market). Most importantly, we argue in
this essay that an increase in government debt leads to a higher increase in
the supply of assets than in the demand for assets because some agents are
borrowing-constrained. A different endogeneity exists for the kind of loca-
tion and voting equilibrium that is analyzed in the second essay. Here fiscal
policy itself is endogenous as voters decide by majority voting how much
taxes and redistribution they want. In the third essay as well, fiscal policy
is endogenous. General equilibrium effects play a role in that consumption
and savings decisions are affected by policy choices. Strategic effects play a
role in that the voters of this generation will consider the effect that their
decision on government debt can have on the next generation of voters.
In the following, I will provide a short non-technical summary of each of
5
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the essays of this doctoral thesis. The complete working papers are in the
Appendix.
Essay 1: Wealth Inequality and the Optimal
Level of Government Debt
In this essay, Christoph Winter and I ask the quantitative question of how
much government debt a benevolent government should issue. As a frame-
work for our analysis, we use a model that often serves as a ’workhorse’
of applied quantitative macroeconomics: an incomplete market model as in
Aiyagari (1994) (see, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004, Chapter
17, for a discussion of the theory and various applications of the incomplete
market models). Insurance markets are absent and households can only
self-insure against fluctuations in their personal labor income by trading a
risk-free one-period bond, subject to a short-selling constraint. The idea is
that some risks to your personal labor income (or equivalently to your indi-
vidual labor productivity) are not or only partly insurable, such as health,
divorce or injuries. What makes this framework so interesting from a mod-
eling perspective is its ability to generate an equilibrium with a stationary
wealth distribution that is very similar to empirical wealth distributions. It
thus allows us to set up the model so as to match the empirical data quite
closely, a process usually called calibration. As a means of illustration and
to be comparable with previous research in this area, the focus is on the US.
A seminal contribution for this kind of quantitative work on the economic
welfare effects of government debt is the article by Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998) in which they argue that the optimal level of government debt under
incomplete markets is positive. In a version of the model also calibrated to
the US economy, they find that the optimal long-run level of government
debt relative to the gross domestic product (GDP) is 0.6. This value is very
close to the ratio of government debt to GDP that was observable in the
6
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US in the last decades before the 2008-2009 financial crisis (approximately
2/3). Hence, they conclude that government debt is already close to the
optimal level. Furthermore, they find small economic welfare effects of a
change in government debt. These findings suggest that it is not necessary
to take policy actions concerning the quantity of government debt from a
macroeconomic perspective, or in other words, even large quantities of gov-
ernment debt are not such a bad thing. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
explain this possibly surprising finding by hinting at the fact that issuing
government debt crowds out private capital, which can be welfare improv-
ing in an incomplete-markets setting. This is because a lower capital stock
is associated with a higher interest rate, which facilitates self-insurance by
increasing the return of the risk-free bond.
An important contribution of our essay is to show that the optimal quantity
of debt that results in an incomplete markets model depends crucially on
the degree of wealth heterogeneity. In particular, we show that once we take
into account the high inequality of earnings and wealth that exists in the
US economy, the optimal level of government debt becomes negative, i.e.,
the government should accumulate assets, not debt. This finding is quite
intuitive: the actual wealth distribution implies that a big fraction of the
population holds almost no assets (or is even in debt); so those households
receive income only from labor earnings. Since government debt crowds out
private capital, this implies a lower marginal product of labor and thus a
lower wage rate. Consequently, government debt adversely affects income
of the wealth-poor, who account for a big fraction of the population. This
the reason why a benevolent government should accumulate capital as well,
accepting a lower capital income of the savers (resulting from a lower interest
rate) in favor of a higher wage rate.
Although higher than found by the earlier literature (notably, by Aiyagari
and McGrattan, 1998; Flode´n, 2001), the overall economic welfare conse-
7
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quences of government debt are found to be still moderate. This picture
changes however when looking explicitly at the economic welfare of different
wealth groups: the wealth-poor, with no or negative assets, the wealth-rich,
who as a group hold 70% of all assets, and the middle class, the group in-
between. Interestingly, the wealth-poor benefit the most from the decrease
proposed as an optimal policy, and the effects are much larger than the over-
all or average welfare effect. Intuitively, the wealth-poor are part of the group
that benefits most from high wages and low interest rates, as they have a
lot of labor income and are sometimes indebted. The downside of low gov-
ernment debt is that the low interest rate discourages savings, and many
(unlucky) previous middle-class households become wealth-poor.
Until now we have focussed on the long-run stock of debt and level of taxes
without considering how a transitional period can lead the economy to those
“steady-state” situations. Given that we found a lower long run stock of
debt improves economic welfare, the question is now, whether or how this
desirable situation can be achieved? Clearly, to lower the level of government
debt the government would have to increase taxes or reduce expenditures. In
this essay, the focus is on the policy of increasing taxes. More precisely, in a
transitional analysis, we balance short-run welfare losses of increased short-
run taxation against the long-run gains of a reduced level of government
debt. Even considering those transitional effects, it is still possible to achieve
overall economic welfare gains by reducing government debt, although they
are now somewhat lower.
Another interesting aspect we analyzed in more detail is the crowding out
of the private debt market by public debt. In an extension, we analyze the
influence of government debt on the private debt market by assuming endoge-
nous borrowing limits. More precisely, we assume that households can lend
to and borrow from each other, but they could also potentially default on
their financial liabilities. Upon default, households would be excluded from
8
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future borrowing and lending forever. As in the recent articles by Zhang
(1997) and A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010), an individual household
will thus be able to borrow only as much as a potential lender will be ready
to give without having to fear a default. Formally, there is an endogenous
limit to borrowing, set in such a way that households are indifferent between
defaulting and participating in financial markets. In fact, as it is in every
borrower’s own interest to observe this limit, there will be no default in equi-
librium.
The effect of a reduction in government debt (accumulation of government
assets) under these conditions is the following: if the government accumu-
lates assets, the resulting fall in the interest rate makes default less attractive,
as a lower interest rate makes it easier for households to service their debt.
Consequently, borrowing limits become looser, and the fraction of the pop-
ulation that is in debt increases. We find that this effect causes the optimal
long-run level of government assets to be even higher compared to the case
when borrowing limits are exogenous.
Essay 2: Homeownership, Mobility and Local
Income Redistribution
Due to the long-term perspective implied when establishing a home and due
to higher transaction costs, homeowners are less mobile compared to renters.
This essay analyzes theoretically how homeownership or mobility affects lo-
cal income sorting equilibria. More precisely, we consider a framework of
locational choice on the one hand, and endogenous policy determination
through voting, on the other hand (see among others Hansen and Kessler,
2001; Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann, 2005; Schmidheiny, 2006). Such a set-up cor-
responds especially well to a federalistic and democratic country like the US
or Switzerland. In such a framework, usually households of a specific region,
i.e. a region with several separate jurisdictions, are characterized by income
9
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differences. In consequence, part of the population is the net beneficiary of
a redistributive policy and the other part the net contributor. For this rea-
son, there is an incentive for net contributors to move away from a high-tax
jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction and vice versa for net beneficiaries.
We model the household decisions in two stages: A household first decides
in which jurisdiction it wants to settle, considering expectations about the
amount of redistribution that will be implemented in this jurisdiction. Sec-
ond, each household has the possibility of electing a local political candidate
with a certain electoral program of redistributive taxation through majority
voting. Majority voting implies that any political candidate proposes the pol-
icy which at least 50% of the electorate support (the pivotal person being the
so called “median voter”). A well-known theorem from the political economy
literature therefore states that (under certain conditions on the preferences
which are satisfied in our framework) the policy outcome under majority vot-
ing is always the one preferred by this median voter (median voter theorem).
When households differ in terms of income, it clearly depends on the income
distribution among the households and the resulting inequality, how much
redistribution the median voter will prefer and, hence, how much redistribu-
tion will result in equilibrium. If inequality is high among households in a
jurisdiction, which means a lot of comparatively poor households and only a
few relatively rich ones, the median voter is poor and will thus prefer a high
amount of redistribution. If inequality is low, which means that everyone
has approximately the same income, the median voter is almost as rich as
anyone else and consequently will prefer low (or, in the extreme case where
everyone is equally rich, no) redistribution. Of course, all this can already
be foreseen by a rational household deciding where to live in the first place.
Thus, in equilibrium every household finds his or her expectations fulfilled
and doesn’t want to move anymore.
Goodspeed (1986) was among the first to show for models with local income
10
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redistribution that a typical equilibrium outcome of such a model is that
households sort themselves according to income classes, the richest house-
holds living in the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate, the second-richest
in the one with the second-lowest tax rate, and so on. This sorting result
means that redistribution is less extreme than if it were implemented at the
national or regional level, because redistribution can then happen only inside
each income class and not between the classes.
The contribution of our essay is to consider the role of homeownership or
mobility for income sorting equilibria of this kind. We begin by presenting
some empirical facts about income sorting and homeownership on which to
base our analysis. For instance, we present data for Swiss cantons suggest-
ing a non-linear relationship between tax differences between communities
(which is a quantitative measure of income sorting within a canton) and the
homeownership rate. Then we present our model of local income redistribu-
tion. We model the redistributive policy, as is standard in the literature, as
a transfer financed by distortive income taxation. Thus, higher taxes mean
more redistribution. To emphasize the role of mobility, we assume that home-
owners and renters differ strongly with respect to their mobility, in kind of an
extreme way: homeowners are completely immobile, whereas renters are per-
fectly mobile. If part of the population is not mobile, this changes the amount
of possible redistribution relative to the case where everyone is mobile, be-
cause those additional immobile households change the voting outcome by
their presence. Or put differently: the median voter might be another per-
son, if part of the population is not mobile. How exactly redistribution is
changed, of course, depends on how much income each homeowner earns. We
assume that the income distribution is the same for renters and homeowners,
which we view as the most natural and neutral assumption to begin with.
Furthermore, to illustrate the general mechanism we want to emphasize, we
concentrate on the case of two jurisdictions.
11
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Our analysis suggests the following results: First, if there are no or only
a few homeowners, there is no income sorting equilibrium. The reason is
that the income distribution is very skewed, meaning that there are clearly
fewer super rich persons than extremely poor persons. Suppose for simplicity
everyone is a renter. In this case, if there was income sorting, the poor and
the middle class would be in one jurisdiction, whereas the moderately rich
and the super rich would be in the other jurisdiction. Where will the tax
rate be higher? The answer is: in the rich jurisdiction. The reason is that in-
equality is much higher between moderately rich and super rich than between
poor and middle class. Thus, in such a situation, the richest households of
the rich jurisdiction would start moving to the other jurisdiction trying to
evade taxes. But this in turn would increase inequality in that jurisdiction,
which means more redistribution and a higher tax rate. The rich would move
again, and so on. There is no “equilibrium”, because the process never stops.
Second, at some point there is a threshold value for the homeownership rate
such that for rates higher than this value there exists a sorting equilibrium of
the kind described above. The reason is that the presence of homeowners has
a dampening effect on inequality in the rich jurisdiction, which permits the
rich to agree on a tax rate that is somewhat lower than the tax rate in the
poor jurisdiction. For a range of moderate homeownership rates, the differ-
ence between tax rates increases with the homeownership rate. Intuitively,
as long as the inequality between homeowners is lower than the inequality
between the richest renters, a higher presence of homeowners decreases the
equilibrium tax rate in the rich jurisdiction, whereas the tax rate in the poor
jurisdiction is less affected.
Third, there is a range of high homeownership rates for which the differ-
ence between tax rates decreases with the homeownership rate. Intuitively,
from some point onwards the tax rate in the poor and the rich jurisdiction
have to be more and more similar, as the high number of homeowners with
12
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an equilibrated income distribution makes the income distribution in both
jurisdictions more and more similar. Finally, we find that an increase in
overall regional inequality increases the likelihood of income sorting for each
possible value of the homeownership rate.
Essay 3: Public Debt in a Political Economy
How can it happen that relatively rich countries end up in an unsustainable
situation of high indebtedness? What characteristics of a country lead to
high indebtedness in theory? What role does the financial market openness
of a country play? And finally, what institutional mechanisms are more prone
to induce high government debt? The third essay, Public Debt in a Political
Economy, aims at providing answers to those questions. The inability of
democratic governments to commit to policies over long periods of time is
viewed as crucial to an understanding of how the level of government debt
is determined. A government that needs to be periodically re-elected cannot
directly decide on what fiscal policy is implemented in the future. Thus,
as already noted by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini
(1990), governments that are re-elected every legislative period may try to
strategically influence decisions of the next period’s government by setting a
specific level of government debt.
More precisely, this essay investigates the political conflict between young
and old voters and what it means for the determination of government debt
(voters are referred to as agents of the model in the following). In eco-
nomics, intergenerational questions are usually analyzed using models with
overlapping generations (OLG). Two lifetime periods are sufficient to ana-
lyze the basic mechanism here. The first period stands for the working-life
of an agent, and the second period is the retirement period. The economic
difference between those periods lies in the labor income profile, all labor
income accruing in the working-life period, whereas in the retirement period
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the agent has to live off his or her savings. The different generations of agents
overlap in the sense that each time period is the working-life period for some
young agents who newly entered the labor market and at the same time is the
retirement period for some old agents. Therefore, at each point in time two
types of agents simultaneously live together: the old and the young. In this
model, I assume a lifetime period to be equal to a legislative period (simply
referred to as period in the following).
Fiscal policy consists of public good provision (which benefits both types
of agents), income taxation (concerning only the young working agents) and
government bond issues. The bonds promise one unit of consumption next
period. They will be used by the young agents to provide for their old age,
as no other savings instrument is available. Importantly, the government has
to meet a budget constraint, meaning that the income from taxation and
new bond issues should provide for the expenditures on public goods and the
units of consumption promised in the last period in the form of bonds.
This model is inspired by Song et al. (2011) with the important difference
that a closed financial market is assumed. In their model, the internationally
open financial market implies that the number of bonds the government is-
sues has no influence on the price of bond, as the international market is very
large compared to the national market. In contrast to earlier literature, Song
et al. (2011) find as a result of their analysis that the lack of commitment
does not lead to higher levels of government debt, but rather to lower ones.
The reason is that young agents today are worried about their public good
provision in the next period and thus prefer not to leave such a high debt
burden to the next government. They will thus put a brake on financing too
much expenditure via debt.
The contribution of this essay is to analyze a model with a closed finan-
cial market. In this case, every bond issued by the government has to be
14
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bought by a young agent ready to save for retirement. This means that the
government can manipulate the interest rate via bond issues. If, for exam-
ple, starting from a given number of bond issues, the government decides to
increase the number of bond issues, the interest rate will increase because
young agents must be persuaded to buy even more bonds (the law of demand
and supply). If, on the contrary, the government decides to issue fewer bonds,
the interest rate will decrease by an analogous mechanism as above. In such
a closed economy model, government debt is thus used as a savings instru-
ment for young agents today, but does not help the government to finance
itself, at least in real terms. Intuitively, there is only a given amount of real
resources in each period, and as there is no possibility to borrow abroad, it is
not possible to change this amount of given resources. All that the govern-
ment can do is to allocate more of those resources to government activities,
such as public good provision, or repaying debt obligations, by increasing
taxation. So what is the role of new bond issues then? The answer is that
they matter for the next period, as they have to be paid back to the old
retired population. In this way, government debt, although it cannot finance
expenditures, provides a link between different periods.
As a benchmark for comparison, I first analyze the commitment solution,
where the first generation decides on the whole future path of taxes, public
goods and government debt. The old agents do not care about government
debt at all, because it is not useful to finance public expenditures today. For
young agents, the role of government debt issues is to achieve the optimal mix
between private and public consumption in old age, with more bonds mean-
ing relatively more private consumption (bond proceeds) and fewer bonds
meaning relatively more public consumption.
Then in the second step, I assume that young and old voters can reelect
the government every period. All voters of one type (young or old) have the
same preferences regarding a policy proposal of a political candidate, but
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they differ idiosyncratically in terms of ideology with respect to this candi-
date. In the political economy literature, ideology summarizes everything
that could be considered important for the voting decision concerning the
political candidate, except for the policy question. It has been shown that
under such conditions any political candidate, maximizing his or her proba-
bility of being elected, will consider a weighted sum of the preferences of the
different types of agents, weighing them with their political power (for exam-
ple, political power = share in the population). In the political equilibrium,
it does not matter which candidate is elected as the candidates all propose
the same policy.
But what will this policy look like more specifically? I show that the tax,
public goods and debt issuing policy depend on how much debt there is or,
in other words, how much consumption was promised to old agents. The
higher the debt burden is, the higher the taxes will be and the lower the
public goods. The new bond issues are used to determine the consumption
of tomorrow’s old agents on the one hand (similar as in the commitment
case) and to influence tomorrow’s decision-making strategically on the other
hand. This strategic effect was not present, because not necessary, in the
commitment case. The effect depends on whether public and private goods
are substitutes or complements. The essay shows that although there are ex-
amples of both of the above, it is not clear from the empirical literature what
would be a good aggregate assumption, since the results are contradictory.
Therefore both cases are considered.
The strategic effect permits today’s young voters to have an influence on
the next generation’s young voters. Young voters today know that the reac-
tion of the next generation of voters to a high level of government debt will
be to reduce public expenditures and increase taxes to be able to finance the
debt burden. Young voters today thus deviate from the optimal tradeoff level
of government debt to induce higher taxation of tomorrow’s young generation
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and in this way rip them off their resources. However, the higher government
debt level also induces cuts in public goods expenditures, so that the young
today must substitute some public goods for private goods in their old age.
The higher the substitutability of public and private goods, the stronger thus
the strategic use of government debt and the higher the debt level.
Regarding the answer to the question of which institutional mechanisms are
particularly prone to favoring high debt accumulation, this essay thus shows
clearly that it depends on the substitutability of public and private goods. It
turns out that if public and private goods are net substitutes, a commitment
mechanism leads to a lower debt level than a voting mechanism. If, however,
public and private goods are net complements, a voting mechanism leads to
a lower debt level than the commitment mechanism.
Coming back to the question asked in the beginning as to how it can hap-
pen that relatively rich countries exhibit high government debt, this essay
indicates the possible underlying causes. On the one hand, government debt
partly constitutes the savings of the young generation for their old age. On
the other hand, in a political conflict between the generations, government
debt can also be used as a strategic instrument to influence the next gen-
eration, leading to potentially higher government debt (in the case of net
substitutability between public and private goods). Both aspects can lead to
a relatively high debt burden, even if a country is rich and developed.
Concerning the characteristics of a country that lead to high indebtedness
in theory, this essay identifies, in the next step, the influence of underlying
preferences on the level of government debt in a country: the preference for
public goods, intergenerational altruism and the political power of the old.
A higher preference for public goods and higher altruism lead to a lower level
of government debt. The influence of voting power depends on the direction
of the strategic effect, higher voting power leading to a debt level nearer to
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the commitment level.
Finally, the question of the role of financial market openness of a country
is analyzed in this third essay, last part of the present doctoral thesis, by
comparing the results to those of the small open economy set-up by Song
et al. (2011). Without tax distortions, government debt is generally lower
in the political equilibrium of closed economies. With high tax distortions,
however, government debt can be lower in open economies.
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Wealth Inequality and the
Optimal Level of Government
Debt
Paper Summary
In this paper, we quantitatively analyze to what extent a benevolent govern-
ment should issue debt in a model where households are subject to idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks, insurance markets are missing and borrowing is
restricted. In this environment, issuing government bonds facilitates saving
for self-insurance.
Despite this, we find that in a calibrated version of the model that is
consistent with the skewed wealth and earnings distribution observable in
the U.S., the government should buy private bonds, and not issue public
debt in the long run. The reason is that in the U.S., a large fraction of
the population has almost no wealth or is even in debt. The wealth-poor,
however, do not profit from an increase in the interest rate following an
increase in public debt. Instead, they gain from higher wages that result
from a reduction in debt.
APPENDIX A. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND THE OPTIMAL LEVEL
OF GOVERNMENT DEBT
A.1 Introduction
In this paper, we ask the following question: what is the optimal level of gov-
ernment debt in a world where insurance markets are incomplete, households
are thus subject to uninsurable shocks to their labor income and borrowing
is restricted?
We consider a model in the spirit of Aiyagari (1994) where households are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their labor productivity and insurance mar-
kets are missing. Only one-period risk-free bonds are available for households
to self-insure against income shocks. Bonds are issued by firms (as claims
to physical capital) or by the government in the form of public debt. In the
absence of aggregate risk, claims to physical capital and public debt are per-
fect substitutes. As noted by Albanesi (2008), issuing government bonds in
such an environment might be an effective way to improve risk-sharing and
aggregate welfare. With the help of this model, we analyze quantitatively
to what extent the U.S. government should issue debt. Perhaps surprisingly,
we find that the optimal level of government debt is negative in the long
run. In other words, our findings suggest that in a long run perspective the
government should save and supply capital to the production sector instead
of issuing bonds.
Our finding can be explained as follows. As it is well known from the seminal
papers of Woodford (1990) and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) as well as
more recently by (Gomes et al., 2008, 2010) issuing government bonds can
have very different effects in an environment with incomplete markets com-
pared to a setting where markets are complete. Heathcote (2005) makes a
similar point with respect to fiscal policy in general. If borrowing constraints
are binding, raising government debt crowds out private capital, even when
taxes are lump-sum. In this case, households that face binding borrowing
constraints will not increase their savings one-to-one in response to an in-
crease in debt, and Ricardian Equivalence breaks down. This implies that
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the demand for private bonds will not meet the supply of private bonds is-
sued by the firm. We say that public debt crowds out private capital, and
therefore also production and output. As a result, the equilibrium interest
rate that clears the private bond market will increase, and the marginal prod-
uct of labor will decrease. Heathcote (2005), who studies tax reforms in a
model with borrowing constraints, finds that this effect can be quantitatively
important. Moreover, if taxation is distortionary instead of lump-sum, the
negative effect of government debt on capital and output is even stronger,
due to an inefficiently low supply of labor and capital. Clearly, both the
crowding out of capital as well as the efficiency losses due to distortionary
taxation reduce aggregate welfare.
In an world with incomplete markets, there are two additional effects how
government debt can influence the well-being of households. Both channels
work through the changes in the interest rate and the wage rate resulting
from crowding out and distortionary taxation. First, a higher interest rate
facilitates self-insurance of private households, since saving yields a higher re-
turn (Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998). Put differently, government debt has
an insurance effect because the price of the riskless production factor (cap-
ital) increases, while the price of the risky factor (labor) decreases (Davila
et al., 2011; Gottardi et al., 2010). Second, government debt also affects the
distribution of consumption via the composition of income, because house-
holds that receive capital income benefit and households that mainly rely
on labor income lose. The insurance and the income composition channel
might have counteracting effects on total welfare, since the households that
profit the most from additional insurance are the consumption-poor, which
also suffer the most from a decline in wages.
Our result suggests that the negative impact government debt has on wel-
fare via efficiency losses and the income composition channel overrides the
positive effect of additional insurance. Our conclusion that the government
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should optimally provide additional capital as a means of production instead
of issuing debt stands thus in contrast to the view of Aiyagari (1995). In
this seminal contribution, he emphasizes that the precautionary saving mo-
tive present in incomplete markets economies leads to an overaccumulation
of capital compared to the complete market benchmark, suggesting that any
government policy that reduces capital could be welfare improving. However,
if one takes the fact that markets are incomplete as given, as we do here, a
social planner could improve welfare by providing additional private capital.
In this sense our finding is in line with the recent contributions of Davila
et al. (2011) and Gottardi et al. (2010). Both papers find that competitive
equilibrium allocation of resources is constrained inefficient, and that there
is in fact an underaccumulation of capital. Our paper contributes to this
literature by showing that a benevolent government can increase aggregate
welfare by accumulating assets and buying private bonds. This policy can -
at least partly - make up for the underaccumulation of assets in the private
sector.
We show that our main result - namely that the government should hold
assets instead of debt - hinges on the fact that wealth and income in the
United States are very unequally distributed across the population. Because
households that are consumption-poor also hold no wealth or are even in
debt, the positive insurance effect of government debt is weak in terms of
aggregate welfare. This explains why we find substantial negative welfare
effects of government debt, whereas Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and in
particular Flode´n (2001) conclude that the opposing effects almost cancel out,
leading to only weak overall welfare effects of government debt. Compared to
these authors, we explicitely target the high wealth and earnings inequality
observed in the U.S. in our calibration procedure, following Castan˜eda et al.
(2003). Looking explicitly at different wealth-groups in the population shows
an even stronger effect for those individual groups. Paying back government
debt and accumulate assets benefits in particular poor agents. The reason
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is that they depend primarily on wage income. For this group, the positive
effects of crowding in (more private capital) in form of higher wages thus
outweigh the negative effects of a lower interest rate.
Another important contribution of our paper is that we are also able to show
that the long-run welfare gains that can be achieved by reducing government
debt with respect to the status quo can outweigh the short-run losses that
occur over the transition, as long as the government uses the right set of pol-
icy instruments. We propose the policy to reduce government debt by taxing
capital highly in one period, and then reduce either capital taxes or labor
taxes from then onwards. This policy is inspired by Greulich and Marcet
(2008), who show theoretically that in a model with wealth heterogeneity
but without borrowing constraints it is Pareto-optimal to leave capital in-
come taxes high in the short run, but reduce them to zero in the long run.
In the standard incomplete market setting, borrowing constraints are ex-
ogenous and thus invariant to public policy. However, there are good reasons
to believe that financial market conditions that determine borrowing restric-
tions also react to policy changes. Therefore we endogenize borrowing limits
by assuming that households can default on their financial liabilities. Upon
default, households are excluded from future borrowing and lending forever.
As in Zhang (1997), A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2011) and A´braha´m and
Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010), borrowing constraints are set such that households
are indifferent between defaulting and participating in financial markets, so
that there is no default in equilibrium. If the government accumulates assets,
the resulting fall in the interest rate makes default less attractive, as a lower
interest rate makes it easier for households to service their debt. As a con-
sequence, borrowing limits become laxer, and the fraction of the population
that is in debt increases. We find that this effect causes the optimal long
run level of government assets to be even higher compared to the case when
borrowing limits are exogenous.
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In line with Attanasio and R´ıos-Rull (2000), A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda
(2011), A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010) and Krueger and Perri (2010)
our results underline the importance of endogenizing the borrowing limit for
analyzing the impact of public policy.
Our paper is related to the recent literature analyzing the macroeconomic
consequences of the recent financial crisis through the lens of incomplete
markets models. Gomes et al. (2010) focus on quantifying the cost of the
increase in government debt during the episode of the ’bailout’. For their
analysis, they look at incomplete market models with aggregate uncertainty.
They do not perform a welfare analysis. Oh and Reis (2011) argue that the
fiscal rescue package after the financial crisis mainly resulted in an increase
in targeted transfers. Therefore they analyze the impact of targeted transfers
on aggregate economic activity in an incomplete markets model with sticky
prices. Interestingly, they also point out that in the United States between
2007 and 2009, public debt increased but private debt fell. This is consis-
tent with our extended version of the model, where a tightening of private
borrowing conditions results from higher interest rates caused by high public
debt. In general however, we view our work with its focus on government
debt and welfare analysis as complementary to those recent papers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present the baseline
model in the next section. In section 3, we discuss the role of borrowing con-
straints by showing that Ricardian equivalence still holds under incomplete
markets, lump sum taxes and without borrowing constraints. In section 4
we discuss the calibration of the model. Section 5 shows the quantitative
results. Section 6 concludes.
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A.2 The Baseline Model
The economy we consider is a neoclassical growth model with incomplete
markets where households face uninsurable income shocks, as in Aiyagari
(1994). Only one-period risk-free bonds are available for households to self-
insure against income shocks. Bonds are provided by either firms, in which
case they can be interpreted as claims to physical capital kt, or by the gov-
ernment, which issues government bonds bt (as in Aiyagari and McGrattan,
1998; Flode´n, 2001). As we assume no aggregate risk, claims on physical cap-
ital and government bonds are perfect substitutes and thus yield the same
return rt.
1 In the following, we present the household sector, the firm sector
and the government sector in greater detail.
A.2.1 Household Sector
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical, infinitely
lived households with total mass of one. Households maximize their expected
utility by making a series of consumption, leisure and savings choices subject
to a budget constraint and a borrowing limit on assets. In period t = 0,
before any uncertainty has realized, their expected utility is given by
U({ct, lt}t=1,2,..., ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt)
where β is the subjective discount factor. The per-period utility function,
u(.), is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously
differentiable. Additionally the first derivative is assumed to satisfy the fol-
lowing limiting (Inada) conditions:
lim
c→0
uc(c, l) = ∞, lim
c→∞
uc(c, l) = 0
lim
l→0
ul(c, l) = ∞
1In Gomes et al. (2008, 2010), government bonds and private capital are imperfect
substitutes due to aggregate uncertainty.
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The idiosyncratic shocks to household productivity, t, follow a Markov pro-
cess with transition matrix pi(′|).
A household thus faces the following per-period budget constraint:
ct + at+1 = yt
where at+1 = kt+1 + bt+1 denotes the sum of the claims on physical capital
and government bonds in t + 1 bought by the household in period t and yt
is the agent’s individual (after-tax) income. The households asset choice is
restricted by an ad-hoc borrowing limit:
at+1 ≥ a
Let θ(a, ) denote the joint distribution of asset holdings and productivity
shocks. Let Γ denote the transition function which maps the current distri-
bution θt(., .) into a new distribution θt+1(., .):
θt+1(at+1, t+1) = Γ[θt(at, t)] (A.1)
The government can tax labor income at some proportional tax rate, τl,t, as
well as financial income at some proportional tax rate, τa,t, and can redis-
tribute income via lump sum transfers, χt. We assume that only non-negative
financial income is taxed or in other words there are no proportional subsidies
in the face of financial losses. More precisely, we define the tax on financial
income τa, as follows:
τa,t(at) =
{
τ¯a,t if at ≥ 0
0 if at < 0
The after-tax interest rate is therefore given by rt = (1 − τa,t(at))rt. The
after-tax wage rate is given by wt = (1− τl,t)wt where wt is the price of labor
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in the economy. After-tax income is thus given by:
yt = wtt(1− lt) + (1 + rt)at + χt
The optimization problem of the household in recursive formulation looks as
follows (see the Appendix for the derivation of a detrended formulation):
W (a, ; θ) = max
c,l,a′
{
u(c, l) + β
∑
′
pi(′|)W (a′, ′; θ′)
}
(A.2)
s.t. c+ a′ = w(1− l) + (1 + r)a+ χ
a′ ≥ a
θ′ = Γ[θ]
A.2.2 Welfare Measure
To answer the normative question of which level of government debt would
be optimal, we have to define a welfare criterion. Following the previous
literature as for example, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Flode´n (2001),
we use as a welfare criterion the aggregate optimal value function:
Ω =
∫
W (a, ; θ)dθ(a, )
This criterion can either be interpreted as (1) a utilitarian social welfare
function where every individual has the same weight for the planner, (2) a
steady-state ex ante welfare of an average consumer before realizing income
shocks or initial asset holdings or (3) the probability limit of the utility of a
infinitely lived dynasty where households utilities are altruistically linked to
each other (for more details see Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998).
Because it is easier to interpret, we compute the average consumption equiv-
alent change in welfare. A more precise definition is given in the Appendix.
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A.2.3 Production Sector
The production sector consists of a representative firm which uses capital,
Kt, and labor, Lt, to produce output, Yt:
Yt = F (Kt, XtLt)
where Xt denotes exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress.
2 This
technology is assumed to grow exogenously at a constant rate Xt+1 = (1 +
g)Xt. For simplicity we normalize initial technology to X0 = 1, such that:
Xt = (1 + g)
t
The production function F (., .) is assumed to have standard properties. The
firm has to rent capital and labor from the owners at prices wt (wage = price
of labor) and rKt (rental rate = price of capital). Thus competitive factor
markets and profit maximizing firms imply the following prices of labor and
capital:
wt = FL(Kt, XtLt) (A.3)
rt = FK(Kt, XtLt)− δ (A.4)
where rt is the rate of return net of depreciation. In equilibrium this rate
of return has to be equal across all assets and thus determines the ”interest
rate” on assets.
A.2.4 Government Sector
The government has to finance a fixed amount of government spending G
and the total transfers to households, TR by issuing new government bonds,
2The presence of technological progress matters for the calibration of the discount
factor. Without growth one would need a higher discount factor in the model to produce
an realistic interest rate. The discount factor plays an important role for assessing the
optimal value of government debt (Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998 and Flode´n, 2001).
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Bt+1 and levying taxes on positive asset and labor income. Furthermore it
also has to pay back bonds from the last period, Bt and pay interest on them,
rtBt. The government budget constraint is thus given by:
G+ rtBt + TR = Bt+1 −Bt + τlwtLt + τ¯artÂt (A.5)
where Ât ≥ At is the tax base for the asset income tax. As explained above
taxes are only levied on positive financial income (no proportional transfers
from the government for indebted people) and thus the tax base is defined
as:
Ât =
∫
at≥0
atdθ(t, at)
Aggregate transfers have to equal the sum of all individual transfers:∫
χdθ(t, at) = TR
A.2.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Using the characterization of the three sectors we can now define the recursive
competitive equilibrium.
DEFINITION A.1. Given a transition matrix pi, a certain sequence of
government bond issues {Bt}∞t=0, the time invariant level of government ex-
penditures G, a certain sequence of capital income taxes {τa(at)}∞t=0, a cer-
tain sequence of labor income taxes {τl,t}∞t=0 and an initial distribution of the
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and of the asset holdings θ0(0, a0) a recur-
sive competitive equilibrium is defined by a law of motion Γ, factor prices
(rt, wt) = (r(Kt), w (Kt)), the value function W = W (θ, a, ) and policy func-
tions (c, a′) = (γ(θ, a, ), ζ(θ, a, )) such that
1. Households’ utility maximization problem is defined in equation (A.2).
2. Competitive firm maximize profits, such that factor prices are given by
(A.3) and (A.4).
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3. The government budget constraint as defined in equation (A.5) holds.
4. Factor and goods markets have to clear:
• Labor market clearing:
Nt =
∫
t(1− lt)dθ(t, at) = Lt
• Asset market clearing:
At+1 =
∫
at+1dθ(t, at) = Kt+1 +Bt+1
• Goods market clearing:∫
ctdθ(t, at) +G+ It = F (Kt, XtLt)
where investment, It is the sum of private investment and public
investment:
It ≡ Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Bt+1 − (1 + rt)Bt
5. Rational expectations of households about the law of motion of the dis-
tribution of shocks and asset holdings, Γ reflect the true law of motion,
as defined in (A.1).
A.3 Ricardian Equivalence and the Role of
the Borrowing Limit
The assumption that households face binding borrowing constraints is cen-
tral to the effect of government debt on the economy that we emphasize in
this paper. It is a well known result that under complete markets and lump
sum taxation government debt is neutral because agents foresee future tax
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changes and adapt their savings behaviour accordingly. But also under in-
complete markets (and lump sum taxes) Ricardian equivalence holds, if there
are no ”ad hoc” borrowing limits.3 Thus it is not the market incompleteness
per se, but rather the combination of market incompleteness and borrowing
constraints that leads to an effect of government debt on the economy. Thus
one has to distinguish clearly between effects arising due to the presence of
borrowing constraints (in other words ”crowding out”) and effects due to
tax distortions. Heathcote (2005) makes a similar point in a related contri-
bution.4 The goal of this section is to clearly show this point analytically.
More precisely, we will show that government debt is neutral for the case of
natural borrowing limits and explicitely make clear why ”ad hoc” borrowing
limits lead to non-neutrality of government debt.
In the incomplete markets model described above the maximization problem
of the household, if there are no ”ad hoc” borrowing limits can be character-
ized by the following Bellman equation (in recursive notation):
W (a, ; θ) = max
l,a′,c
{
u(c, l) + β
∑
′
pi(′|)W (a′, ′; θ′)
}
s.t. w(1− l) + (1 + r)a+ χ = a′ + c
c ≥ 0
Suppose the government issues supplementary debt ∆b and redistributes the
proceeds as a supplementary transfer, such that χnew = χ+∆b. Furthermore
suppose that the additional taxes necessary to pay the interest payments in
future periods will be lump sum. It is easy to show that this policy doesn’t
affect the permanent income of an agent. Although he gets a transfer now,
3In this case there is still a so called natural borrowing limit arising from the fact that
consumption must be positive (see also Aiyagari, 1994).
4Heathcote (2005) analyzes the quantitative short run effects of changes in the timing
of proportional income taxes in heterogeneous agent economies with incomplete markets.
He also distinguishes between effects via tax distortions and effects arising due to the
presence of borrowing constraints.
37
APPENDIX A. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND THE OPTIMAL LEVEL
OF GOVERNMENT DEBT
he has to pay higher taxes in the future whose present value is equal to
the transfer received. Therefore to smooth consumption the household can
simply save a′∗new = a
′∗ + ∆b, where a′∗ denotes the optimal savings without
the supplementary debt issuance. This will leave the household’s budget in
the period of the issuance of government debt unaffected as the additional
debt cancels out:
c+ a′∗new = w(1− l) + (1 + r)a+ χnew
c+ a′∗ + ∆b = w(1− l) + (1 + r)a+ χ+ ∆b
In future periods his budget is also unaffected as the additional income from
savings can be used to pay the additional lump sum tax.(Note that the
necessary additional lump sum tax is reduced by the higher income from
asset income taxation T ′new = r
′∆b− τ ′ar′∆b = r′∆b):
c′ + a′′∗new + T
′
new = w
′′(1− l′) + (1 + r′)a′∗new + χ
c′ + (a′′∗ + ∆b) + r′∆b = w′′(1− l′) + (1 + r′)(a′∗ + ∆b) + χ
Thus the optimal path of consumption and leisure of the household remains
unaffected by the policy. The demand for assets is increased exactly by the
amount of government debt issues such that firms face the same remaining
demand for their assets as before. As a consequence the interest rate and
wage rate in the economy will remain the same. Government debt is neutral.
RESULT 1. Under incomplete markets, lump sum taxes, when households
face no borrowing constraints, government debt is neutral.
Under an ”ad hoc” borrowing constraint however the households for which
the constraint binds do not save optimally but rather a′ = a. Those house-
holds will thus not adapt their savings by adding the additional government
debt a′new < a + ∆b, because they can improve their consumption path (get
nearer to the optimum) by consuming more in the period, when they are
borrowing constrained and obtain the transfer. Intuitively, as there is the
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chance to obtain a higher income shock they might not be borrowing con-
strained anymore in the future. Thus they are more in need of funds today
than tomorrow and use the transfer to ”relax” their borrowing constraint.
Therefore the aggregate demand for assets does not increase by as much as
the new debt issues. The remaining demand for assets is lower and as a
consequence capital is more expensive for firms. The interest rate in the
economy will increase and the wage rate will decrease. Government debt is
not neutral anymore. A more formal derivation of the results of this section
is given in the Appendix.
In this section, we have shown that in our model binding borrowing con-
straints are a precondition for government debt to have non-trivial macroe-
conomic effects other than through accompanying changes in taxation. Given
this important role of borrowing constraints we analyze the case where bor-
rowing constraints are endogenous to public policy in the next section.
A.4 An Extension: Endogenizing the Bor-
rowing Limit
So far, we have assumed that borrowing limits are exogenous and thus invari-
ant to public policy. This does not necessarily need to be the case. In this
section, we follow Zhang (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and
Levine (2001), Krueger and Perri (2006) and A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda
(2010) who endogenously generate borrowing limits by assuming that house-
holds cannot commit to honor their debt contracts. In a related contribution,
A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2011) show that endogenizing borrowing lim-
its matters in an environment with incomplete markets for the optimal mix
of capital and labor taxes.
In line with the literature on limited commitment, we assume that if house-
holds default, they are excluded from future borrowing and lending (autarky).
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The value of autarky can be expressed as follows:
V (; θ) = max
caut,laut
{
u(caut, laut) + β
∑
′
pi(′|)V (′; θ′)
}
s.t. caut = (1 + λ)w(1− laut) + χ
θ′ = Γ[θ]
where λ is a parameter describing a consumption gain (if λ > 0), which
translates into a utility gain, resulting in autarky. λ captures, in reduced
form, the differences between default regulation in reality and in our model.
For example, a λ > 0 could arise because in reality, exclusion from financial
markets is temporary only, while exclusion is permanent in our model.5 We
calibrate the value of λ to match the number of people in debt.6
For households that have not defaulted yet, the optimization problem can be
stated as follows:
W (a, ; θ) = max
c,l,a′
{
u(c, l) + β
∑
′
pi(′|)W (a′, ′; θ′)
}
(A.6)
s.t. c+ a′ = w(1− l) + (1 + r)a+ χ
a′ ≥ ξ(; θ) for all ′| with pi(′|) > 0
θ′ = Γ[θ]
It is the same problem as problem A.2 above, except for the fact that the
household’s borrowing limit ξ is now a function of the distribution of assets
(θ) and the realization of the income shock .
5Assuming instead a temporary exclusion from financial markets would make the model
more complicated and does not yield any qualitative value added to the analysis.
6There may also be additional costs related to default (e.g. social stigma) which are
not modeled. This would make λ smaller. In the calibration section, we find that for our
setting to be able to match the number of people in debt we need λ > 0.
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More precisely, the borrowing limit is defined as follows:
a(; θ) = {a : W (a = a, ; θ) = V (a = 0, ; θ)} (A.7)
ξ(; θ) ≡ sup
′:Π(′|)>0
{a(′; Γ(θ))}
We impose that the borrowing limits in equilibrium are set such that there
is no default.7 The recursive competitive equilibrium in this extended model
is thus similar to the one stated in the previous section, with an additional
no-default condition.
DEFINITION A.2. A recursive competitive equilibrium with endogenous
borrowing limits is defined as a recursive competitive equilibrium as defined
by Definition C.5, where additionally
• Borrowing limits are set such there is no default as given by equation
(A.7).
A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010) show that if the period utility func-
tion is unbounded below, then equation (A.7) defines a unique and finite
default threshold. They also show that the default threshold on individual
capital holdings is non-positive. Intuitively, the borrowing limit, denoted by
a, is defined such that the value of being in autarky is just equal to the value
of keeping the debt and staying in the market, if a household is actually on
the borrowing limit. Or in other words the borrowing limit is the lowest
possible asset holdings of an agent so that he still prefers holding on to the
debt contract and staying in the market rather than not repaying the debt
but being excluded. Depending on the income state, , that realizes we will
have a different borrowing limit.8
7The general mechanism - that borrowing conditions are tighter (looser) when the
interest rate is higher (lower) - would also hold if we allowed for borrowing in equilibrium.
As our aim is to model the endogenous reaction of the borrowing conditions and not the
default behaviour of households we thus assume a model of limited commitment with
no default in equilibrium. See Livshits et al. (2007) and Chatterjee et al. (2007) for a
discussion of U.S. bankruptcy laws and a quantitative model of consumer default.
8A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010) also show that the same borrowing limits would
result by assuming perfectly competitive financial intermediaries. The ”effective” borrow-
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A.5 Calibration
As a benchmark, we calibrate our model with endogenous labor supply to
the long run average of the U.S. economy.
A.5.1 Utility Function, Production Function and Taxes
We assume that preferences can be represented by a constant relative risk
aversion utility function:
u(c) =
(cηl1−η)1−µ
1− µ
We set µ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, to 2 in our benchmark
calibration, which is well in the range commonly chosen in the literature (be-
tween 1 and 3).
We also assume a Cobb-Douglas production function:
F (K,XL) = Kα(XL)1−α
As already mentioned above, we normalized initial technology to X0 = 1,
such that Xt = (1 + g)
t. The parameter α of the production function is
set to target a labor share of 0.7. The discount factor β is set to target an
asset-output ratio of 3.1 (cf. Cooley and Prescott, 1995 or A´braha´m and
Ca´rceles-Poveda, 2010). The labor elasticity η is set to target an average
labor supply of 0.3. The depreciation rate is set to target an investment
share of around 20 percent, which we estimate from the Penn World Tables.
ing limit that financial intermediaries will impose one period in advance, denoted by ξ, is
chosen such that if the worst possible state (given the state today) occurs tomorrow the
household will still not default. Thus they will choose the tightest of the possible bor-
rowing limits as ”effective” borrowing limit. Note that some state tomorrow could occur
with zero probability given a particular state today. In this case, the associated borrowing
limits can be neglected. As we will see later for our calibration, as it is possible to reach
the lowest income state from any other previous state, there is thus only one relevant
borrowing limit.
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We take that annual depreciation rate δ to be 7 percent (see also Trabandt
and Uhlig, 2009). Table A.1 shows the values of the parameters and the
targets to which they are calibrated. The fiscal policy parameters are set as
Table A.1: Targeted Parameter Values
Parameter Value Target Data Model
α 0.3 Labor share 0.7 0.7
β 0.9576 K/Y 3.1 3.1003
η 0.3092 Labor, L 0.3 0.30001
δ 0.07 I/Y 0.225 0.19
g 0.02 Output growth 0.02 0.02
λ 0.083 % of HH with a ≤ 0 0.24 0.2473
found by Trabandt and Uhlig (2009), which are similar to the ones found in
Mendoza et al. (1994) (see Table A.2).
Table A.2: Parameter Values
taken from the Literature
Parameter Value
Debt to GDP ratio, b 0.670
Labor tax, τ l 0.28
Capital tax, τ k 0.36
Transfers, χ 0.083
A.5.2 Income Process
We follow Castan˜eda et al. (2003) by calibrating our model to the Lorenz
curves of U.S. earnings and wealth as reported by the 2007 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances (SCF). This is in contrast to the previous literature, where
the earnings process was measured directly from the data. We choose this
different procedure because it allows us to find an income process that is
consistent with both the aggregate and the distributional aspects of the data
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on earnings and wealth (Castan˜eda et al., 2003). A desirable feature is that
such an income process produces a sufficiently large amount of wealth ac-
cumulation by earnings-rich households to explain the high cross-sectional
inequality in wealth holdings seen in the data. Since we do not model hous-
ing, we define wealth as net financial assets excluding housing and other real
assets (see also A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda, 2010). Earnings are defined
in a way to be as close as possible to the concept of earnings in the model, i.e.
labor earnings such as wages and salaries plus a fraction of business income
before taxes and without government transfers (for a more detailed definition
see Dı´az-Gı´menez et al., 1997). Note that we have to specify a vector of 4
income states and a 4x4 transition matrix, which after normalization of the
vector of income states leaves us with 15 targets to specify. Notice that this
is much less than the actual number of potential targets that we could pick.
Instead of targeting 15 specific points, we searched for a set of parameter
values such that the Lorenz curves of earnings and wealth generated by the
model are similar to the ones observed in the data. As an illustration how
close our calibration achieves in matching the data we report the quintiles of
the wealth distribution and the earnings distribution in Table A.3.
More precisely, we find the following vector of income states:
s = {0.055, 0.551, 1.195, 7.351}
It should be noted that the highest income state is more than 130 times as
high as the lowest income state. Furthermore, we get the following transition
matrix for the income states:
Π =

0.940 0.040 0.020 0.000
0.034 0.816 0.150 0.000
0.001 0.080 0.908 0.012
0.100 0.015 0.060 0.825

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Table A.3: Distributional properties at benchmark stationary economy
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Wealth (financial assets)
Data −1.60% 0.10% 1.64% 8.29% 91.57%
Benchmark Calibration −1.57% 0.88% 3.92% 7.23% 89.54%
Model fitted to AR(1) 3.24% 10.07% 16.96% 25.71% 44.03%
Earnings
Data −0.40% 3.19% 12.49% 23.33% 61.39%
Benchmark Calibration 0.00% 2.38% 12.58% 22.73% 62.31%
Model fitted to AR(1) 1.21% 9.70% 16.18% 26.85% 46.07%
* Quintiles (Q1-Q5) denote wealth (resp. earnings) of a group in percent
of total wealth (resp. earnings).
As can be seen from the transition matrix, there is a 10 percent probability
of moving from the highest income state today to the lowest income state
tomorrow. This generates a strong saving motive for income-rich households,
leading to the high degree of wealth inequality that we also observe in the
data. The same mechanism is also present in the transition matrix found by
Castan˜eda et al. (2003).
In the rows labelled ”Model fitted to AR(1)”in table A.3, we report the earn-
ings and wealth inequality that would result if the earnings states and the
transition matrix where fitted to replicate an AR(1) process with persistence
ρ = 0.6 and variance σ = 0.3 (the values used by Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998) in their benchmark specification). It is important to notice that this
method does not generate the degree of wealth and earnings inequality that
we observe in the data.
A.5.3 Borrowing Limits
We calibrate the ad-hoc borrowing limit to match the percentage of house-
holds with negative or zero financial assets in the 2007 SCF (24 percent).
We find a borrowing limit of a = −0.3.
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In the extension of the model with limited commitment we can generate
this borrowing limit endogenously by setting the parameter defining utility
in the autarky state to λ = 0.083.
Recall that λ > 0 can be interpreted as a relaxation of the autarky state,
which suggests that our modelling of autarky is ”too harsh” with respect to
the data.
A.6 Results
We are now ready to compute the optimal amount of government debt with
the help of our quantitative model. In the first section, we focus on the long
run consequences of government debt on welfare. That is, we compare the
aggregate welfare of stationary equilibria that are associated with different
levels of government debt, ignoring the welfare effects that arise along the
transition between different stationary equilibria. This allows us to compare
our results with previous contributions that analyzed the optimal level of
government debt by comparing stationary equilibria as well (see e.g. Aiyagari
and McGrattan, 1998 and Flode´n, 2001). Second, we believe that this is
a useful excercise to gain intuition about how government debt can affect
welfare in general. In section A.6.3, we also include the transition path into
our welfare calculations.
A.6.1 Long Run Average Welfare
When markets are incomplete, an increase in government debt has positive
and negative effects on aggregate welfare. In this section, we use our cali-
brated model to compute the net effect of these counteracting effects.
Remember that due to the presence of borrowing constrained agents sav-
ings will not be increased by the amount of additional government debt, but
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less, such that the bond price decreases or equivalently the interest increases.
This implies crowding out of private capital and thus as firms produce less
and need less labor as a consequence, a lower wage rate. The reverse happens
when government debt is reduced (lower interest rate, higher wage rate). Ad-
ditionally long run taxes change and affect welfare. For convenience, we now
summarize the three main welfare effects of government debt in our frame-
work. Consider for simplicity an increase in government debt (generally the
reverse will hold true for a decrease):9
1. Level effect: As discussed above government debt leads to crowding
out of private capital. If the capital stock in the benchmark economy
is too low with respect to its efficient level, this crowding out leads to
lower welfare. The behaviour of tax rates is non-monotonic, as will be
discussed below. The level welfare effect of government debt through
taxes depends if disposable income is higher or lower as a consequence.
2. Insurance effect: If the interest rate increases and the wage rate falls,
the uncertain component of income, namely labor income, is reduced
relative to the certain component (capital income). This leads to less
uncertainty of consumption and thus to welfare gains for households
from an ex ante perspective.
3. Income composition effect: As the interest rate rises relative to the wage
rate, wealth-rich households gain compared to wealth-poor households,
because the latter depend more on labor income. Because the wealth-
poor are also the consumption-poor, this leads to an aggregate welfare
loss since marginal utility is higher for households with low levels of
consumption.
9Our labelling of the different effects follows Flode´n (2001). He distinguishes between
a ”level” effect, an ”uncertainty” effect and an ”inequality” effect. We chose to label the
redistributive effect ”income composition effect”, because we would like to capture how
the redistribution arises, namely because of the different compositions of income between
households in this model.
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Figure A.1 shows the average consumption equivalent change in welfare over
the different stationary equilibria. Figure A.1 reveals that it is optimal for
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Figure A.1: Consumption Equivalent Change in Welfare With Respect to
Benchmark
the government to hold assets, either of a value of around 50 percent of
GDP, if debt is financed by changes in capital income taxation, or of a value
of around 110 percent of GDP, if debt is financed by changes in labor income
taxation. This result is in contrast to the previous literature, notably Aiya-
gari and McGrattan (1998), who find that the government should optimally
issue debt of around 60 percent of GDP.
The reason for the different outcomes lies in the different calibration of the
income process. Recall from table (A.3) that our calibration implies that the
degree of wealth inequality generated by our model is close to the one that is
observable in the U.S., where a large fraction of the population holds almost
no assets at all. This implies that these households will not benefit from
an increase in the interest rate associated with an increase in debt. Conse-
quently, we find that the level effect and the income composition effect of an
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increase in government debt outweigh the insurance effect.
This finding is line with the recent results in Davila et al. (2011), who com-
pute the constrained efficient level of capital in a model with incomplete
markets. As we do, they conclude that it is the income composition of
the consumption-poor households that matters. If those households depend
mainly on labor income which is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
the constrained efficient allocation involves a larger stock of capital than the
market economy delivers. The income composition effect is then more deci-
sive for aggregate welfare than the insurance effect. Figure A.1 also reveals
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Figure A.2: Implied Tax Rates, Interest Rates and Wage Rates for Sta-
tionary Equilibria With Different Debt Levels
that depending on whether debt is financed by labor taxes or capital taxes,
we get a different optimal level of government assets. In order to understand
the differences, we first need to understand the general behaviour of tax rates
after a change in government debt. First, recall that from the government
budget constraint (A.5), an increase in government debt implies that the
government needs to levy more taxes in order to pay the additional interest
49
APPENDIX A. WEALTH INEQUALITY AND THE OPTIMAL LEVEL
OF GOVERNMENT DEBT
due, if the government expenditures and transfers are kept fixed. When gov-
ernment debt is reduced however the behaviour of taxes is non-monotonic,
decreasing for modest reductions, but increasing again for higher reductions.
The reason is that a lower interest rate, as a consequence of lower government
debt reduces the incentive to save. Therefore assets of the households and
consequently also the tax base for the capital income tax of the government.
Now, back to the question why the optimal public asset levels are different
depending on the form of taxation that is used to equalize the budget. Figure
A.2 shows that the capital income tax has to change more dramatically to
keep the budget balanced after a change of government debt, compared to
a situation when the labor income tax adjusts. Consider the role of capital
taxation when the government increases its assets (i.e. reduces government
debt). As we have argued above the lowering of the interest rate leads to an
erosion of the tax base. This forces the government to increase the capital
tax rate in order to keep its budget balanced, therefore reducing after-tax
returns on capital even further. A vicious circle starts.
Now consider the role of labor taxation when the government increases its
assets. Again, the interest rate falls and the wage rate rises. The combina-
tion of the two causes households to consume more leisure and to work less.
However, differently from the case of capital taxation, there is no vicious
circle as for capital taxation, but rather a dampening effect: the rising wage
dampens the negative incentive effect of an increase of the tax rate. However,
increasing the labor income tax rate also dampens the positive effect of higher
wages on welfare. Clearly, after-tax wages rise less for a given reduction in
government debt than in the case where capital income taxation is used. As
a consequence, the optimal level of government debt is about twice as low
as in the case where the capital income tax adjusts (-110 percent versus −50
percent of GDP).
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Moving towards the optimal level of government assets leads however to rela-
tively small aggregate welfare gains considering the effort it probably means
in practice to reduce government debt. Starting from the benchmark reduc-
ing government debt relative to GDP by 10 percent (from 2
3
to 0.6) increases
welfare to a level equivalent to an average increase in consumption by 0.0715
percent if the capital income tax adjusts and by 0.0474 percent if the labor
income tax adjusts. On overall welfare gains up to an equivalent average
rise of consumption of 0.618 percent are possible for the case of capital in-
come taxation and of 0.654 percent for the case of labor income taxation.
Although the overall effect is already approximately 7.5 times larger than for
the specification of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), it is still relatively small.
In the next section we show that those small aggregate welfare effects can be
decomposed into substantial group-specific welfare effects depending on the
wealth group of households that is considered.
A.6.2 Welfare of Different Wealth-Groups: Poor, Mid-
dle Class, Rich
The policy of changing the level of government debt has different implications
depending on which wealth-group is considered. Thus, to fully understand
compositional effects on welfare it is useful to consider the evolution of the
relative importance of wealth groups and the respective welfare changes for
those groups. For this purpose let us define three types of agents according
to their wealth:
1. Poor: Agents who are indebted or hold zero assets.
2. Rich: Agents who are part of the group of richest persons who together
as a group hold 70 percent of total assets.
3. Middle class: Agents who are neither rich nor poor.
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It is important to stress that those groups are exclusive for all specifications
considered here. By definition poor households do not have any asset income
and therefore care only about their labor income. The poor are thus only
affected by changes in wages or labor income taxation. The rich have only
little labor income compared to asset income. Therefore they care primarily
about changes in the interest rate and capital income taxation. Finally, the
middle class is affected by both changes in labor income and changes in cap-
ital income.
Figure A.3 shows the change in welfare at different levels of government debt
for each wealth-group and the change of the relative size of each wealth-
group. The first thing to note is that there are large group-specific changes
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Figure A.3: The Compositional Effects: Welfare Changes of the Poor, the
Middle Class and the Rich in Comparison
in average (group-) welfare (see the left hand side of Figure A.3). On aggre-
gate those effects seem to average out, which explains small overall welfare
effects. Secondly, a reduction of government debt is good for the poor. The
average poor household can gain welfare worth a 0.735 percent (0.713 per-
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cent) rise in consumption from a 10 percent reduction in government debt,
if financed by capital income taxation (labor income taxation). On overall,
the average poor household can even gain welfare worth a 12.0 percent (16.9
percent) rise in consumption, if moving to the optimal debt level. Not sur-
prisingly for the poor it would be optimal to reduce debt as much as possible
by changing capital income taxation.
Thirdly, the welfare changes seem to be concave for the rich in the case
of capital taxation. In other words the average rich household has much to
lose if government debt is reduced, but not a lot to gain, if it is increased.
The reason is that the change in taxes is non-monotonic, as mentioned in
the last section. When government debt rises the rich gain from the rise in
interest, but lose from higher taxes. When government debt is reduced from
a certain level onwards they lose from both higher taxes and lower interest
rates.
Finally, there is an effect of government debt on the relative size of wealth
groups. A reduction of government debt increases the number of wealth-
poor in the population relative to the middle class (see the right hand side of
Figure A.3). Intuitively saving is discouraged because of lower interest rates.
This increase in the number of poor leads to a falling tax base and eventually
higher taxes. Thus an ’optimum’ level arises from which onwards high tax
distortions become overwhelming.10
In the next section we analyze how the results change when we also include
the transitional periods into the welfare analysis.
10Reducing government debt thus reduces inequality in the long run, a result that was
already emphasized by Flode´n (2001).
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A.6.3 Welfare Over the Transition Path
In the previous section, we computed the optimal long-run level of govern-
ment debt by comparing stationary equilibria. Our results suggested that
the government should optimally hold assets.
One might wonder whether this conclusion still holds when we take the tran-
sition between two stationary equilibria into account. Clearly, if government
debt is reduced and if the government keeps its expenditures fixed, it follows
from the budget constraint that taxes have to be increased during the period
during which debt is reduced.
In this section we argue that it is possible to gain from a reduction in gov-
ernment debt although either consumption or leisure (or both) need to be
sacrificed in the short run. We assume that in period t, the government (un-
expectedly) increases the capital income tax for one period to 100%. This
upper bound is chosen such that capital owners are not expropriated. The
revenues of this tax increase are then used to reduce government debt. This
in turn allows the government to reduce either capital income taxes (scenario
1) or labor income taxes (scenario 2) from period t = 2 onwards. The ex-
periment is inspired by Greulich and Marcet (2008), who show that in order
to achieve a Pareto-optimal tax reform the government should leave capital
taxes high in the short run and reduce then to zero in the long run.
We find that it is possible to reduce government debt to 56.54% in scenario
1 and to 56.47% in scenario 2 (see Table A.4). Under both scenarios, total
welfare gains from reducing government debt are positive, namely +0.007%
in scenario 1 or +0.026% in scenario 2. This holds despite the fact that sub-
stantial welfare costs occur during the transition, a finding that we explain in
more detail in the following. Notice that it seems more promising to reduce
long run labor income taxes. In order to better understand the intuition
behind our results, we plotted the path of the capital stock, of labor supply,
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Table A.4: Welfare changes over the transition path
Kind of tax rate New debt to Welfare change
GDP level excl. trans. incl. trans.
Capital income tax 56.54% +0.106% +0.007%
Labor income tax 56.47% +0.107% +0.026%
of the after-tax interest rate and of the after-tax wage rate in Figure A.4.
11 Recall from the long-run analysis above that when government debt is
reduced, this crowds in private capital. This stems from the fact that bor-
rowing constraints are binding for some households. These households do not
dissave, despite the fact that taxes are expected to be lower in the future.
As a result, the private capital stock rises and the equilibrium interest rate
falls (see first picture of Figure A.4).
However in the short run there is an additional effect from the one-period
tax increase, stemming from the fact that the capital income of one period is
taxed away. This is a negative income effect, and because leisure is a normal
good, households consume less leisure and increase their labor supply (see
second picture of Figure A.4). This in turn leads to a short run increase in
the interest rate and decrease in the wage rate (see third and fourth picture
of Figure A.4). This hurts in particular borrowing constrained households,
because they depend solely on their wage income. Moreover they already
work the maximum hours, so they cannot respond to lower wages by working
more. Because the borrowing constrained household are the consumption-
poor, there are high welfare costs are associated along the transition path.
Interestingly, in scenario 2 this adverse effect is dampened, because of an
intertemporal substitution effect resulting from the fact that labor taxes will
be lowered from period 2 onwards. Households are willing to increase leisure
11Note that the figure omits the first period for the after-tax interest rate, because in
this period capital taxes are 100% by definition of our experiment. This means that the
after-tax interest rate is 0 in the first period. This hinders the readability of the figure, so
we left it out.
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Figure A.4: Implied Capital Stock, Labor Supply, Interest Rates and Wage
Rates for the Transition Experiment
today in exchange for less leisure tomorrow. This explains why wages are
below the benchmark level for a shorter time than for scenario 1. Welfare
losses are lower.
The best policy given the possibilities analyzed here is thus to reduce gov-
ernment debt by setting a high capital income tax today and use the lighter
budget to lower labor income taxes from period 2 onwards.
However, a caveat to this analysis is that we do not explicitly aim at calcu-
lating the optimal path of capital and labor income taxes over the transition.
It is possible that there is a different timing of taxes which produces even
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higher welfare gains. 12
The next section shows the welfare effects of this policy for different wealth
groups over the transition path.
A.6.4 Welfare Effect on Different Wealth Groups Over
the Transition Path
In this section we show that households with little wealth have the highest
welfare loss during the transition, while relatively aﬄuent households gain
relative to the benchmark stationary equilibrium (see Table A.5). Interest-
ingly, the group that benefits the most from reducing government debt in the
long-run suffers the most in the short-run (and vice versa).
The intuition behind this striking result is as follows. Recall from Figure
A.4 that output and thus also wages are higher in the long-run, compared to
periods after the lower debt level was implemented. This is due to the fact
that reducing government debt crowds in private capital. Since households
are rational, they foresee this. As a result, households would like to reduce
their savings today, or borrow more, respectively. Those who are borrowing
constrained cannot do so, however. Thats why it is the wealth-poor who
loose during the transition. Why is the wage lower in the first few periods?
12We have shown that the welfare effects of government debt change dramatically with a
careful modelling of wealth inequality. The downside of this greater precision of the wealth
distribution is however that the computation of the stationary wealth distribution is more
time consuming (see for example Heer and Maussner, 2009 as a reference on different
methods for computing the stationary wealth distribution and their performance in terms
of precision and computing time). Therefore finding the ’optimal’ path of transition which
involves iterating over the whole path of interest rates, wage rates and tax rates is a difficult
task. (Note that with endogenous labor there is an additional adjustment). Greulich
and Marcet (2008) go in this direction by analyzing optimal capital, labor income taxes
and resulting government debt holdings in a model with heterogenous agents. However
they miss important aspects because they do not include individual risk and borrowing
constraints. Extending their results to an Aiyagari-framework as presented here would
thus be very valuable but exceeds the aim of this paper. Therefore we leave it to future
research for now.
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Table A.5: Welfare effect on different wealth groups
Quintiles Welfare change relative to benchmark
excl. transition path incl. whole transition path
Capital income tax
Q1 (20% poorest) +0.496% −31.067%
Q2 (20%− 40%) +0.300% −3.656%
Q3 (40%− 60%) +0.182% +6.825%
Q4 (60%− 80%) +0.112% +13.118%
Q5 (20% richest) −0.798% +49.566%
Labor income tax
Q1 (20% poorest) +0.505% −31.115%
Q2 (20%− 40%) +0.310% −3.691%
Q3 (40%− 60%) +0.188% +6.939%
Q4 (60%− 80%) +0.114% +13.232%
Q5 (20% richest) −0.797% +49.497%
* Welfare gains in consumption units in percent.
The reason is that the funds for paying back government debt are taken
from households that own wealth and partly depend on their asset income.
They have to forego asset income for one period. There are two ways of
dealing with such a situation, where there is less asset income: dissave or
work more. In fact wealthy households will do both. Thus the general level
of labor supply rises as can be seen in Figure A.4. As discussed above this
is harmful for borrowing constrained agents who depend solely on labor in-
come and virtually already work as much as possible. Notice that the loss
is more pronounced for households that are hit by a particularly good or
a particularly bad income shock (wealth-poor only) in the period when the
reduction of the government debt takes place. This is show in Table 6 where
we decompose welfare changes in the first period of the transition with re-
spect to wealth groups and income states. Clearly, the effect of borrowing
constraints is exacerbated for the wealth-poor if they are hit by a bad in-
come shock, which explains why they loss is more pronounced for this group.
However, households with the best earnings draws loose by even more, irre-
spectively of their wealth holdings. The reason is as follows: households with
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Table A.6: Welfare effect in the first transition period for wealth-
income-groups
Capital income tax
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Poor −58.143% −46.496% −40.456% −75.035%
Middle Class −18.012% −19.052% −28.656% −73.562%
Rich +12.057% +17.777% +6.946% −55.212%
Labor income tax
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Poor −58.122% −46.435% −40.237% −74.948%
Middle Class −18.028% −28.351% −28.351% −73.470%
Rich +12.135% +17.930% +7.225% −55.100%
* Welfare gains in consumption units in percent.
the highest earnings shocks expect a lower earnings in the future. This is
true even though average earnings are increasing over the transition path.13
Households in this group therefore do not want to dissave, but rather engage
in precautionary saving against the event of receiving lower earnings draws
in the future. This can be done both through adjusting labor supply and
working longer hours and through accumulating additional savings. Because
the wage rate is lower initially and households foresee a falling interest rate,
they need to save more now relative to the benchmark to provide for possibly
lower labor productivity in the future.
The fact that borrowing constraints play a crucial role in explaining the wel-
fare cost of the transition suggests that the policy that directly targets trans-
fers to the wealth-poor could reduce the welfare losses significantly, making
it even more profitable to reduce government debt. We leave this for future
research and conclude this section by stressing that in order to fully assess
the welfare costs of fiscal policy in the short and in the long-run, understand-
ing the interaction between borrowing constraints and wealth inequality are
13Recall that our calibration implies substantial difference between the highest and the
other realization of the income shock.
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key.
In the next section, we thus go one step further and relax the assumption
that borrowing constraints are exogenous. As we will see, this gives us even
higher welfare gains in the long-run.
A.6.5 Endogenous Borrowing Limit
In section A.4 we have shown how our model can be extended to include en-
dogenous borrowing limits by assuming limited commitment of households to
repay loans. This is important because borrowing limits then have to change
endogenously as a response to a change in government debt.
In this section we will thus analyze the version of our model with endogenous
borrowing limits to see how this endogeneity potentially changes the results
about the optimal long run level of government debt. We focus again on
stationary equilibria to gain an intuition about the long run effects and be
comparable to the previous literature which mainly focussed on stationary
equilibria as well.
Figure A.5 shows that, in fact, there is an endogenous reaction of borrow-
ing limits to differences in government debt. Borrowing limits are tighter
in stationary equilibria where government debt is higher and looser in sta-
tionary equilibria with lower government debt. More precisely, an increase
(decrease) of government debt and the subsequent rise (fall) of interest rates
due to crowding out (crowding in) leads to the borrowing limit of the low-
est income group being tighter (looser).14 What is the intuition behind this
tightening (loosening)? When there is more government debt a higher in-
terest rate and a lower wage rate arise in the new equilibrium. How the
borrowing limits react depends on the relative attractiveness of autarky. A
14Remember that due to our specification of the transition matrix of income shocks the
borrowing limit of the lowest income group is the relevant one for any household.
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Figure A.5: Implied Tax Rates, Interest Rates and Wage Rates for Sta-
tionary Equilibria With Different Debt Levels in the Case of Endogenous
Borrowing Limits
higher interest rate makes autarky more attractive relatively to being at the
borrowing limit, because a household that is at the borrowing limit has to
pay a higher debt service. The effect of the wage rate depends on how much
households adjust their labor supply to smooth consumption and leisure.
Households tend to use more extensively adjustments through labor supply
when being in autarky than when they are part of financial markets. The
reason is that in the latter case they have an additional means of smoothing
consumption and leisure through savings and dissavings. A lower wage rate
thus makes financial autarky less attractive, because here the household has
to rely solely on adjustments to labor supply to smooth consumption and
leisure. For low income households this wage effect is not important as they
have to work hard regardless of being in autarky or being part of financial
markets. Thus the interest rate effect dominates the wage rate effect for the
lowest income group. Therefore with higher government debt and a higher
interest rate the borrowing limit of this income group will become tighter
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and vice versa for a lower government debt.
The endogenous reaction of borrowing limits leads to a dampening effect
on aggregate variables such as the interest rate, the wage rate and the tax
rate (see Figure A.5). The distribution of wealth however changes faster
than with exogenous borrowing limits (see Figure A.6). To gain an intuition,
consider for example a reduction in government debt. If borrowing limits be-
come looser instead of staying fixed, agents that in the case of fixed borrowing
limits would like but are not able to, now can borrow more. The wealth dis-
tribution thus changes more dramatically. However this means also less a
dampening effect on the changes of aggregate variables such as the interest
rate and the wage rate. The reason is that the demand for savings is reduced
and absorbs some of the reduction in asset supply that occurs because gov-
ernment debt is reduced. Remarkably the endogeneity of borrowing limits
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Figure A.6: The Compositional Effects: Welfare Changes of the Poor,
the Middle Class and the Rich in Comparison in the Case of Endogenous
Borrowing Limits
leads to quite different welfare effects (see Figure A.7). Firstly, the optimal
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Benchmark in the Case of Endogenous Borrowing Limits
level of welfare is farther to the left in both the case of labor and the case
of capital income taxation. It is now optimal for the government to hold
assets of around 160 − 170 percent of GDP. Intuitively, the reaction of the
borrowing limits procures a higher welfare to poor agents without having to
incur high tax distortions. The reason is that the reaction of the tax rate
is ”slower” due to the dampening effect of endogenous borrowing limits as
discussed above.
Second there are sort of ”double peaks” in the shape of the aggregate welfare
change. To understand the reason for this difference to the case of exogenous
borrowing limits, it is useful to look once more at the compositional effects.
Figure A.6 shows how the welfare of different wealth-groups in the population
changes. At first when there are still a minority of poor in the population
the positive welfare effect of a higher wage on that group is not so strong
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given that the wage also changes slower. Thus at first welfare increases less
steeply than in the case of exogenous borrowing limits (see Figure A.7). But
subsequently as the number of poor increases faster for higher levels of gov-
ernment assets welfare begins to increase more steeply. Similarly to the case
of exogenous borrowing limits at very high asset levels the negative effect of
having a higher number of poor with generally lower welfare begins to matter
more than that their welfare rises a little bit. Consequently as seen in Figure
A.7 welfare starts to fall again. This mechanism translates into a different
shape of the welfare change.
A.7 Conclusion and Further Research
As shown by Davila et al. (2011) the competitive equilibrium in an incom-
plete markets model is ’constrained inefficient’ and there is scope for public
policy. In this paper we show that government debt can be used to imple-
ment an allocation nearer to the constrained efficient one. However, different
than previously argued we show that if calibrating the model to the actual
wealth distribution, the government should, in the long run, rather accumu-
late assets suggesting that the capital stock is too low under laissez-faire.
Asset-poor agents profit most from the reduction of government debt in the
long run. The reason is that the increase in the wage affects them strongly
as their income consists primarily of wage income. However lower interest
rates mean that the incentives to save are decreased so that the number of
asset-poor agents in the population increases. This leads to a falling tax
base and higher taxes. An ’optimum’ exists from which onwards high tax
distortions become overwhelming.
To reach this new stationary equilibrium we propose a policy of setting the
capital income tax to the maximum for one period, reduce government debt
and using the lighter budget to reduce labor taxes afterwards. This analysis
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shows that at least some welfare gains can be achieved by reducing govern-
ment debt. However the results about relative welfare changes are reversed
relative to the long run. Asset-poor agents lose consumption and/or leisure
over the transition because of temporarily lower wages and less insurance
opportunities. Further research has to show if those negative transitional
effects on the weakest chains of society could be alleviated by using targeted
transfers.
Endogenizing borrowing limits leads to even higher optimal levels of gov-
ernment assets in the long run as part of the effect on the equilibrium in the
asset market (and thus on the equilibrium interest rate) is absorbed by the
reaction of the borrowing limits. On the one hand this makes the insurance
effect weaker, on the other hand there is an additional insurance effect from
the reaction of borrowing limits which permits households to borrow more.
In this sense public and private insurance concur with each other. As a result
government debt is even less appropriate as an insurance channel. Further
research in this direction could include the analysis of transitional welfare
effects or the use of transfers as insurance.
Summarizing we have shown that in an incomplete markets model which
maps the high wealth inequality in the U.S. the government can achieve
welfare gains by reducing government debt especially in the long run. The
only source of uncertainty in our model are idiosyncratic income shocks. A
possible extension would be to additionally include aggregate shocks to in-
clude a motive for tax smoothing like in Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey
(1983), Aiyagari et al. (2002) or Heathcote (2005). Another possible exten-
sion concerns the transition to the new stationary equilibrium. With respect
to transitional effects it would be interesting to analyze the optimal tax mix
as well as the timing of taxes for our calibration (extending results of Greulich
and Marcet, 2008; Heathcote, 2005).
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A.8 Appendix to the Paper
A.8.1 Detrended Formulation of the Household Max-
imization Problem
In our model, there is a balanced growth path along which variables will be
growing at the rate of technology growth. To find the stationary equilibrium
of the model or to compute the transition from one stationary equilibrium
to another it is useful to first detrend variables with respect to this exoge-
nous productivity growth component to obtain a formulation where variables
are constant in the balanced growth equilibrium. (This procedure was also
used in the earlier literature, for example by Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998;
Flode´n, 2001). Denote a detrended variable by ”tilde”: x˜ = x
Y
. The present
value of lifetime utility (for a Cobb-Douglas can then be denoted as follows:
U({c˜t}t=1,2,..., {lt}t=1,2...) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtY
η(1−µ)
t u(c˜t, lt)
Now using the fact that Yt = Y0(1 + g)
t, where Y0 is output in period 0, we
can write:
U({c˜t}t=1,2,..., {lt}t=1,2...) = Y η(1−µ)0 E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1 + g)tη(1−µ)u(c˜t, lt)
= Y
η(1−µ)
0 E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜tu(c˜t, lt)
where β˜ = β · (1 + g)η(1−µ).
Similarly, we can find a detrended version of the household budget constraint
by dividing it by Yt:
ct
Yt
+
Yt+1
Yt
at+1
Yt+1
=
w¯t
Yt
t(1− lt) + (1 + r¯t)at
Yt
+ χ
c˜t + (1 + g)a˜t+1 = ˜¯wt(1− lt) + (1 + r¯t)a˜t + χ˜t
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Also the borrowing constraint can be detrended:
a˜t+1 ≥ a˜t
The resulting recursive formulation in detrended variables is given by:
W (a˜, ; θ) = max
a˜′,c˜,l
Y
η(1−µ)
0 u(c˜, l) + β˜
∑
′
pi(′|)W (a˜′, ′; θ′)
s.t.c˜+ (1 + g)a˜′ = ˜¯w(1− l) + (1 + r¯)a˜+ χ˜
a˜′ ≥ a˜
θ′ = Γ[θ]
A.8.2 Ricardian Equivalence Under a Natural Borrow-
ing Limit but not Under a Binding ”ad hoc”
Borrowing Limit
The optimal sequences for consumption, leisure and savings have to satisfy
the following first order conditions in every period t for every possible state
t:
ul(c
∗
t , l
∗
t )
uc(c∗t , l∗t )
= wt
β
∑
t+1
pi(t+1|t)uc(c∗t+1, l∗t+1)
uc(c∗t , l∗t )
=
1
1 + rt+1
c∗t + a
∗
t+1 = wtt(1− l∗t ) + (1 + rt)at + χ
Now suppose we have a new economy with additional government debt is-
sues ∆b, a higher lump sum transfer in period 0 of χ0,new = χ + ∆b and an
additional lump sum tax Tt,new = rt∆b− τa∆b = rt∆b for t > 0.
Suppose each household saves exactly ∆b in addition: a∗new,t+1 = a
∗
t+1 + ∆b,
but chooses the same consumption and leisure path given the shocks and
initial asset level. Clearly this satisfies the first two conditions above. It
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also satisfies the budget constraint of the household as we will show now. In
period 0:
c∗0 + a
∗
new,1 = w00(1− l∗0) + (1 + r0)a0 + χ0,new
c∗0 + a
∗
1 + ∆b = w00(1− l∗0) + (1 + r0)a0 + χ+ ∆b
In periods t > 0:
c∗t + a
∗
new,t+1 + Tt,new = wtt(1− l∗t ) + (1 + rt)anew,t + χ
c∗t + a
∗
t+1 + (1 + rt)∆b = wtt(1− l∗t ) + (1 + rt)(at + ∆b) + χ
As the households choose the same consumption and leisure the wage rate
will be the same as in the old economy without government debt. As the
savings of each individual household are higher by ∆b aggregate asset de-
mand has to be higher by ∆b (households being a mass of one). Supply of
assets is also higher by ∆b (closed economy) such that the interest rate in
the economy will be the same. If we are in a stationary equilibrium in the
initial economy, we will be in the same stationary equilibrium in the economy
with government debt provided that it is financed with lump sum taxes and
redistributed via lump sum transfers as shown above.
Finally it remains to show that such a policy satisfies the government budget
given the same expenditure G, the same all time transfer χ and the same
proportional taxes τa and τl. In period 0:
G+ r0B0 + TR0,new = B1,new −B0 + τlw0L0 + τ¯ar0Â0
G+ r0B0 + TR + ∆b = B1 + ∆b−B0 + τlw0L0 + τ¯ar0Â0
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In period t > 0:
G+ rtBt,new + TR = Bt+1,new −Bt,new + τlwtLt + τ¯artÂt,new + Tt,new
G+ rt(Bt + ∆b) + TR = Bt+1 + ∆b−Bt −∆b+ τlwtLt + τ¯art(Ât + ∆b)
+(1− τ¯a)rt∆b
Thus we have shown that in the model with natural borrowing limits there
is Ricardian equivalence.
Suppose however we have instead an ad hoc borrowing limit which is bind-
ing for some households. In this case everything is the same except that for
some agents savings are determined by a′∗ = a and their Euler equation is
not satisfied:
β
∑
t+1
pi(t+1|t)uc(c∗t+1, l∗t+1)
uc(c∗t , l∗t )
<
1
1 + rt+1
for agents with a′∗ = a (A.8)
Now we can show by contradiction that Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
Suppose Ricardian equivalence would hold, then the borrowing constrained
households would have to save a′∗new = a+ ∆b and choose the same path for
consumption and leisure. But if they choose the same path for consumption
and leisure their Euler equation is still not satisfied, as shown by equation
(A.8) above. But if the Euler equation doesn’t hold for agents with a′∗new =
a+ ∆b it means they would like to go more into debt and they can do so as
a′∗new = a + ∆b > a. Consequently they will not save a
′∗
new = a + ∆b. There
is a contradiction. We have thus shown that Ricardian equivalence cannot
hold in this case.
A.8.3 Definition of the Consumption Equivalent Wel-
fare Change
The consumption equivalent welfare change for the average household is de-
fined as the percentage change in consumption that the household must incur
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in the old situation in order to be indifferent between staying in the old sta-
tionary equilibrium and jumping to the new stationary equilibrium. Let the
old stationary equilibrium be denoted by the subscript 0 and be character-
ized by a (detrended) debt level b˜0 =
B0
Y0
and a resulting density θ0. In our
computations this point of comparison will always be the benchmark equi-
librium with b˜0 =
2
3
. Let the new stationary equilibrium be denoted by the
subscript 1 and characterized by the debt level b˜1 6= b˜0 and a resulting density
θ1 6= θ0. The consumption equivalent welfare change for a household with
assets a˜ and income state , x0→1 is the percentage change in consumption
in situation 0 that makes the household indifferent between staying in 0 and
going to 1:∫
W (a˜, ; θ0, x0→1)dθ0(a˜, ) =
∫
W (a˜, ; θ1)dθ1(a˜, )∫
E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
((c(a˜, ; θ0) · (1 + x0→1))η l(a˜t, t; θ0)1−η)1−µ
1− µ dθ0(a˜, ) =∫
E0
∞∑
t=0
β˜t
(c(a˜, ; θ1)
ηl(a˜, ; θ1)
1−η)1−µ
1− µ dθ1(a˜, )
Solving this equation for x0→1 we obtain:
x0→1 =
 ∫ Et=0∑∞t=0 β˜t (c(a˜,;θ1)ηl(a˜,;θ1)1−η)
1−µ
1−µ dθ1(a˜, )∫
Et=0
∑∞
t=0 β˜
t (c(a˜,;θ0)
ηl(a˜t,t;θ0)1−η)1−µ
1−µ dθ0(a˜, )

1
η(1−µ)
− 1
=
(∫
W (a˜, ; θ1)dθ1(a˜, )∫
W (a˜, ; θ0)dθ0(a˜, )
) 1
η(1−µ)
− 1
Logically, if x0→1 is positive (negative) the average household would absent
the compensation (not) prefer to be in the new situation. Thus a positive
(negative) consumption equivalent welfare change means that the new debt
level is (not) preferred in terms of welfare of the average household.
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A.8.4 Numerical Algorithm
The general algorithm to find the recursive general equilibrium is similar to
A´braha´m and Ca´rceles-Poveda (2010). Given a level of government debt, b,
a tax rate for labor income, τl, a tax rate for capital income, τa and a guess
for the borrowing limit, a, we search for the policy functions for consump-
tion, leisure and next periods assets (savings), c(.), l(.) and a
′
(.) by using a
policy function iteration method. More precisely, we use an endogenous grid
point method, commonly used in the literature, which we extend to include
endogenous labor. Then we compute the implied wealth density function
using interpolation methods. Given the wealth densities we obtain a new
equilibrium aggregate capital stock which implies a certain equilibrium in-
terest rate and wage rate, as well as a new tax rate. Note that we either
change the capital income tax or the labor income tax depending on the ex-
periment. (Denote the respective tax rate simply as τ in what follows). Then
we find the final equilibrium in two steps first iterating simultaneously over
the aggregate capital stock and the tax rate we want to change and then
in a further outer loop iterating over the borrowing limit (if endogenous).
More precisely we take out the following steps to find the equilibrium given
a certain level of government debt:
Loop to find borrowing limit Given a certain level of government debt,
b, guess an initial vector for the borrowing limit a0. Denote iterations
in this loop by p.
Loop to find interest rate and tax rate Denote iterations in this
loop by q.
Step 1 Given a borrowing limit guess initial values for the tax rate, the
aggregate labor supply and the aggregate capital stock: [τ 0, L0, K0].
Those values for the aggregate capital stock and labor supply im-
ply a certain interest rate r0 and a certain wage rate w0.
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Step 2 Guess initial values for the policy functions c0(.), l0(.),a
′0(.).
Now comes an inner loop to find the new policy functions. Denote
iterations in this loop by n.
Step 3 For each iteration n given [wq−1, rq−1, τ q−1, ap−1] use the guesses,
[cn−1(.), ln−1(.), a
′n−1(.)] to compute new policy functions that sat-
isfy the first order conditions of the households, [cn(.), ln(.), a
′n(.)].
Step 4 Find the associated density function over assets and income
states.
Step 5 Given the density, compute the new aggregate capital stock
Kq and the new aggregate labor supply Lq, which imply a new
wage rate wq, a new interest rate rq and a new tax rate τ q. Then
repeat Step 2-5 until we find the equilibrium interest rate, wage
rate and tax rate given the guess for the borrowing limit.
Step 6 Use the policy functions at the final equilibrium to compute the
value of autarky V p and the value of being in the financial market
arrangement W p, given the previous value for the borrowing limit ap−1.
Step 7 Compute the new borrowing limit, ap, by tightening them if V p >
W p and loosening them if W p > V p. Then repeat Step 1-7 until the
equilibrium borrowing limit is found.
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Appendix B
Homeownership, Mobility and
Local Income Redistribution
Paper Summary
Regions are characterized by different homeownership rates. Homeowners
and renters differ in their mobility costs, renters having lower mobility costs.
This paper analyses how the presence of those different types of households
affects income sorting and tax differences between local jurisdictions. To this
aim we analyze a model of local income redistribution with mobile (renters)
and immobile (homeowners) households. Linear income taxes finance a lump
sum transfer. Policies are determined endogenously through voting. In such
a framework if there are no or only few homeowners no income sorting equi-
librium exists. Above a certain threshold for the homeownership rate we find
an inverted U-shaped relationship between tax differences and homeowner-
ship rates, tax differences between jurisdictions being highest for intermediate
homeownership rates.
APPENDIX B. HOMEOWNERSHIP, MOBILITY AND LOCAL
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
B.1 Introduction
In democratic countries citizens themselves exert an important influence on
local fiscal policy through the elections of political representatives. If those
countries are federalistically organized a central aspect is the fiscal autonomy
of local jurisdictions. Clearly, in this case, the mobility behaviour of citizens
has important effects on local fiscal policies. Income sorting or stratifica-
tion patterns where households locate into different jurisdictions according
to their income class are often observed empirically in democratic federalistic
countries (Pommerehne et al., 1996; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Bakija and
Slemrod, 2004; Schmidheiny, 2006a). Rich households typically live in juris-
dictions with low tax rates and high house prices whereas poor households
live in areas with high taxes and low house prices. Thus it is important to un-
derstand the factors determining income sorting, because it has an influence
on the daily lives of citizens in their respective jurisdictions, for example, on
housing rents, taxation and redistributionary policies at the local level.
The literature on income sorting analyzes how different factors determine in-
terjurisdictional income sorting equilibria. For example, Hansen and Kessler
(2001) focus on the influence of jurisdiction sizes and Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann
(2005) and Schmidheiny (2006b) on the influence of heterogeneity in prefer-
ences for public goods and/or housing. Another potentially important factor
are differences in mobility costs arising, for example, from the homeowner-
ship status of a household. The contribution of this paper is to investigate
theoretically the influence of this factor on local income sorting equilibria.
We begin by presenting some empirical facts about income sorting and home-
ownership to motivate our analysis. Empirical studies show that homeowners
are less mobile than renters (Barcelo´, 2006; Helderman et al., 2004; Munch
et al., 2006; Ioannides and Kan, 1996). Analyzing tax differences between
communities in Swiss Cantons, we find evidence for a non-linear relation-
ship between those tax differences and the homeownership rate. In our view,
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this could be due to differences in mobility costs of homeowners and renters.
To illustrate the influence of differences in mobility costs on local income
sorting equilibria we then analyze a stylized set-up where we differentiate
between two types of households: Homeowners with infinite mobility costs
and renters with zero mobility costs. Consequently homeowners will not
move at all whereas renters are perfectly mobile. We focus on a purely re-
distributive model where a distortive tax on income finances a lump sum
transfer (Goodspeed, 1986, 1989; Hansen and Kessler, 2001). Hence, higher
taxation means more redistribution but is costly because of distortions. For
redistribution to be an interesting political outcome households have to differ
in terms of income. Thus, some households are net contributors whereas oth-
ers are net-beneficiaries. To be able to obtain analytical results we focus the
analysis on the case of two jurisdictions and assume income to be distributed
lognormally among households irrespective of their homeownership status.
Furthermore to concentrate on the effect of mobility costs we abstract from
different jurisdictional sizes and assume that jurisdictions are of equal size.
Households take decisions in two stages: First a household decides in which
jurisdiction it wants to live considering expectations about the amount of re-
distribution that will be implemented in the respective jurisdictions. Second,
each household has the possibility to elect a local political candidate with a
certain electoral program of redistributive taxation through majority voting.
The median voter theorem implies that the policy that will be implemented
is the policy preferred by the median voter. When households differ with
respect to income it clearly depends on the intrajurisdictional income distri-
bution and resulting identity of the median voter how much redistribution
will result in equilibrium. When the median voter is relatively poor (rich),
redistribution will be high (low). Clearly, if part of the population is not
mobile, this changes the amount of equilibrium redistribution relative to the
case where everyone is mobile, as immobile households change the voting
outcome by their presence.
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We find the following results: First, if there are no or only few homeown-
ers no income sorting equilibrium exists. The reason is that the income
distribution is typically skewed to the right, meaning that there are much
fewer very rich than very poor persons. If everyone was mobile and we had
income sorting, the richest half of the population would live in one jurisdic-
tion (referred to as rich jurisdiction in the following) and the poorest half
in the other (referred to as poor jurisdiction). The median voter in the rich
jurisdiction would however be poor, relative to the average person in that
community, compared to the median voter in the poor jurisdiction. More
precisely, the mean-to-median ratio (to which we refer to in the following by
the term m-to-m inequality) in the rich jurisdiction would be higher than in
the poor jurisdiction and thus taxes would be higher in the rich jurisdiction.
Therefore the rich and also the poor would not like to live in such a segre-
gated way in the first place, so that no income sorting equilibrium exists for
completely mobile households and equally sized jurisdictions.1 However, we
show in this paper that, if there is a certain number of immobile homeowners
in the population, an income sorting equilibrium can exist even with equally
sized jurisdictions. Intuitively, the presence of immobile homeowners has a
exarcerbating effect on m-to-m inequality in the poor jurisdiction. For this
reason, tax rates are relatively higher in the poor jurisdiction with more im-
mobile homeowners. With enough immobile homeowners the tax rate in the
poor jurisdiction will even overtake the one in the rich jurisdiction. We thus
find a threshold homeownership rate (or number of immobile households in
the population) from which on an income sorting equilibrium exists.
Our second result is that from this threshold onwards there is an inverted
1This result was already emphasized by Hansen and Kessler (2001). They show that
the presence of differently sized jurisdictions is necessary to induce income sorting. The
presence of a very small jurisdiction to accomodate the richest households is crucial. They
characterize the threshold value for the smallest jurisdiction such that an income sorting
equilibrium exists. Extending their analysis we show that even with equally sized jurisdic-
tions income sorting can arise due to the presence of immobile households (homeowners).
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U-shaped relationship between homeownership rates and tax rates. For a
range of moderate homeownership rates the difference between tax rates
increases with the homeownership rate. Intuitively, as long as m-to-m in-
equality between homeowners is lower than m-to-m inequality between the
richest renters, a higher presence of homeowners leads to lower m-to-m in-
equality (and thus higher taxes) in the rich jurisdiction relative to the poor
jurisdiction. For high homeownership rates the difference between tax rates
decreases with the homeownership rate. Intuitively, from some point on-
wards the tax rate in the poor and the rich jurisdictions will be more and
more similar as the high number of homeowners with the same equilibrated
income distribution makes the jurisdictions more and more similar in terms
of m-to-m inequality. Finally, we find that an increase in overall inequality
increases the range of homeownership rates where income sorting arises (or
equivalently decreases the threshold homeownership rate).
Our paper aims at contributing to the literature on multijurisdictional mod-
els of local income redistribution with endogenous policy determination by
emphasizing the impact of household heterogeneity in terms of mobility be-
haviour on the income sorting equilibrium. We argue that homeowners are
less mobile than renters and focus on including those two groups. Epple
and Romer (1991) also differentiate between renters and homeowners. They
propose a similar redistribution model but where redistribution is financed
via property taxes. The difference between renters and homeowners in their
model is that tax capitalization in house prices only affects homeowners and
not renters. In contrast, we focus on differences in mobility behaviour of
those two groups. Hansen and Kessler (2001) analyze a similar model to
explain the existence and size of tax havens. They point out to the fact
that tax havens empirically are rather small countries. They show that a
jurisdiction of a very small size is needed which can accomodate the most
aﬄuent households for an income sorting equilibrium to exist. In contrast,
we abstract from size differences and focus on the impact of mobility differ-
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ences. In reality, it is probably the interaction of both those factors (and
possibly other factors as well) which determine the existence of an income
sorting equilibrium and the exact location of each income group. Other fac-
tors determining income sorting are analyzed, for example, by Kessler and
Lu¨lfesmann (2005) (heterogeneity of preferences for public goods) or Schmid-
heiny (2006b) (heterogeneity of preferences for public goods and housing).
In addition, our paper can also contribute to the discussion if income re-
distribution is feasible at all on a local level in a federalistic country where
citizens are mobile (Wildasin, 1991; Brueckner, 2000; Lee, 1998, 2007). Per-
fect income sorting puts important constraints on local income redistribution
because in this case income can only be redistributed within income groups.
However perfect income sorting is rarely observed empirically. Similar to
Schmidheiny (2006b) although for different reasons our model implies imper-
fect income sorting. In this case, more redistribution is feasible.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 displays em-
pirical evidence that motivates our study. In Section 3 we discuss the related
literature. In Section 4 we present our theoretical model and in Section 5
we discuss the equilibrium results. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.
B.2 Income Sorting and Homeownership: Some
Empirical Facts
In this paper, we emphasize that homeowners are less mobile than renters.
Empirical evidence indeed shows that this is the case. For example, Bar-
celo´ (2006) finds that residential mobility is lower among homeowners than
among renters in Europe from 1994 to 1998, Helderman et al. (2004) find
the same for the Netherlands over the period 1981 to 1998, Munch et al.
(2006) for Danemark over the period 1997 to 2000 and Ioannides and Kan
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(1996) mention that this holds also for the US in 1987. There can be different
reasons for this: (1) Homeowners face higher transaction costs than renters
when moving. For example, transaction costs for selling and buying houses
are higher than for changing renting contracts. (2) Houses often pass from
parents to children in the form of bequests. (3) There are changes in the life-
cycle component to individual mobility that go in the direction of slowing
down changes in homeownership. According to a survey of many developed
economies by Scanlon and Whitehead (2004), if younger households enter
homeownership they do it at a later stage in life than previously. This is in
line with the results of Mulder and Wagner (2001) showing that British and
US families are likely to postpone family formation depending on the avail-
ability of housing. (4) Synergy effects when owning and investing in a house
at the same time could be responsible for lower mobility of homeowners. For
example, Brueckner and Joo (1991) explain that homeowners have a longer
time horizon because they often consider their houses as investment assets
as well as living facilities. If a house was bought as a long term investment
to save for retirement and the owner wanted to profit from synergy effects
of owning the house (for example, because an owner takes better care of the
house than a renter would do), this would supposedly reduce the mobility of
the homeowner until he reaches the retirement age.
Another important assumption of our model is that the overall homeown-
ership rate in a region with multiple jurisdictions is taken to be exogenously
given, i.e. independent of income sorting and resulting tax or rent differences
in that region. Empirically, there is no clear consensus what determines the
homeownership rate in a region. Religious affiliations seem to play a role,
as emphasized, for example, by Keister (2003) or tax exemptions for home-
ownership on the national level. If homeownership rates on the regional level
were caused by such factors, this would still be consistent with our approach
as long as those factors are not in turn strongly interacting with income sort-
ing or local income taxation.
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Furthermore overall homeownership rates seem to change only slowly over
time. A selection of a number of countries from Atterho¨g (2005) reveals over-
all stable homeownership patterns (see Figure B.1). Therefore we take the
view that a tendency to homeownership is related to historical or cultural
factors and thus exogenous to the income sorting equilibrium.
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Figure B.1: Homeownership Rates Over Time in OECD Countries
Our model aims at explaining tax-induced income sorting across jurisdic-
tions. Empirically, tax migration and sorting by income groups and effects
on redistribution are frequently observed. Schmidheiny (2006a) shows that
in Switzerland high income households are more likely to choose low tax ju-
risdictions. Using data from US federal states, Bakija and Slemrod (2004)
find that wealthy retirees try to avoid high state taxes by changing their
state of residence. Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2001) find a negative relationship
between tax rates and the share of rich households. Using data from Swiss
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cantons and main cities, they regress the share of various income classes on
income tax rates. Pommerehne et al. (1996) find some evidence for tax haven
Cantons and tax-induced migration in Switzerland, but they conclude that
a ”race to the bottom” is not a concern.
Looking at Switzerland for empirical evidence on tax-induced income sorting
may be case point. Real-world conditions in Switzerland are probably closest
to most theoretical models, including ours. Many jurisdictions (the Cantons
or the communes) decide independently and democratically on taxation and
on the provision of public services. It is therefore an ideal laboratory for an
empirical test of diverse theoretical predictions. When taking the coefficient
of variance in communal tax rates as a measure for tax differences between
communities within a canton, we find a positive relationship between income
inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and tax differences as shown in
Figure B.2. A higher overall income inequality seems to be linked to higher
differences in communal tax rates within a region.
Taking the overall homeownership rate of a canton as a measure of mobility,
we find a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between mobility and the
coefficient of variance in communal tax rates as shown in Figure B.3. Tax
differences within a region (canton) are less pronounced for high mobility
(low homeownership rates) up to a certain threshold and falls again for low
mobility (high homeownership rates).
B.3 Related Literature
In his seminal paper Tiebout (1956) argues that a decentralized system of
taxation and public goods provision allows citizens to ”shop among jurisdic-
tions” according to their preference for public goods. This idea is known
as ”Tiebout sorting”. Empirically, Oates (1969) finds evidence for Tiebout
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Figure B.2: Variance in Intra-Regional Tax Rates and Income Inequality
sorting, whereas Pollakowski (1973) shows that his initial results are not very
robust. More recently Rhode and Strumpf (2003) find that heterogeneity of
public goods across communities decreases over time which goes against the
predictions of an extended Tiebout model. The later theoretical literature
therefore deviates explicitely from the assumptions of the Tiebout model to
test its robustness (Westhoff, 1977, 1979; Rose-Ackerman, 1979; Bucovetsky,
1982).
Subsequent theoretical work combines an explicit voting process with a mi-
grational decision a` la Tiebout to obtain a general equilibrium approach
(Epple et al., 1984, 1993; Nechyba, 1997; Epple and Platt, 1998). In this ap-
proach, individuals typically move to a preferred jurisdiction in a first stage
and there is majority voting over fiscal policy and taxes in a second stage.
When moving individuals foresee the outcome of majority voting in the sec-
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Figure B.3: Variance in Intra-Regional Tax Rates and Homeownership
ond stage, such that once an equilibrium is reached, they have no further
incentive to move. The present paper follows such an approach. However,
different than most of the previous authors who analyze models of property
taxation which is the dominant form of local public finance in the US, we
consider a model of income taxation.
Despite the frequent focus on property taxation, there are some notable
exceptions that analyze general equilibrium models of local public good pro-
vision with income taxation (Goodspeed, 1986, 1989; Hansen and Kessler,
2001; Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann, 2005; Schmidheiny, 2006b). Those contribu-
tions all have a slightly different focus to ours in the sense that they do
not analyze the influence of different degrees of mobility on income sorting.
Goodspeed (1986) derives the conditions for existence of an equilibrium in
a metropolitan model with income taxation, congestible public goods and
89
APPENDIX B. HOMEOWNERSHIP, MOBILITY AND LOCAL
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
a housing market. He also estimates the welfare loss from changing from a
head tax to a proportional income tax. However, he does not consider the
influence of different mobility patterns.
Epple and Romer (1991) analyze the influence of a special aspect of mobil-
ity in a setting with property taxation. More specifically they differentiate
between two main cases: (1) a model where there are only renters who rent
houses from absentee landlords and (2) a model with homeowners who con-
sider also the capital gains or losses they will incur as a result of a change
in the net-of-tax price of housing induced by a change in the level of redis-
tributive taxation. The conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of the
model are the same in both cases, but an owner with a given endowed in-
come will prefer a lower level of redistributive taxation than a renter with the
same income. Hansen and Kessler (2001) focus on explaining the existence
of tax havens depending on the size of a country (or jurisdiction). They
show that if there is a jurisdiction of a very small size which can accomodate
the most aﬄuent individuals, an income sorting equilibrium can arise. In
Hansen and Kessler (2001) the decisive characteristic of a jurisdiction which
leads to income sortingof individuals with respect to income is the difference
in country (or jurisdictional) size, whereas in our setting the fraction of the
non-mobile population plays a similar crucial role. Alternatively, Kessler and
Lu¨lfesmann (2005) show that income sorting equilibria can be due to differ-
ent preferences for public goods. Finally, analyzing a richer model where
individuals differ in both income and preferences for housing, Schmidheiny
(2006b) derives imperfect income segregation. All these contributions, like
ours, show the possible existence of income sorting equilibria. However the
approach presented in this paper is different as it is the fraction of immobile
individuals which matters for income sorting to occur. This paper conse-
quently extends existing work on income sorting equilibria in models with
income taxation.
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Similarly to Epple and Romer (1991) and Hansen and Kessler (2001) we an-
alyze a purely redistributive setting without considering a public good which
could enter the utility function explicitely. Grossmann (2002) argues that
the distinction between a purely redistributive setting versus a public goods
setting matters in models of majority voting because the consequences for the
nature of the link between inequality and redistribution (or the size of govern-
ment) differ between those settings. In a redistributive setting higher income
inequality leads to more redistribution in equilibrium, whereas in a public
goods setting a higher income inequality may lead to less redistribution. Em-
pirically, the relationship between income inequality and redistribution has
been investigated by many authors with rather inconclusive results (Perotti,
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Be´nabou (2002) presents a review of the
results of this strand of literature and finds that ”the results are rather dis-
appointing: the effect of income distribution on transfers and taxes is rarely
significant, and its sign varies from one study or even one specification to
another.”2 However, some studies find evidence in favor of the redistributive
setting (Milanovic, 2000; Perotti, 1996). Being aware of the criticism we still
opt for a redistributive setting, as our main interest is to assess the implica-
tions of mobility on taxation and on opportunities for income redistribution
via grants.
We look at jurisdictions in a metropolitan area centered around a big city,
where all individuals go to work in the same place but live in different ju-
risdictions. Therefore, we neglect possible effects coming from local produc-
tivity differences which would be important when looking at jurisdictions
on a higher level such as countries. (Productivity differences are taken into
account in models of spatial asset pricing, see e.g. Ortalo-Magne´ and Prat,
2008). Furthermore, we look at a static model which does not allow for
growth and human capital accumulation (effects which are analyzed in re-
cent contributions such as Be´nabou, 1996a,b,c; Glomm and Lagunoff, 1999;
2See Be´nabou (2002), p. 24.
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Ferna´ndez and Rogerson, 1998 or Epple et al., 2009). Given our focus on
redistributive government expenditures we leave such considerations out as
they are especially interesting when analyzing schooling expenditures and
public investments.
One main implication of our model is that in equilibrium individuals may
be stratified with respect to income classes. As mentioned in the last sec-
tion, some studies indeed provide empirical evidence for income sorting (see,
for example, Bakija and Slemrod, 2004; Pommerehne et al., 1996; Feld and
Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2006 or Bru¨lhart and Jametti,
2006). These studies deserve credit for showing that tax differences and in-
come sorting occur, when jurisdictions enjoy fiscal autonomy and they show
to what extent empirically individuals react to such tax differences by mi-
gration. However, they assume that tax rates are set exogenously by a local
government (benevolent or not). It is not a priori clear how such results have
to be interpreted given that in reality taxes are rather set endogenously, in
most cases by a voting process where the residents have to decide for some
political candidate or party who proposes a certain tax policy. Thus, more
recently, a lot of authors attempted to structurally estimate or calibrate equi-
librium models of local jurisdictions where voting is endogenous (see Epple
and Sieg, 1999; Epple et al., 2001; Bayer et al., 2004; Bajari and Kahn, 2005;
Sieg et al., 2002, 2004; Ferreyra, 2007; Ferreira, 2010 and for Switzerland
Schmidheiny, 2006a). These contributions generally find strong evidence for
income sorting between local jurisdictions as well.
The focus of our paper is on the influence of mobility patterns on taxation
and redistribution. Therefore, we also contribute to the part of the literature
which makes predictions about the influence of the degree of mobility on
local taxation and the possibility of redistributive policies at the local level.
In the ”race-to-the-bottom” literature a higher mobility typically leads to
lower taxes and less redistribution (see, for example, Brueckner, 2000). Em-
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pirical studies analyzing whether this breakdown of the welfare state really
occurs yield different results. Brown and Oates (1987) and Feldstein and
Wrobel (1998) find evidence for tax avoidance in the US similar to the one
presented above and thus argue that redistribution should be taken out by
the central government only. However, for Switzerland Feld (2000) finds that
a considerable amount of redistribution takes place at the local level despite
high mobility of tax payers and strong tax competition. Alternatively, Lee
(2007) presents a political-support approach to redistribution in a federation,
which leads to a different conclusion than the standard ”race to the bottom”
models. He finds that depending on the cost of housing (which is equivalent
to mobility costs in his model), mobility may increase or decrease income
redistribution. As will become clear from our analysis, our model in contrast
predicts a non-linear relationship between redistribution and mobility, redis-
tribution being highest for intermediate levels of mobility.
In the next section we will thus present a theoretical model where groups
with different degrees of mobility have an influence on the income sorting
equilibrium. The non-linear pattern between mobility and income sorting
(redistribution) predicted by this model is consistent with the empirical facts
about this relationship for Swiss Cantons presented in Section B.2. In ad-
dition the imperfect income sorting implied by the model is consistent with
empirical findings about income sorting. The non-linear relationship between
taxation and mobility could also explain the inconsistent empirical results
presented in the last paragraph.
B.4 The Model
We look at a system of integrated and independent jurisdictions denoted
j = 1, ..., J in an economy, all having the same size. The jurisdictions are
politically independent in the sense that each jurisdiction determines fis-
cal policy in an autonomous way. We choose a setting similar to recent
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contributions on sorting such as Hansen and Kessler (2001) or Kessler and
Lu¨lfesmann (2005). But different from them, in our economy jurisdictions
distinguish themselves only by the fraction of homeowners.
We develop a model of redistribution to analyze the interaction between
homeownership, the economy’s income inequality, and political decisions on
redistributive taxes. The most important elements of the model are: (1)
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to income so that redistribution
is an important political outcome. (2) A jurisdiction’s budget must balance.
(3) Migration is costless for the group of renters, i.e. in equilibrium renters
must be unable to improve their positions by moving. (4) After settlement in
a specific jurisdiction, political decisions are determined by majority voting.
There are two types of households in the economy: renters (R) and home-
owners (H). To illustrate the mechanism we have in mind we assume those
two types to differ with respect to mobility costs in a stark and stylized way:
Renters face zero mobility costs so that they are completely mobile, whereas
homeowners face infinite mobility costs so that they never move. We denote
the number of renters in a jurisdiction j by λRj and the number of home-
owners by λHj . All households, irrespective of their mobility cost type, earn
an exogenous income yi which can be interpreted as location independent
labor income.3 Each household who does not own a house has to rent a unit
of housing from competitive absentee landlords to gain the right to live and
vote in a jurisdiction. Rents in jurisdiction j are denoted as rj. Housing
demand is normalized to unity. The utility V of an individual i (i ∈ [R,H])
is assumed to be linear in consumption ci (U i = ci). All households in ju-
risdiction j have to pay proportional income taxes tj on their income y
i and
3We make this assumption, because we have in mind local jurisdictions, for example
communities, in a metropolitan area, where there is a large number of commuters to a
central city. Consequently, almost everyone in the community is working in the city and
income is not affected by local conditions of the community.
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receive a (basic income) grant gj from the local government.
4 The budget
constraint of a renter i in jurisdiction j is thus
yi + gj = c
i + yitj + rj,
and indirect utility is equal to net income minus the rent
V R(yi, tj, gj, rj) = (1− tj)yi + gj − rj.
Homeowners, in contrast, do not need to pay rents as they live in their own
house. The budget constraint of a homeowner i in jurisdiction j is thus given
by
yi + gj = c
i + yitj,
and indirect utility is consequently equal to
V H(yi, tj, gj) = (1− tj)yi + gj.
In the economy income is distributed across all individuals according to the
distribution function F (y) with density f(y) > 0 and support [0,max y].
Households of each type R and H have the same ex-ante distribution of in-
come. Denote the income distribution of households within a jurisdiction j by
Fj(y). In every jurisdiction, the income distribution for homeowners is given
by this ex-ante distribution since they face infinite mobility costs and do not
move: fHj (y) = f(y). The income distribution for renters for each jurisdiction
j instead emerges endogenously after migration and is denoted fRj (y). We
normalize each jurisdiction’s size in the economy to unity. Let λj =
λHj
λHj +λ
R
j
denote the percentage of homeowners in jurisdiction j (called homeownership
rate in the following) and thus the percentage of renters is simply given by
1 − λj. In this paper, we assume λj = λ, i.e. equal homeownership rates in
4We might introduce local public good provision instead of pure redistribution. In
this case the preference for public goods would play a role. Instead, we opt for a purely
redistributive setting, because the focus of our paper is the influence of mobility and not
the influence of different preferences for public goods.
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each jurisdiction. While this may seem like a crude simplification, the gen-
eral mechanism stays the same even if homeownership rates differ between
jurisdictions except that there is an additional margin of variation.5 From
the viewpoint of renters, the homeownership rate λ determines the size of a
jurisdiction for them. Changes in average and median incomes depend on
the part of the mobile (renters) as well as the immobile (homeowners) pop-
ulation. Therefore, in our setting, the homeownership rate has potentially
different implications than a jurisdiction’s size in the model of Hansen and
Kessler (2001). To insure that rents in each jurisdiction of the economy are
fully determined even when the population size in each jurisdiction is fixed,
we suppose that competitive absentee landlords underbid each other in the
jurisdiction with the lowest mean income. More specifically, in the jurisdic-
tion with the lowest mean income rents must equal the break-even price r
for absentee landlords.6
To focus on political motives for government and individual behavior, we
abstract from allocative reasons for public spending and assume that juris-
dictions raise income taxes for redistributive purposes only. The government
has a redistribution policy in the sense that it confers the same basic income
or grant gj to every individual in the jurisdiction. Proportional income taxes
tj finance the grant gj. This “ability to pay principle” is a common approx-
imation of the progressive tax systems in use. A jurisdiction’s budget must
balance and thus the budget constraint is
(tj − 1
2
t2j)
∫ max y
0
ydFj = gj.
where Fj denotes the endogenous measure of individuals with income y living
in jurisdiction j such that average income in jurisdiction j can be expressed
as y¯j =
∫ max y
0
ydFj. The budget constraint equates local income tax revenues
5Results for the equilibrium analysis with different homeownership rates can be ob-
tained from the authors upon request.
6Technically we could also assume that there is an oversupply of houses.
96
B.5 Equilibrium Analysis
minus costs of raising public funds. The term (tj − 12t2j) outlines a concave
per capita Laffer-curve. Taxation is costly with costs taking the form t2j/2
for simplicity. We assume that the jurisdictions all have the same efficiency
in redistribution, i.e. the same costs of taxation.7 Because of the binding
budget constraint we can solve for the grant gj, which is then determined by
the chosen tax rate
gj =
(
tj − 1
2
t2j
)
y¯j. (B.1)
B.5 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium of the model is determined in two steps:
1. Renters choose the jurisdiction to live in which results in the locational
equilibrium.
2. All households in a jurisdiction cast their votes which results in the
voting equilibrium.
When backward solving the model we look at the voting equilibrium first.
Given the conditions resulting from the voting equilibrium we analyze the
locational equilibrium.
B.5.1 Definition of the Equilibrium
Every voter i maximizes his indirect utility with respect to the tax rate and
the basic income grant given the budget constraint. Rents are not directly
relevant to the voting decision and can thus be left out at this step, i.e.
7As incomes are exogenous and pure redistribution is analyzed, the absence of costs of
taxation would allow for arbitrarily high tax rates. Deadweight losses of distortive taxation
could also be introduced more generally by endogenous labor supply. This would mainly
complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative results and providing additional
insights.
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homeowners and renters will not differ in their voting decision given their
income:
max
tj
(1− tj)yi + (tj − 1
2
t2j)y¯j
The preferred tax rate of a household i is thus given by: tij
∗
= 1 − yi
yj
. In
the unique majority voting equilibrium the tax choice of the median voter is
implemented, i.e.
t∗j = 1−
ymj
yj
, (B.2)
where ymj is the income of the median voter in jurisdiction j. The level
of redistribution in equilibrium is thus given by g∗j =
1
2
y2j−(ymj )
2
yj
. Redistri-
bution will be higher in jurisdictions with high mean income and lower in
jurisdictions with a high median income. The political choice by the median
voter determines the fiscal package of taxes and grants (t∗j , g
∗
j ). To facilitate
the explanations in the rest of the paper let’s define the specific concept of
inequality encountered in this voting model (mean-to-median inequality):
DEFINITION B.3. Define m-to-m inequality as the ratio of the mean to
the median in a jurisdiction:
m-to-m inequalityj =
yj
ymj
Note that the higher the m-to-m inequality in a jurisdiction, the more
redistribution there is and the higher taxes are in equilibrium (see equation
(B.2)).8
Given the equilibrium tax rate, we can determine the locational equilibrium,
i.e. how the different types of households locate over jurisdictions. In a loca-
tional equilibrium each type of renter must be happy with his or her choice of
jurisdiction and does not want to move given the choice of the other renters.
8Note also that this measure of inequality is positively correlated to other frequently
used inequality measures, such as, for example, the Gini coefficient, under specific distri-
butional assumption.
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If household i decides to settle in jurisdiction j his or her utility must be
greater or equal in jurisdiction j than in any other jurisdiction denoted −j,
i.e. V (yi, tj, gj, rj) > V (yi, t−j, g−j, r−j).
In summary, the equilibrium of the model is defined as follows:
DEFINITION B.4. An equilibrium in the economy is defined as an income
distribution of mobile individuals in each jurisdiction fM
∗
j (y), a fiscal policy
package (t∗j , g
∗
j ) and rental fees r
∗
j for all j = 1, ..., J , such that (1) no mobile
individual with income yi living in j has an incentive to move to another
jurisdiction −j, that is, V (yi, t∗j , g∗j , r∗j ) > V (yi, t−j, g−j, r−j) and (2) tax rates
t∗j = 1−
ymj
yj
reflect the median voter’s choice in each jurisdiction.
B.5.2 A Symmetric Equilibrium
First, we show that independent of the homeownership rate λ, and the exact
form of the income distribution, F (y), there always exists a symmetric equi-
librium in which all jurisdictions implement the same fiscal policy package,
(tj, gj), and rents, rj, and average incomes, yj, are the same across all juris-
dictions.
Suppose that the population is distributed symmetrically over all jurisdic-
tions in the economy such that in each jurisdiction the local income distri-
bution of mobile individuals is equal, i.e. fMj (y) = f
M(y) for all j = 1, ..., J .
This is equivalent to saying that median and average incomes are the same
in all jurisdictions, independent of the homeownership rate λ. Therefore, tax
rates and consequently also the level of redistribution will be the same in each
jurisdiction. The clearing of renting markets implies that absentee landlords
will set the same renting price denoted by r. Therefore every mobile individ-
ual is indifferent between jurisdictions and thus the presumed distribution
fM(y) is an equilibrium outcome. The following Proposition summarizes this
finding:
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PROPOSITION B.1. Independent of the homeownership rate, λ, in the
economy, a symmetric equilibrium with identical fiscal policies (tj, gj) =
(t∗, g∗), identical rents rj = r, and identical average incomes y¯j = y¯ in
all jurisdictions j = 1, ..., J always exists.
B.5.3 An Asymmetric Equilibrium
Another possibility is that jurisdictions offer different tax-grant packages, i.e.
(tj, gj) 6= (th, gh) for j, h ∈ [1, ..., J ] and j 6= h. If (tj, gj) 6= (th, gh) renters
may sort themselves into different jurisdictions: a phenomenon referred to
as income sorting in the literature. The existence of such an income sorting
equilibrium depends on the homeownership rate, λ, as well as on the exact
form of the ex-ante income distribution, F (y).
To illustrate the possibility of income sorting, we focus for simplicity on
the case of two jurisdictions with (t1, g1) 6= (t2, g2). Suppose an income sort-
ing equilibrium exists such that jurisdiction j = 1 is a low tax (wealthy)
jurisdiction, whereas jurisdiction j = 2 is a high tax (poor) jurisdiction. Let
us now characterize the resulting equilibrium. First, note that jurisdiction
j = 1 must have a lower grant-rent differential than jurisdiction j = 2, i.e.
(t1, g1 − r1) < (t2, g2 − r2). This must be so, because otherwise all renters
would like to live in the jurisdiction with low taxes and a high grant-rent
differential.
Second, note that, as in equilibrium both jurisdictions must be populated
and there is no extra-space, there must be a boundary renter with boundary
income y˜ who is just indifferent between the two jurisdictions. If an income
sorting equilibrium exists, all renters with income y > y˜ will live in the low
tax (wealthy) jurisdiction j = 1 and all renters with y ≤ y˜ will live in the
high tax (poor) jurisdiction j = 2. In an income sorting equilibrium, the
boundary renter with income y˜ is the renter with the lowest income in juris-
diction j = 1 whereas in jurisdiction j = 2 the renter with income y˜ has the
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highest income among renters.
Third, note that from (B.2)
ym1
y1
>
ym2
y2
must hold to ensure t1 < t2. Or
in other words,
ym1
y1
>
ym2
y2
is a necessary condition for income sorting. To
summarize this finding we formulate the following Lemma:
LEMMA B.1. A necessary condition for an income sorting equilibrium is
that m-to-m inequality is lower in the low tax jurisdiction than in the high
tax jurisdiction.
For the housing market to clear rents have to adjust such that exactly the
fraction of wealthiest renters, xR = 1−F (y˜), wants to live in jurisdiction j =
1. Note that xR depends on the homeownership rate λ in both jurisdictions
as they determine how many people can live in each jurisdiction. In the
case of two jurisdictions half of the renters are considered wealthy while
the other half are considered poor. Consequenlty, the fraction of wealthiest
renters equals xR = 1
2
and the boundary income equals the economy’s median
income, i.e. y˜ = F−1(1
2
) = ym.9 Given the boundary income and a sorting
equilibrium, the distribution of income, the mean and the median incomes
in the two jurisdictions look as follows:
LEMMA B.2. Let y˜ be the boundary income. In a sorting equilibrium the
distributions of income in jurisdictions j = 1 and j = 2 are
G1(y) =
{
λF (y) y ≤ y˜
(2− λ)F (y)− (1− λ) y > y˜
G2(y) =
{
(2− λ)F (y) y ≤ y˜
(1− λ) + λF (y) y > y˜ .
9Expressed differently, the fraction of wealthiest renters is equal to the remaining space
in the low tax jurisdiction divided by the number of renters from the economy’s population,
i.e. xR = 1−λ2−λ−λ =
1
2 .
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The mean incomes in each jurisdiction are
y¯1 = λ
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1− λ)
∫ max y
y˜
yf(y)dy, (B.3)
y¯2 = λ
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1− λ)
∫ y˜
0
yf(y)dy, (B.4)
and the median incomes in each jurisdiction are
ym1 = F
−1
(
1
2
3− 2λ
2− λ
)
(B.5)
ym2 = F
−1
(
1
2
1
2− λ
)
(B.6)
The proof of this Lemma is relegated to the Appendix.
As the mean and the median incomes in both jurisdiction depend on the
homeownership rate in the economy, equilibrium tax rates also depend on λ,
i.e. t∗1(λ) = 1 − y
m
1 (λ)
y¯1(λ)
and t∗2(λ) = 1 − y
m
2 (λ)
y¯2(λ)
. By the government bud-
get constraint the grant is determined as a function of λ, i.e. g∗j (λ) =(
t∗j(λ)− 12t∗2j (λ)
)
y¯j. To see how rents are determined in this model consider
the renter with boundary income y˜ who is indifferent beween jurisdiction
j = 1 and j = 2, i.e.
V (t∗1(λ), g
∗
1(λ)− r1, y˜) = V (t∗2(λ), g∗2(λ)− r2, y˜)
(1− t∗1(λ))y˜ + g∗1(λ)− r∗1 = (1− t∗2(λ))y˜ + g∗2(λ)− r∗2.
Note that r∗2 will be equal to the minimum rent r as absentee landlords only
compete for renters in the high tax jurisdiction.10 Thus, we have
r∗1 − r = (t∗2(λ)− t∗1(λ))y˜ + g∗1(λ)− g∗2(λ) > 0
10Note that technically there is an infinitesimally small oversupply of houses such that
rents in jurisdiction 2 are determined, similar to the symmetric case. For notational
simplicity we omit it from the formulas.
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Different to the model of Hansen and Kessler (2001) where everyone is mobile
and jurisdictions are of different sizes, for the model set-up here, there is no
general result of existence of an income sorting equilibrium without specific
assumptions on the ex-ante distribution of income. Furthermore, it is possi-
ble that tax rates become negative as the ex-post distribution of income is
not unimodal anymore.11 Due to this lack of general results, we will assume
that ex-ante income is distributed lognormally in the next section and that
parameters of the distribution are such that tax rates are non-negative. In
this case, it is possible to show that if the homeownership rate, λ, is above a
certain threshold, income sorting exists. The homeownership rate then plays
a similar role as jurisdiction size in Hansen and Kessler (2001) determining
the cases where income sorting exists.
Before we turn to the case of the lognormal distribution consider as an illus-
tration the following simple example:
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose λ = 0, meaning that everyone in the population
is mobile and the distribution of income is uniform but different over three
parts of the support, so that it is skewed to the right in a very stylized way:
f(y) =

1
2
for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
3
8
for 1 < y ≤ 2
1
8
for 2 < y ≤ 3
There is some ex-ante m-to-m inequality in the economy as y¯ = 9
8
> ym = 1.
Suppose individuals were sorted by income classes, such that the richest half
lives in jurisdiction 1 and the poorest half lives in jurisdiction 2. Figure B.4
Panel A illustrates a possible income sorting equilibrium in this case where
11Decentralized political and locational choice may not produce a stable equilibrium
solution. Sorting is not a general outcome of locational equilibrium models as contributions
by Rose-Ackerman (1979), Epple and Platt (1998), Hansen and Kessler (2001) show.
Westhoff (1977) constructs a model with a pure public good and shows that income sorting
equilibria can exist. Nechyba (1997) states conditions for sorting equilibria to arise in
models with property taxation.
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everyone is mobile. The first part of the Figure shows the densities of the
population over income in the overall region which is at the same time the
ex-ante density in each jurisdiction before migration. The boundary income
is exactly y˜ = ym = 1 the dividing line between the two halves in the first sub-
figure. The two following subfigures show the densities that would result for
the two communities in a possible income sorting equilibrium. In jurisdiction
1 the poor half of the population left and the rich half from the other commu-
nity joined. The contrary holds for jurisdiction 2. This implies for median
incomes, mean incomes and thus for the tax rates in both jurisdictions (for
an illustration see the dashed lines in B.4 Panel A):
ym1 =
5
3
, y¯1 =
7
4
⇒ t∗1 =
1
21
ym2 =
1
2
, y¯2 =
1
2
⇒ t∗2 = 0
Thus, the tax rate in jurisdiction 2 (poor jurisdiction) would be lower than
in jurisdiction 1 (rich jurisdiction) if the population was sorted by income in
this way . Intuitively the rich would like to go in jurisdiction 2, but if all the
rich went in this jurisdiction the voting process would again yield a tax rate
like in jurisdiction 1 now (jurisdiction are ex-ante identical!). The rich are
unable to gather in one of the jurisdictions and agree about a low tax rate
because the inequality between them is higher than the inequality between the
poor. For λ = 0 an income sorting equilibrium cannot exist.
Now suppose that one third of the population is immobile (λ = 1
3
). Figure B.4
Panel B illustrates this case. The first subfigure again shows the densities of
households over income in the overall region which is at the same time the ex-
ante density in each single jurisdiction before migration takes place. The only
difference is that now some households in each income group are immobile
(denoted by the red lines in the subfigures). Logically, as those households
are immobile their densities do not change with migration (same pattern of
red lines in each of the three subfigures). The boundary houshold is again
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A. Case λ = 0 (everyone mobile)
B. Case λ = 1/3 (one third of the population immobile)
Figure B.4: Existence of Stratification Equilibria: A Simple Example
y˜ = ym = 1. Now suppose again that the richest half moves to jurisdiction 1
whereas the poorest half moves to jurisdiction 2 with the only difference that
now only the mobile population moves. After migration we would obtain for
the medians and the means (for an illustration see the dashed lines in B.4
Panel B) :
ym1 =
23
15
, y¯1 =
37
24
⇒ t∗1 =
1
185
ym2 =
3
5
, y¯2 =
17
24
⇒ t∗2 =
13
85
Tax rates in the rich jurisdiction are now lower than in the poor jurisdiction
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so that nobody wants to change his location ex-post. The resulting inequality
after migration is lower in the rich jurisdiction and thus the tax rate will be
lower there. Income sorting constitutes an equilibrium.
This example illustrates the potential role that homeownership can play
for the existence of income sorting equilibria. Hansen and Kessler (2001)
noted that if jurisdictions do not have the same size and one jurisdiction is
“small enough” then it is possible for the rich to gather there and agree on a
tax rate that is lower than in the “big” jurisdiction, where m-to-m inequality
will be higher. Here, we note that even if the jurisdicitons all have the same
size, the fact that part of the population is not mobile can lead to income
sorting.
Intuitively, if part of the population are homeowners, i.e. immobile by as-
sumption (positive homeownership rate, λ > 0), this can increase m-to-m
inequality in the jurisdiction where the poor decide to live relative to the
case of no homeownership, as some rich homeowners will not move. For this
reason, an income sorting equilibrium which implies a higher tax rate in the
high tax relative to the low tax jurisdiction can arise with enough homeown-
ers. However this mechanism depends on the exact assumption about the
income distribution of households. The next section will thus discuss more in
detail the existence of income sorting equilibria when income is distributed
lognormally.
B.5.4 Existence of an Income Sorting Equilibrium When
Income is Distributed Lognormally
As already mentioned, it is not possible to show general results for existence
without assuming a specific income distribution function. We propose to
assume that income is distributed lognormally across households. This as-
sumption implies that the distribution of income is bounded below and open
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above and that the biggest mass of households have relatively low incomes.12
It turns out that the homeownership rate, λ, in the economy and the initial
income inequality both have a distinguishible effect on the existence of a sort-
ing equilibrium. Given a certain level of initial income inequality reflected
by the parameter σ for the lognormal distribution13, a treshold λ˜ for home-
ownership rate is implicitely defined, such that from this threshold onwards
an income sorting equilibrium exists. This is summarized by the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION B.2. Suppose income is lognormally distributed across
individuals. For any given finite parameter σ, there is a unique threshold for
the homeownership rate, λ˜, implicitly defined by
t2(λ˜)− t1(λ˜) = 1
exp
(
σ2
2
)
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1−λ˜
2−λ˜
))
[
λ˜+ 2(1− λ˜)Φ(σ)
]
−
exp
(
−σ√2erf−1
(
1−λ˜
2−λ˜
))
[
λ˜+ 2(1− λ˜) (1− Φ(σ))
]
 (B.7)
= 0.
If the homeownership rate in the economy is lower than the threshold, i.e.
λ < λ˜, there is no income sorting equilibrium. If the homeownership rate is
higher than the threshold, i.e. λ > λ˜, an income sorting equilibrium exists,
i.e. t2 − t1 > 0.
(The proof is relegated to the Appendix). As an illustration, consider
the case of σ = 0.5. Figure B.5, Panel A shows that, in this case, there is
a threshold level for the homeownership rate λ˜ = 0.325 from which on the
12As income distributions are usually skewed to the right the lognormal distribution has
been found to approximate true income distributions quite closely and has been applied
as a reasonably good characterization by other authors from the field (for example Epple
and Romer, 1991 and Hansen and Kessler, 2001 among others).
13Different measures of inequality are increasing in σ for the lognormal distribution, for
example the variance of income, V ar(y) = eµ+σ
2
(eσ
2 − 1) or the ratio of mean to median
income, yym = e
σ2
2 .
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difference between the tax rates is positive and thus a sorting equilibrium
exists. At the left of this threshold a sorting equilibrium cannot exist re-
gardless in which of the two jurisdictions the rich move as the jurisdiction in
which the rich have moved will feature a higher m-to-m inequality and thus
a higher tax rate.
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Figure B.5: Relationship Between the Degree of Mobility and Differences
in Tax Rates
If there is no sorting equilibrium, a natural question to raise is what hap-
pens instead? From a theoretical standpoint it is clear: There is simply no
stable equilibrium in the metropolitan area. Empirically, we would observe
migration that proceeds uninterruptedly and frequent changes in tax rates.
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B.5.5 The Role of Initial Inequality
The parameter σ which we interpret as a parameter characterizing the amount
of inequality in the initial income distribution among all individuals (renters
and homeowners) plays a crucial role for the threshold level λ˜. Consider the
four cases for σ in Panel B of Figure B.5. The higher σ the bigger is the
range of possible values for the homeownership rate from which on a sorting
equilibrium arises. A numerical approximation of the threshold λ˜, implicitely
defined in Proposition 2, as a function of σ confirms this finding as shown in
Figure B.6.14
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Figure B.6: Relationship Between Threshold and Initial Inequality
In the figure we can see that as the initial inequality σ increases the thresh-
old λ˜ becomes smaller, that is, even a small homeownership rate is already
sufficient to lead to a sorting equilibrium, if the initial inequality in income
is high. This can also be shown formally as summarized by the following
Proposition:
14The numerical approximation is done using a cubic-spline-approximation method. For
more details on function approximation methods see Judd (1998) or Miranda and Fackler
(2002).
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PROPOSITION B.3. Suppose income is distributed lognormally across
individuals. If σ → ∞, there is always a sorting equilibrium independent of
the homeownership rate in the economy.
(The proof can be found in the Appendix). Because of the nature of
the lognormal distribution a higher σ increases the skewness of the income
distribution.15 The reason why there is no sorting equilibrium in some cases
(especially for low homeownership rates) is that m-to-m inequality is too
high among the rich part of the population compared to the poor part. In
the range of low homeownership rates more homeownership then increases
m-to-m inequality (after migration) among the poor more than among the
rich, so that the higher the homeownership rate the more likely is a sorting
equilibrium. The effect of a high initial inequality, σ, is now to exacerbate
this effect of the homeownership rate. The higher σ the less homeowners are
needed to ensure that m-to-m inequality between the rich will be lower than
between the poor.
B.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed local redistribution in a political economy model
where local governments have tax-grant instruments, part of the population
is mobile (renters) and the other part immobile (homeowners). Voters are
aware of migration effects of taxes and grants. This setting allows us to fo-
cus explicitly on the relationship between homeownership, mobility, income
inequality and redistribution. In summary, our theoretical model leads to
three predictions: (1) When mobility is high (low homeownership rate), in-
come sorting does not arise as rich taxpayers in a certain community are too
unequal between each other. (2) When part of the population is immobile
(homeowners), income sorting may arise as part of the rich homeowners are
15For the lognormal distribution the mean is y = eµ+
σ2
2 for a parameters µ and σ. Note,
the higher σ the less similar the lognormal distribution becomes to the normal distribution.
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exploited by the poor renters while the rich renters may escape taxes. For
high homeownership rates sorting is less likely as only few renters move and
their influence on inequality is not sufficiently high. (3) Finally, when initial
inequality in the economy is high even low homeownership rates can already
induce income sorting.
Our work aims at contributing to the question, if redistributive policies can
or should be taken out at the local level. On the one hand our results could
be interpreted as showing that in the presence of homeownership there can-
not be perfect income sorting, or in other words imperfect income sorting
arises. A redistributive policy on the local level can, thus, be more effective
compared to a world where income sorting is perfect. Another interpretation
of our results in terms of redistributive policies could be that local income re-
distribution in a federal system is more effective if (initial) income inequality
in the federation is not too high and homeownership is not at an intermediate
degree.
Our paper is, however, just a first step in trying to investigate the relation-
ship between homeownership, mobility and fiscal policy on the local level.
The model presented here could be usefully extended by endogenizing the
decision of homeownership. Another, potentially interesting extension to our
current model would be to investigate a setting where mobility costs are less
extreme, including, for example, some positive nonzero but finite mobility
costs for some households. Furthermore, one could consider the influence
of different assumptions about the relationship between mobility costs and
income (or wealth) for the resulting income sorting equilibrium. For now this
is left to future research.
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B.7 Appendix to the Paper
B.7.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Distribution Functions
In jurisdiction 1, the low tax jurisdiction, only homeowners have an income
below the boundary, so that for y ≤ y˜ we have:
G1(y) = λF (y)
There are two kinds of people with income above the boundary: (1) home-
owners with distribution λF (y) and (2) renters with distribution (1−λ)F (y)−F (y˜)
1−F (y˜)
(the fraction of people that have income between y˜ and y divided by the to-
tal fraction of people with income above y˜). Thus we have the following
distribution for people with income y > y˜:
G1(y) = λF (y) + (1− λ)F (y)− F (y˜)
1− F (y˜)
= (2− λ)F (y)− (1− λ).
as xM = 1 − F (y˜) = 1
2
. The distribution of the population in jurisdiction 1
over income will thus have two different parts:
G1(y) =
{
λF (y) y ≤ y˜
(2− λ)F (y)− (1− λ) y > y˜
Similarly, one can show for jurisdiction 2, the high tax jurisdiction:
G2(y) =
{
(2− λ)F (y) y ≤ y˜
(1− λ) + λF (y) y > y˜ .
Mean Incomes
In the low tax jurisdiction, jurisdiction 1, all homeowners have an mean
income given by the original mean income,
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy and all renters
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have a higher mean income given by
∫ max y
y˜
y f(y)
1−F (y˜)dy (where the density is
weighted by the total fraction of individuals with income higher than the y˜
to obtain the expectation of y conditional on having an income higher than
y˜ and the support is from the boundary to the maximum income). Thus,
mean income in jurisdiction 1 is
y¯1 = λ
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy + (1− λ)
∫ max y
y˜
y
f(y)
1− F (y˜)dy
= λ
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1− λ)
∫ max y
y˜
yf(y)dy,
and similarly for jurisdiction 2:
y¯2 = λ
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy + (1− λ)
∫ y˜
0
y
f(y)
F (y˜)
dy
= λ
∫ max y
0
yf(y)dy + 2(1− λ)
∫ y˜
0
yf(y)dy.
Medians
Principally there are four different cases for the relationship between median
income and the income of the boundary mobile individuum:
1. ym ≥ y˜ in both communities,
2. ym1 ≥ y˜ and ym2 ≤ y˜,
3. ym1 ≤ y˜ and ym2 ≥ y˜,
4. ym ≤ y˜ in both communities.
We want to show that we must be in case 2 and that the medians are given
by equations (B.5) and (B.6). To do this, we will proceed in the following
order. First, we will show that if we are in case 2 the medians must be equal
to (B.5) and (B.6). Then, we will show that given those medians we must
be in case 2 for all relevant λ. Thus equations (B.5) and (B.6) represent the
only relevant case for the medians.
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Part 1 Suppose ym1 ≥ y˜ and ym2 ≤ y˜. Then the median in jurisdiction
1 is implicitely defined as:
G1(y
m
1 ) = (2− λ)F (ym1 )− (1− λ) =
1
2
ym1 = F
−1
(
1
2
3− 2λ
2− λ
)
.
Similarly for the median in jurisdiction 2 we then have:
G2(y
m
2 ) = (2− λ)F (ym2 ) =
1
2
ym2 = F
−1
(
1
2
1
2− λ
)
Those are the medians given in equation (B.5) and (B.6)
Part 2 Suppose the medians are given by ym1 = F
−1 (1
2
3−2λ
2−λ
)
and ym2 =
F−1
(
1
2
1
2−λ
)
. This implies
ym1 = F
−1
(
1
2
3− 2λ
2− λ
)
≥ y˜ = F−1
(
1
2
)
for all λ ≤ 1
as 3−2λ
2−λ ≥ 1 for all λ ≤ 1 and F−1(.) is a monotonously increasing function.
Similarly:
ym2 = F
−1
(
1
2
1
2− λ
)
≤ y˜ = F−1
(
1
2
)
for all λ ≤ 1
as 1
2−λ ≤ 1 for all λ ≤ 1 and F−1(.) is a monotonously increasing function.

114
B.7 Appendix to the Paper
B.7.2 Derivation of Results of Example 1
Using Lemma 1 and and the distribution function given in the example we
obtain for λ = 0:
ym1 = F
−1
(
3
4
)
= 1 +
2
3
=
5
3
, y¯1 = 2
∫ 2
1
3
8
ydy + 2
∫ 3
2
1
8
ydy =
7
4
⇒ t∗1 =
1
21
ym2 = F
−1
(
1
4
)
=
1
2
, y¯2 = 2
∫ 1
0
1
2
ydy =
1
2
⇒ t∗2 = 0
and for λ = 1
3
:
ym1 = F
−1
(
7
10
)
= 1 +
4
9
=
23
15
, y¯1 =
1
3
y +
4
3
[∫ 2
1
3
8
ydy +
∫ 3
2
1
8
ydy
]
=
37
24
⇒ t∗1 =
1
185
ym2 = F
−1
(
3
10
)
=
3
5
, y¯2 =
1
3
y +
4
3
∫ 1
0
1
2
ydy =
17
24
⇒ t∗2 =
13
85
B.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
An income sorting equilibrium exists, if and only if t∗1(λ) < t
∗
2(λ), or in words:
the tax rate in the rich jurisdiction is lower than in the poor jurisdiction. We
will show existence of an income sorting equilibrium for the case of λ ≥ λ˜
in two steps. First, we will show that if t∗1(λ) < t
∗
2(λ) which is the case for
λ ≥ λ˜ by definition of the threshold, then income sorting arises (Part 1).
Second, we will show that if renters are sorted into jurisdictions according to
income classes, we must have t∗1(λ) < t
∗
2(λ) for all λ ≥ λ˜ (Part 2).
Part 1 Suppose we have λ ≥ λ˜ and thus t∗1(λ) < t∗2(λ). Note that we
must have a lower grant-rent differential in jurisdiction 1, i.e. (t∗1(λ), g
∗
1(λ)−
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r∗1(λ)) < (t
∗
2(λ), g
∗
2(λ) − r∗2(λ)). Otherwise, if the grant-rent differential was
bigger in jurisdiction 1, everyone would like to live in jurisdiction 1. As all
the jurisdictions must be populated and there is no extra space in jurisdiction
1. There would be an over-demand for living in jurisdiction 1 and the price of
housing would rise there until the grant-rent differential becomes smaller than
in jurisdiction 2 and some individuals agree to live in jurisdiction 2. What can
be inferred about the distribution of renters over income in each jurisdiction?
The ones that prefer a higher grant-rent to a lower tax rate will move to
jurisdiction 2 while individuals preferring a lower tax rate to a higher grant-
rent differential will move to jurisdiction 1. Totally differentiating shows
that the slope of an indifference curve spanned by t and g− r is positive and
increasing in income, i.e.
d(gj − rj)
dti
∣∣∣∣
V=V
= y > 0.
Thus, low-income individuals prefer regions with higher taxes combined with
large grant-rent differentials, whereas high-income individuals prefer regions
with low taxes and high grant-rent differentials. Consequently, from the
fact that not everyone can live in jurisdiction 1, (t∗1(λ), g
∗
1(λ) − r∗1(λ)) <
(t∗2(λ), g
∗
2(λ) − r∗2(λ)) and that the relative preference for lower taxes versus
a higher grant-rent differential depends on income, we can conclude that a
sorting equilibrium must arise. Renters up to a certain boundary income y˜
live in jurisdiction 2 and individuals with higher income than the boundary
y˜ live in jurisdiction 1.
Part 2 Suppose there is income sorting. Then one can show that there is
a threshold, λ˜, from which onwards an income sorting equilibrium exists. We
procede in several steps. First, we derive the equation that defines the thresh-
old (equation (B.7)) and then we show that the threshold really exists and
is unique. For the lognormal distribution we have F (y) = 1
2
+ 1
2
erf
(
ln(y)−µ
σ
√
2
)
by definition with an overall mean given by y¯ = exp
(
µ+ σ
2
2
)
and an overall
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median given by ym = exp (µ). We now calculate the means and the medians
for this distribution given income sorting.
Means
We can write ∫ ∞
ym
yf(y)dy = exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
Φ(σ)
and ∫ ym
0
yf(y)dy = exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
(1− Φ(σ))
where Φ is cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Thus
equations (B.3) and (B.4) become
y1 = λ exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
+ 2(1− λ) exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
Φ(σ)
= exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)]
and
y2 = exp
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))] .
Medians
For the log normal distribution we obtain for ym1 :
F (ym1 ) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
ln(ym1 )− µ
σ
√
2
)
=
1
2
3− 2λ
2− λ
ym1 = exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)
+ µ
)
and for ym2 :
F (ym2 ) =
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
ln(ym2 )− µ
σ
√
2
)
=
1
2
1
2− λ
ym2 = exp
(
−σ
√
2erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)
+ µ
)
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Difference Between Tax Rates
Using the means and medians, we can now calculate the difference between
tax rates
t2 − t1 = 1− y
m
2
y2
− 1 + y
m
1
y1
=
ym1
y1
− y
m
2
y2
=
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1−λ
2−λ
)
+ µ
)
exp
(
µ+ σ
2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)]
− exp
(−σ√2erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
)
+ µ
)
exp
(
µ+ σ
2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))]
=
1
exp
(
σ2
2
) (exp (σ√2erf−1 (1−λ2−λ))
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)] −
exp
(−σ√2erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
))
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))]
)
.
This shows (B.7).
Existence and Uniqueness of Sorting Threshold
We would like to show formally that there exists a unique sorting threshold
for the case of two communities with equal homeownership rates. We proceed
in four steps:
a Show that t2 − t1 = 0 at λ = 1 for all σ > 0.
b Show that t2 − t1 < 0 at λ = 0 for all σ > 0.
c Show that there must be at least one λ for which t2− t1 = 0 in the interval
λ ∈ [0, 1[.
d Show that there at most one λ for which t2−t1 = 0 in the interval λ ∈ [0, 1[.
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Part a First, one can easily show that for any σ the tax differential
(B.7) is equal to zero at λ = 1:
t2 − t1 = 1
exp
(
σ2
2
)(
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1 (0)
) · 1− exp (−σ√2erf−1 (0))
1
)
= 0
Part b At λ = 0 we will have for (B.7)
t2 − t1 = 1
exp
(
σ2
2
)(
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1
2
))
2 (1− Φ(σ))− exp (−σ√2erf−1 (1
2
))
2Φ(σ)
4 (1− Φ(σ)) Φ(σ)
)
To see that this must be below zero for all σ consider the numerator (substi-
tuting constant terms with c =
√
2erf−1
(
1
2
)
> 0 for simplicity)
exp (cσ) (1− Φ(σ))− exp (−cσ) Φ(σ)
= exp (cσ) (1− Φ(σ))− exp (−cσ) (1− Φ(−σ))
= H(σ)−H(−σ)
This shows that the numerator is the difference of a function H(x) = exp (cx)
(1− Φ(x)) at some point above zero with itself at some point below zero.
Clearly if this function is decreasing this difference must be negative. The
derivative of this function is given by
H ′(x) = c exp(cx)(1− Φ(x)) + exp(cx)(−φ(x))
= exp(cx) [c(1− Φ(x))− φ(x)]
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This derivative is negative because (1) the exponential term is positive and
(2) the term in brackets is always negative. To see this consider
c(1− Φ(x))− φ(x) < 0
c =
√
2erf−1
(
1
2
)
(≈ 0.67449) < min
[
φ(x)
(1−Φ(x))
]
(≈ 0.79789) ≤ φ(x)
(1− Φ(x)) .
Part c Consider the first derivative of the tax differential with respect
to the homeownership rate:
∂(t2 − t1)
∂λ
=
1
exp
(
σ2
2
) {exp(k1q(λ)) [k1q′(λ)v1(λ)− v′1(λ)]
v1(λ)2
−exp(k2q(λ)) [k2q
′(λ)v2(λ)− v′2(λ)]
v2(λ)2
}
where we defined
k1 = −k2 = σ
√
2
q(λ) = erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)
q′(λ) =
√
pi
2
exp
(
q(λ)2
)(− 1
(2− λ)2
)
v1(λ) = (1− 2Φ(σ))λ+ 2Φ(σ)
v′1(λ) = (1− 2Φ(σ))
v2(λ) = (1− 2Φ(−σ))λ+ 2Φ(−σ)
v′2(λ) = (1− 2Φ(−σ)).
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At λ = 1 this first derivative is equal to
1
exp
(
σ2
2
)
exp(0)
[
σ
√
2
(
−
√
pi
2
)
− (1− 2Φ(σ))
]
1
−
exp(0)
[
−σ√2
(
−
√
pi
2
)
− (1− 2Φ(−σ))
]
1

=
1
exp
(
σ2
2
) {σ√2(−√pi
2
)
− (1− 2Φ(σ))− σ
√
2
(√
pi
2
)
+(1− 2Φ(−σ))}
=
1
exp
(
σ2
2
) {−σ√2pi + 2(Φ(σ)− Φ(−σ))} < 0
as
2(Φ(σ)− Φ(−σ))
σ
≤ max
(
2(Φ(σ)− Φ(−σ))
σ
)
(≈ 1.6) <
√
2pi(≈ 2.5).
This means that there is at least one intersection with zero in the interval
[0, 1[, because the tax differential function intersects at the point λ = 1 from
above. From part 1 we know that at λ = 1 the tax difference t2− t1 = 0 and
from part 2 that at λ = 0 the tax difference is t2 − t1 < 0. This also implies
that the number of intersections in the interval [0, 1[ has to be odd.
Part d To see that there is a unique intersection expand (B.7) and set
the numerator to zero
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
))
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))]
− exp
(
−σ
√
2erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
))
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)] = 0
exp
(
−σ2
√
2erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
))
−
1− (1− λ)erf
(
σ√
2
)
1 + (1− λ)erf
(
σ√
2
) = 0
m(λ)− n(λ) = 0
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Note that we have already shown that n(0) > m(0) for any σ. If we can show
that n(λ) and m(λ) are both convex increasing functions, then it is clear that
they have at most two intersections. See, Figure B.7 as an illustration for
σ = 1.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Homeownership rate 
Fu
nc
tio
ns
 m
()
, n
()
 
 
m()
n()
Figure B.7: Proof of Unique Sorting Threshold: An Illustration
Together with part 3 of the proof, where we have shown that there must be
at least one threshold, this would complete the proof that the threshold is
unique.
It is easy to show that the function n(λ) is a convex increasing function:
∂n(λ)
∂λ
=
2erf
(
σ√
2
)
[
1− (1− λ)erf
(
σ√
2
)]2 > 0 as erf(x) > 0 for x > 0
∂2n(λ)
(∂λ)2
=
4erf
(
σ√
2
)
[
1− (1− λ)erf
(
σ√
2
)]3 > 0 as erf(x) > 0 for x > 0, (1− λ) < 1
anderf
(
σ√
2
)
< 1
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The function m(λ) is also clearly an increasing function:
∂m(λ)
∂λ
=
exp
(
erf−1
(
1−λ
2−λ
) (−2√2σ + erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
)))√
2piσ
(2− λ)2 > 0
But at a first glance it is not clearly convex or concave:
∂2m(λ)
(∂λ)2
=
1
(λ− 2)4 exp
(
erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)(
2
√
2σ + erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)))√
2piσ[
4 + exp
(
erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)2)√
2piσ − 2λ− exp
(
erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)2)
√
pierf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)]
The term in square brackets determines, if this second derivative is positive
or negative, because all other terms are positive.
As a preliminary consider that on the interval λ ∈ [0, 1[ we have:
0 ≤ erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)
<
1
2
0 ≤ erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)2
<
1
4
Now we want to show that the square brackets are positive. We split the
square brackets into two terms p1(λ), the positive part, and −p2(λ), the
negative part:
p1(λ) = 4 + exp
(
erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)2)√
2piσ
p2(λ) = 2λ+ exp
(
erf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)2)√
pierf−1
(
1− λ
2− λ
)
In the following, we will show that p1(λ) > p2(λ), which means that the term
in square brackets must be positive. Instead of comparing p1(λ) and p2(λ)
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we can also compare the lower bound of p1(λ) with respect to λ on the given
interval: minλ [p1(λ)] ≤ p1(λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1[ with an upper bound of p2(λ)
with respect to λ on the given interval: maxλ [p2(λ)] ≥ p2(λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1[.
Those boundaries are given by:
min
λ
[p1(λ)] = 4 +
√
2piσ
max
λ
[p2(λ)] = 2 + exp
(
1
4
)
1
2
√
pi
Comparing them we see that
4 +
√
2piσ > 2 + exp
(
1
4
)
1
2
√
pi(≈ 3.1379) for all σ ≥ 0
which completes the proof. 
B.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the difference between tax rates:
t2 − t1 = 1
exp
(
σ2
2
) (exp (σ√2erf−1 (1−λ2−λ))
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)] −
exp
(−σ√2erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
))
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))]
)
We want to show that:
lim
σ→∞
(t2 − t1) = 0
Rewrite the tax difference as follows:
t2 − t1 =
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1−λ
2−λ
)− σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)] −
exp
(
−σ√2erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
)− σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))]
First note that the denominators’ limiting values are constant:
lim
σ→∞
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)] = 2− λ
lim
σ→∞
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))] = λ
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The second term thus goes to zero:
lim
σ→∞
exp
(
−σ√2erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
)− σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))] =
exp(−∞)
λ
= 0
The first term also goes to zero because the square term dominates:
lim
σ→∞
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1−λ
2−λ
)− σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)] =
exp(−∞)
2− λ = 0
Thus we must have:
lim
σ→∞
(t2 − t1) = lim
σ→∞
exp
(
σ
√
2erf−1
(
1−λ
2−λ
)− σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ)Φ(σ)]
− lim
σ→∞
exp
(
−σ√2erf−1 (1−λ
2−λ
)− σ2
2
)
[λ+ 2(1− λ) (1− Φ(σ))]
= 0

125
Bibliography
Atterho¨g, M. (2005). Importance of Government Policies for Home Owner-
ship Rates. Mimeo.
Bajari, P. and M. E. Kahn (2005). Estimating Housing Demand With an
Application to Explaining Racial Segregation in Cities. Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics 23, 20–33.
Bakija, J. and J. Slemrod (2004). Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes?
Evidence from Federal Estate Tax Returns. Working Paper 10645, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.
Barcelo´, C. (2006). Housing Tenure and Labour Mobility: a Comparison
across European Countries. Working Paper 0603, Banco de Espan˜a.
Bayer, P., R. McMillan, and K. Rueben (2004). The Causes and Conse-
quences of Residential Segregation: an Equilibrium Analysis of Neigh-
bourhood Sorting. Mimeo.
Be´nabou, R. (1996a). Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment:
The Local Connection. The Review of Economic Studies 63, 237–264.
Be´nabou, R. (1996b). Heterogeneity, Stratification, and Growth: Macroe-
conomic Implications of Community Structure and School Finance. The
American Economic Review 86, 584–609.
Be´nabou, R. (1996c). Inequality and Growth. NBER Macroeconomics An-
nual 11, 11–74.
126
Bibliography
Be´nabou, R. (2002). Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent
Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Effi-
ciency? Econometrica 70, 481–517.
Brown, C. and W. E. Oates (1987). Assistance to the Poor in a Federal
System. Journal of Public Economics 32, 307–330.
Brueckner, J. K. (2000). Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory
and Evidence. Southern Economic Journal 66, 505–525.
Brueckner, J. K. and M.-S. Joo (1991). Voting with Capitalization. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 21, 453–467.
Bru¨lhart, M. and M. Jametti (2006). Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax Exter-
nalities: An Empirical Test. Journal of Public Economics 90, 2027–2062.
Bucovetsky, S. (1982). Inequality in the Local Public Sector. The Journal of
Political Economy 90, 128–145.
Epple, D., R. Filimon, and T. Romer (1984). Equilibrium among Local
Jurisdictions: Toward an Integrated Treatment of Voting and Residential
Choice. Journal of Public Economics 24, 281–308.
Epple, D., R. Filimon, and T. Romer (1993). Existence of Voting and Housing
Equilibrium in a System of Communities with Property Taxes. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 23, 585–610.
Epple, D. and G. J. Platt (1998). Equilibrium and Local Redistribution in an
Urban Economy when Households Differ in both Preferences and Income.
Journal of Urban Economics 43, 23–51.
Epple, D., R. Romano, and H. Sieg (2009). Life Cycle Dynamics Within
Metropolitan Communities. Mimeo.
Epple, D. and T. Romer (1991). Mobility and Redistribution. The Journal
of Political Economy 99, 828–858.
127
APPENDIX B. HOMEOWNERSHIP, MOBILITY AND LOCAL INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION
Epple, D., T. Romer, and H. Sieg (2001). Interjurisdictional Sorting and
Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis. Econometrica 69, 1437–1465.
Epple, D. and H. Sieg (1999). Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Ju-
risdictions. The Journal of Political Economy 107, 645–681.
Feld, L. P. (2000). Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empir-
ical Analysis for Switzerland. Public Choice 105, 125–164.
Feld, L. P. and G. Kirchga¨ssner (2001). Income Tax Competition at the State
and Local Level in Switzerland. Regional Science and Urban Economics 31,
181–213.
Feldstein, M. and M. V. Wrobel (1998). Can State Taxes Redistribute In-
come? Journal of Public Economics 68, 369–396.
Ferna´ndez, R. and R. Rogerson (1998). Public Education and Income Dis-
tribution: A Dynamic Quantitative Evaluation of Education-Finance Re-
form. American Economic Review 88, 813–833.
Ferreira, F. (2010, October). You Can Take it With You: Proposition 13
Tax Benefits, Residential Mobility, and Willingness to Pay for Housing
Amenities. Journal of Public Economics 94 (9-10), 661–673.
Ferreyra, M. M. (2007). Estimating the Effects of Private School Vouchers
in Multidistrict Economies. The American Economic Review 97, 789–817.
Glomm, G. and R. Lagunoff (1999). A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Volun-
tary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods. The Review of Economic
Studies 66, 659–677.
Goodspeed, T. (1986). Local Income Taxation: Equilibrium, Social Optimal-
ity, and Welfare Loss in a General Equilibrium Metropolitan Model. Ph.
D. thesis, University of Maryland College Park.
Goodspeed, T. (1989). A Reexamination of the Use of Ability-to-Pay Taxes
by Local Governments. Journal of Public Economics 38, 319–342.
128
Bibliography
Grossmann, V. (2002). Income Inequality, Voting over the Size of Public
Consumption, and Growth. European Journal of Political Economy 19,
265–287.
Hansen, N. A. and A. S. Kessler (2001). The Political Geography of Tax
H(e)avens and Tax Hells. American Economic Review 91, 1103–1115.
Helderman, A. C., C. H. Mulder, and M. V. Ham (2004). The Changing
Effect of Home Ownership on Residential Mobility in the Netherlands,
1980-98. Housing Studies 19, 601–616.
Ioannides, Y. M. and K. Kan (1996). Structural Estimation of Residential
Mobility and Housing Tenure Choice. Journal of Regional Science 36,
335–363.
Judd, K. L. (1998). Numerical Methods in Economics. The MIT Press.
Keister, L. A. (2003). Religion and Wealth: The Role of Religious Affiliation
and Participation in Early Adult Asset Accumulation. Social Forces 82,
175–207.
Kessler, A. S. and C. Lu¨lfesmann (2005). Tiebout and Redistribution in a
Model of Residential and Political Choice. Journal of Public Economics 89,
501–528.
Lee, K. (1998). Uncertain Income and Redistribution in a Federal System.
Journal of Public Economics 69, 413–434.
Lee, K. (2007). Does Mobility Undermine Income Redistribution? A
Political-Support Approach to Redistribution in a Federation. Finan-
zArchiv 63, 186–210.
Liebig, T. and A. Sousa-Poza (2006). The Influence of Taxes on Migration:
Evidence from Switzerland. Cambridge Journal of Economics 30, 235–252.
129
APPENDIX B. HOMEOWNERSHIP, MOBILITY AND LOCAL INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION
Milanovic, B. (2000). The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality, and
Income Redistribution: an Empirical Test with the Required Data. Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy 16, 367–410.
Miranda, M. J. and P. L. Fackler (2002). Applied Computational Economics
and Finance. The MIT Press.
Mulder, C. H. and M. Wagner (2001). The Connections between Family For-
mation and First-time Home Ownership in the Context of West Germany
and the Netherlands. European Journal of Population 17, 137–164.
Munch, J. R., M. Rosholm, and M. Svarer (2006). Are Homeowners Really
more Unemployed? The Economic Journal 116, 991–1013.
Nechyba, T. J. (1997). Existence of Equilibrium and Stratification in Lo-
cal and Hierarchical Tiebout Economies with Property Taxes and Voting.
Economic Theory 10, 277–304.
Oates, W. E. (1969). The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spend-
ing on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and
the Tiebout Hypothesis. The Journal of Political Economy 77, 957–971.
Ortalo-Magne´, F. and A. Prat (2008). Spatial Asset Pricing: A First Step.
Mimeo.
Perotti, R. (1994). Income Distribution and Investment. European Economic
Review 38, 827–835.
Perotti, R. (1996). Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the
Data Say. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 149–187.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?
American Economic Review 48, 600–621.
Pollakowski, H. O. (1973). The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public
Spending on Property Values: A Comment and Further Results. Journal
of Political Economy 81, 994–1003.
130
Bibliography
Pommerehne, W. W., G. Kirchga¨ssner, and L. P. Feld (1996). Tax Harmo-
nization and Tax Competition at State-Local Levels: Lessons from Switzer-
land. In Developments in Local Government Finance: Theory and Policy.
G. Pola and R. Levaggi and G. France.
Rhode, P. W. and K. S. Strumpf (2003). Assessing the Importance of Tiebout
Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990. The American Economic
Review 93, 1648–1677.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1979). Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Vot-
ing, and the Land Market. Journal of Urban Economics 6, 319–337.
Scanlon, K. and C. Whitehead (2004). International Trends in Housing
Tenure and Mortgage Finance. Mimeo.
Schmidheiny, K. (2006a). Income Segregation and Local Progressive Tax-
ation: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 90, 429–458.
Schmidheiny, K. (2006b). Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation
when Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 36, 270–299.
Sieg, H., V. K. Smith, H. S. Banzhaf, and R. Walsh (2002). Interjurisdictional
Housing Prices in Locational Equilibrium. Journal of Urban Economics 52,
131–153.
Sieg, H., V. K. Smith, H. S. Banzhaf, and R. Walsh (2004). Estimating the
General Equilibrium Benefits of Large Changes in Spatially Delineated
Public Goods. International Economic Review 45, 1047–1077.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure. The Journal
of Political Economy 64, 416–424.
Westhoff, F. (1977). Existence of Equilibria in Economies with a Local Public
Good. Journal of Economic Theory 14, 84–112.
131
APPENDIX B. HOMEOWNERSHIP, MOBILITY AND LOCAL INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION
Westhoff, F. (1979). Policy Inferences from Community Choice Models: A
Caution. Journal of Urban Economics 6, 535–549.
Wildasin, D. E. (1991). Income Redistribution and in a Common Labor
Market. American Economic Review 81, 757–774.
132

Appendix C
Public Debt in a Political
Economy
Paper Summary
In this paper I analyze the determination of government debt in a dynamic
politico-economic model with overlapping generations and a closed bond mar-
ket. Government debt is on the one hand an investment instrument for young
agents to provide old age support and on the other hand a strategic instru-
ment for voters today to influence the decision of tomorrow’s voters. In the
closed economy where the resource constraint has to hold the level of govern-
ment debt has no effect on today’s total available resources. However it has
an influence on the allocation of resources to public or private consumption.
Under commitment government debt is solely determined by the tradeoff
between public and private goods in old age. In the political equilibrium
there is additionally a ’strategic effect’ of government debt. By setting a
higher level of government debt, today’s generation of young voters can rip
off tomorrow’s generation of young voters by inciting a higher taxation. The
more substitutable public and private goods are, the stronger is the strategic
effect.
C.1 Introduction
C.1 Introduction
Since the end of the financial crisis of 2008/2009 Europe has fallen into a
debt-crisis. Especially the governments of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portu-
gal are experiencing high risk premia on their bonds and troubles with their
government finances. How can it happen that those relatively “rich” coun-
tries end up in such an unsustainable situation of high indebtedness? What
characteristics of a country lead to high indebtedness in theory? Which role
does the financial openness of a country play? And finally what institutional
mechanisms are more prone to induce high government debt?
This paper aims at providing some answers to those questions. In line with
the recent literature on the political economy of government debt, the in-
ability of democratic governments to commit to policies over long periods of
time is viewed as crucial for an understanding of how the level of government
debt is determined (see for example Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Persson and
Svensson, 1989; Song et al., 2009; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010; Battaglini and
Coate, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2011). A government that is re-elected every
period cannot directly decide on what fiscal policy is implemented in the fu-
ture, because the next government will be in place by then and may change
existing plans. As already noted by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina
and Tabellini (1990) governments that are re-elected every period may thus
try to influence strategically decisions of the next period’s government by
setting a specific level of government debt.
More precisely, in this paper, I investigate the politico-economic motives be-
hind the determination of public debt in a model with young and old voters.
To this aim, I analyze an overlapping generations model where agents live
for two periods. There is a first period when the agent works and a second
period when he retires and lives of his savings. In both periods the agent
consumes public goods in addition to his private consumption. I focus on
Markov-perfect equilibria where government debt is the only payoff-relevant
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state variable. Government debt is on the one hand an investment instru-
ment for young agents to provide old age support and on the other hand a
strategic instrument for the government today to influence the decision of
tomorrow’s government. Because I assume a closed economy with an en-
dogenous interest rate and the resource constraint has to hold, government
debt can however not be used to finance expenditures today. In fact, there is
an intertemporal dichotomy in the model, where previous government debt,
taxes and public goods determine the equilibrium allocation today, whereas
new government debt only matters for the equilibrium allocation tomorrow.
To gain intuition and as a benchmark for comparison, I first analyze the
commitment solution, where the first generation decides on the whole future
path of taxes, public goods and government debt. The old agents do not
care about government debt at all, because it is not useful to finance public
expenditures today. For the young agents the role of government debt issues
is to achieve the optimal mix between private and public consumption in
old age. The bond proceeds will be consumed privately by today’s young,
tomorrow in their old age. The consumption units promised in form of the
bonds, however, have to be paid out by the government which restrains to-
morrow’s budget and thus constrains public good provision tomorrow. Thus,
under commitment, the young agents today choose new government debt is-
sues such that they optimally solve their tradeoff between private and public
consumption tomorrow.
In the political equilibrium, there is additionally a ’strategic effect’ on the
decisions of future voters. Young voters today know that the reaction of the
next generation of voters to a high level of government debt will be to reduce
public expenditures and increase taxes to be able to finance the debt burden.
They can thus gain from setting a higher level of government debt to induce a
higher taxation of tomorrow’s young generation. In this way, the young gen-
eration today can “rip off” the next generation of young. To achieve this the
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young today have to be ready to substitute public with private goods tomor-
row. Thus the more substitutable public and private goods are the more they
will make use of this strategic effect. Regarding the answer to the question
which institutional mechanisms are particularly prone to favor a high debt
accumulation, this paper thus shows that it depends on the substitutability
of public and private goods. If public and private goods are substitutes, a
commitment mechanism leads to a lower debt level than a voting mechanism.
If, however, public and private goods are complements, a voting mechanism
leads to a lower debt level than the commitment mechanism.
A comparative statics analysis yields an answer to the question what charac-
teristics of a country can lead to high levels of government debt. The more
concern there is for public goods provision or the more altruistic parents are
in a country the lower will be the level of government debt. The influence
of the political power of old voters on the level of government debt depends
on whether public goods are substitutes or complements. When the power
of the old voters increases the level of debt resembles more the one under
commitment, i.e. under complementarity it will be higher and under substi-
tutability it will be lower.
A closely related contribution is the paper by Song et al. (2009) who analyze
a similar model for a small open economy with a constant interest rate. They
show that under distortive taxation the fact that the young are concerned
about public good provision in the next period prevents government debt to
rise to the maximal sustainable level. One contribution of this paper is to
compare the results to those of the small open economy model presented in
Song et al. (2009). Such an analysis is important, because since the findings
of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) it is well-known that savings and investments
in a country are statistically correlated, which puts the small open economy
assumption in its purest form, i.e. with a constant interest rate, into question.
Therefore the reality is probably somewhere in between with an international
137
APPENDIX C. PUBLIC DEBT IN A POLITICAL ECONOMY
financial market willing to absorb some of the bonds, but not an unlimited
amount of them, so that to some extent the interest rate will react to bond
issues. Interestingly, the analysis in this paper shows that endogenizing the
interest rate leads to very different results for the politico-economic deter-
mination of government debt. Even without distortive taxation an interior
debt level is reached which is lower than the maximum. This could be an
explanation for the general increase in government debt levels in the devel-
oped economies during the last decades. Financial openness could be a factor
to favor the building up of high government debt, as the government is not
constrained to a national market but can sell the bonds on the international
financial market with deeper pockets. However, a caveat is that, as shown in
an extension, under distortive taxation this result can be reversed. In fact,
when tax distortions are high enough government debt can even be lower
in open economies. The reason is that if the costs of providing bonds are
high (for example, because of efficiency losses arising from tax distortions),
government debt will be reduced drastically in the open economy because of
the concern of young voters for future public goods provision, as shown by
Song et al. (2009). However, in the closed economy, some bonds are neces-
sary as they provide the (only) saving instrument for the young agents. As
a result, government debt is higher in the closed economy in this case. Thus
the distortiveness of taxation is a crucial factor to consider to understand
the influence of financial openness on the politico-economic determination of
government debt.
This paper is complementary to recent work about the determination of pub-
lic debt in models without commitment. Debortoli and Nunes (2010) analyze
optimal fiscal policy in an economy where governments with different pref-
erences alternate in office. Battaglini and Coate (2008) present a dynamic
legislative bargaining model where legislators can distribute revenues back
to their districts via pork-barrel spending. Acemoglu et al. (2011) study the
dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model, but under the
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assumption that taxes and public goods are determined by a self-interested
rent-seeking politician who cannot commit to future policies. Those authors
all emphasize different channels which may lead to an overaccumulation of
public debt. Here the focus is on the general-equilibrium effect and the polit-
ical conflicts between different generations of voters. An important difference
to previous work is that (similarly to Song et al., 2009) the inability of gov-
ernments to commit does not necessarily lead to a higher level of government
debt.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 discusses the implications of the model. Section 4 presents an
extension with elastic labor supply and distortive taxation and discusses its
implications. Section 5 concludes.
C.2 A Simple Model with an Endogenous In-
terest Rate
The model presented here is based on Song et al. (2009), but with the impor-
tant difference that the interest rate is endogenous. For simplicity agents live
for two periods only. In the first period they work and in the second period
they retire and live of their savings. The population size is constant. There is
no production sector. The government can tax income, issue bonds, supply
public goods and has to pay back government debt from previous periods.
C.2.1 Private Maximization Problem
The individual has the choice between two kinds of consumption: private
goods consumption (c) and public goods consumption (g). Agents are altru-
istic towards their children. The preferences of a young agent in period t can
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be summarized by the following utility function:
UY,t = u(cY,t) + θu(gt) + β
[
u(cO,t+1) + θu(gt+1) + λUY,t+1
]
(C.1)
where cY,t is private consumption of the agent in his youth in period t, gt is
public consumption in his youth, cO,t+1 is private consumption in his old age
in period t+ 1, gt+1 is public consumption in his old age, θ is the preference
for public goods relative to private goods, β is the time preference or patience
and λ is the degree of altruism. Note that λ = 0 nests a pure OLG model,
where everyone only cares about his own utility and λ = 1 nests the case of
perfect altruism or dynasties (infinitely lived agents).
Correspondingly an old agent in period t has the following utility function:
UO,t = u(cO,t) + θu(gt) + λUY,t (C.2)
I assume a CES-utility function in the following way:
u(x) =
x1−σ
1− σ (C.3)
Note that this specification implies that the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution and the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods
are both equal to 1
σ
. I also assume supplied hours of labor to be constant
and equal to 1: h = 1, such that the gross income of an agent, yt, is given
by:
yt = w
where w is a constant wage parameter. Note that this assumption implies
that there are no tax distortions and taxation is effectively lump sum. Income
net of taxes is thus given by:
A(τt) = (1− τt)w
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Private agents can save for their retirement by buying one period bonds from
their own national government. The budget constraints of the private agents
are then given by:
cY,t + ptb
d
t+1 = A(τt)
cO,t+1 = b
d
t+1
where pt is the price of bond for bonds sold at time t and b
d
t+1 represents the
number of units of consumption promised at time t delivered at time t + 1
(demand for bonds). The gross interest rate will then be Rt+1 =
1
pt
.
The young have to decide how much to consume at time t in their youth
and at time t + 1, when they are old. They take the price of bond, the
tax rate and government consumption as given. Therefore the maximization
problem of the consumer looks as follows:
max
cY,t,cO,t+1
u(cY,t) + θu(gt) + β
[
u(cO,t+1) + θu(gt+1) + λUY,t+1
]
s.t. cY,t + ptb
d
t+1 = A(τt)
cO,t+1 = b
d
t+1
Solving this problem yields the typical Euler equation which defines the
tradeoff between consumption today and tomorrow as a function of the price
of bond:
pt = β
u′(cO,t+1)
u′(cY,t)
The unique and interior solutions for the private consumption choices of old
and young agents are given by:
c∗O,t+1(τt−
, pt
−
, β
+
, w
+
) =
1
pt
β
1
σ
p
1−σ
σ
t + β
1
σ
A(τt) = b
d
t+1 (C.4)
c∗Y,t(τt−
, pt, β
−
, w
+
) =
p
1−σ
σ
t(
p
1−σ
σ
t + β
1
σ
)A(τt) (C.5)
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A higher wage income naturally has a positive effect on consumption for
young and old and a higher tax rate correspondingly has a negative effect on
both consumptions as it lowers net income of the agents. A higher discount
factor has the effect of shifting consumption from today to tomorrow, because
more patient agents like to save more. It is clear that a lower price of bond
meaning a higher return on bonds increases consumption of the old. However
note that the effect of the interest rate on consumption of the young depends
on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
C.2.2 Government Constraints
The government has to balance expenditures with revenues. The revenues
consist of new bonds that are issued and tax revenues: pt+1b
s
t+1 + τtw, where
bst+1 is the government supply of bonds, which pay one unit of consumption
at time t+ 1. The expenditures consist of the debt to repay (in units of con-
sumption) which is given from last periods and the government expenditure
for provision of the public good: gt + bt. Therefore the budget constraint of
the government looks as follows:
ptb
s
t+1 = gt + bt − τtw
The government thus has to provide the promised units of time t consumption
(bt) and it issues new bonds b
s
t+1. In the decision problem of the government,
debt to repay is thus a liability from last period, which is taken as given.
Therefore bt will be defined as the state variable in the decision problem of the
government. Because cO,t = bt I will denote the state variable interchangeably
by cO,t or bt.
When the bond market clears, bst+1 = b
d
t+1 and using the first order conditions
the government budget constraint simplifies to:
gt = w − cY,t − cO,t (C.6)
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Note that government spending in t is a function of the consumption of the
young, cY,t, and the state variable, cO,t, only. This implies that the new
bonds that are issued, bt+1, do not affect the budget of the government given
the consumption allocation of the young. The reason is that the government
cannot simply finance its expenditures by borrowing from abroad like in Song
et al. (2009). The bonds have to be sold to the young agents today and those
have to be willing to give up some consumption. Equation (C.6) is a resource
constraint that the government has to respect.
In this paper I abstract from default and assume that the government is
committed to pay back the debt. In the small open economy model (SOE) of
Song et al. (2009) there is a natural debt limit given by the present discounted
value of the maximum tax revenue that can be collected:1
bSOE =
Rτ¯w
(R− 1)
where R denotes the interest rate equivalent to the inverse bond price, w is
the endowment like here, and τ¯ denotes the maximal tax rate. The reason is
that the government cannot go beyond this limit without repudiating debt
at some future point in time. Thus this debt limit arises naturally from the
assumption that the government is committed not to repudiate the debt.
In case of an endogenous interest rate, this natural debt limit doesn’t exist
because the government influences the interest rate with fiscal policy.
The concept most closely resembling the one of a debt limit in this closed
economy model is a feasibility limit on private consumption of the old next
period. As we have seen, debt is equal to consumption of the old. There
1In the model by Song et al. (2009) government debt is defined as before interest,
whereas in the model presented in this paper government debt is defined for reasons of
technical simplicity as government debt after interest. Denote government debt in the
model by Song et al. (2009) by b˜ and government debt in this model simply by b. To make
the two concepts comparable one can redefine the debt in the model by Song et al. (2009)
to correspond to b: b = R · b˜. As the interest rate is constant in the small open economy
this is simply a multiplication by a constant.
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is a clearly defined ”natural” upper bound for this variable given by the re-
source constraint. Consumption of the old cannot be larger than the available
resources, w:
cO,t+1 = bt+1 < w (C.7)
Thus there is a different ”debt limit” in the closed economy model (CE) given
by:
bCE = w (C.8)
C.2.3 The Commitment Problem
As a first step, I analyze the case of commitment where the first generation of
voters can fix future policies once and for all. More precisely, the solution to
the commitment problem is defined as a feasible path of the policy variables
(the tax rate, τt, the public good, gt, and the level of government debt,
bt+1) that would be chosen by the first generation, if they could decide on
the whole path of each of the variables over time. To be able to find an
analytical solution I reformulate the problem in terms of allocations using the
bond market clearing condition, the budget constraints and the first order
conditions of the agents. Equation (C.6) defines gt in terms of consumption
allocations:
gt = w − cY,t − cO,t
The following system of equations yields pt, bt+1 and τt in terms of consump-
tion allocations (where the bond market clearing is assumed to hold):
pt = β
u′(cO,t+1)
u′(cY,t)
bt+1 = cO,t+1
(1− τt)w = cY,t + ptbt+1
When I have found the solution of the problem in terms of consumption al-
locations I can then recover the corresponding price of bond, tax rate and
government bond issues using this system of equations. Such an approach is
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called ”primal” and is frequently used in the optimal taxation literature.
To understand how the commitment problem can be formulated it is use-
ful to first look at the case where only the old decide, then the case where
only the young decide and finally at the more general formulation where both
groups are assigned their corresponding weight.
Only the Old Decide
First suppose only the old agents decide. Then their optimization problem
can be formulated in a recursive way with the following Bellman equation
(see Appendix for more details):
V CommO (cO) = max
cY ,c
′
O,g
{
v(cY , cO, g) + λβV
Comm
O (c
′
O)
}
(C.9)
s.t. g = w − cY − cO
where v(cY , cO, g) = u(cO) + (1 + λ)θu(g) + λu(cY ). As already mentioned
above I define consumption of the old today (which is equal to the inher-
ited level of government debt from last period) as the state variable, which
summarizes all past events. Note that consequently old agents today cannot
decide on their consumption today, because this is already determined by
their bond holdings (the savings decision in their youth). They decide on
consumption of the young today and consumption of the old tomorrow. The
first order conditions of this problem are given by (see Appendix for more
details):
−θ(1 + λ)u′(g) + λu′(cY ) = 0 (C.10)
λβ[u′(c′O)− θ(1 + λ)u′(g′)] = 0 (C.11)
Equation (C.11) shows that consumption of the old, or equivalently govern-
ment debt has to be constant, because cY doesn’t show up in the equation.
In fact, in the closed economy model there is an intertemporal dichotomy
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in the problem. cY determines the allocation of total resources (w) between
private and public consumption today and c′O determines the allocation be-
tween private and public consumption tomorrow. Therefore the choice of
c′O is only relevant for the future and does not depend on the state of the
economy cO. Intuitively as alluded above, government debt cannot be used
as a financing instrument for government spending this period, because the
government has to sell the bonds to the young agents inside the economy
and cannot borrow funds from the international capital market.
Solving equations (C.10) and (C.11) for consumption of the young, cY , and
consumption of the old next period, c′O, under the assumption of CES-utility
one obtains the following solutions (see Appendix for more details):
cY,t =

λ
1
σ(
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +λ
1
σ
)(w − cO,t) in t = 0
λ
1
σ[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w in t > 0
cO,t+1 = bt+1 =
1[
(θ(1 + λ))
1
σ + 1 + λ
1
σ
]w for λ, β > 0 in t ≥ 0
To understand better the determination of the debt level in this model con-
sider the case of no altruism. If there was no altruism (λ = 0), the old
would choose cY = 0 and g = w − cO,0 to receive the maximum amount of
public goods consumption for themselves. This means that they tax away
the whole income of the young generation by setting the maximal tax rate
τ = 1. However if we look at the F.O.C. for consumption of the old in equa-
tion (C.11) we note that if λ = 0 the consumption of the old is indeterminate
(or equivalently public debt is indeterminate). That is the old do not care
about consumption of the next generation of old in this case. Clearly, as they
care only about public goods consumption today it is sufficient for them to
set consumption of the young today to a minimal level. Whether the young
are promised any consumption in the next period to compensate them for the
loss or not does not interest the old, because they will not be alive anymore.
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In contrast, if there is altruism (λ > 0) the level of government debt is not
indeterminate. The reason is that the old care about their children which in
turn are affected by government debt in two ways: (1) the bonds they own
constitute their consumption in old age and (2) the debt represents a burden
for the government budget next period which means that less public goods
can be provided. The level of debt therefore solves the tradeoff between pub-
lic and private consumption of the old of tomorrow (the young of today).
The old of today will consider this if they are altruistic.
Only the Young Decide
This subsection analyzes the case where only the young agents decide. Their
problem can be formulated recursively in two stages (see Appendix for more
details):
{cY,0, cO,1, g0} = arg max
{
u(cY,0) + θu(g0) + V
Comm
O (cO,1)
}
(C.12)
V CommO (cO) = max
cY ,c
′
O,g
{
v(cY , cO, g) + λβV
Comm
O (c
′
O)
}
for t > 0
s.t. g = w − cY − cO
where v(.) is defined as above. As we can see, the commitment problem where
only the young decide is different only in period 0. From period 1 onwards it
is the same as if only the old decide (see equation (C.9)). Therefore it is not
surprising that the solutions for cY,t and cO,t+1 are the same as in the case
where only the old decide with the exception of cY,0 (see Appendix for more
details):
cY,t =

1(
1+θ
1
σ
)(w − cO,t) in t = 0
λ
1
σ[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w in t > 0
cO,t+1 = bt+1 =
1[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w for λ, β > 0 in t ≥ 0
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Consider again the case of no altruism to gain intuition. In period 0 the young
set their consumption such that resources at their disposition (w − cO,0) are
optimally split between public and private consumption. Private consump-
tion is a share of 1
1+θ
1
σ
of those available resources and public consumption
a share of θ
1
σ
1+θ
1
σ
. Note that the higher the share of public consumption com-
pared to private consumption the higher taxes have to be. Thus the young
will tax themselves according to their preference for public goods, θ, tak-
ing the state variable cO,0 as given. Logically, the higher the preference for
public goods, θ, the higher the share of public consumption will be. Fur-
thermore the higher the elasticity of substitution, 1
σ
, the higher the share of
public consumption, if θ < 1 and the lower the share of public consumption,
if θ > 1. Take the natural case of θ < 1. In this case private consump-
tion has a higher weight in the utility function. To the extent that different
sorts of consumption are substitutable (measured by 1
σ
) they thus prefer to
consume privately. A higher substitutability thus lets them substitute pub-
lic by private consumption and the share of public consumption will be lower.
In period 1, the young set private consumption of their children to zero,
cY,1 = 0, as they are not altruistic. This means they tax away their whole
income and use it for bond repayments (or equivalently their own private con-
sumption in old age) and public goods provision. Their disposable income
is thus equal to w. As intra-temporal utility is symmetric in old age and
youth they will split disposable income in the same way as before between
private and public consumption. To achieve this optimal mix, they set the
number of bonds to cO,1 =
1
1+θ
1
σ
w. Thus a share 1
1+θ
1
σ
of income is consumed
privately and a share θ
1
σ
1+θ
1
σ
of income is consumed publicly. Logically, cO,t+1
for t > 1 is again indeterminate in the absence of altruism.
The General Commitment Solution
If young and old decide both together according to their weight (0 < ω < 1),
one can find a two-stage recursive formulation of this problem by combining
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the one from the old and from the young (see Appendix for more details):
{cY,0, cO,1, g0} = arg max {(1− ω)q(cY,0, g0) + ωv(cY,0, cO,0, g0) (C.13)
+βω˜V CommO (cO,1)
}
(C.14)
V CommO (cO) = max
cY ,c
′
O,g
{
v(cY , cO, g) + λβV
Comm
O (c
′
O)
}
for t > 0
s.t. g = w − cY − cO
where v(.) is defined as above, q(cY,0, g0) = u(cY,0) + θu(g0) and ω˜ = (1 −
ω + ωλ). The solutions to this problem are the following (see Appendix for
more details):
cY,t =

ω˜
1
σ
[θ(1+ωλ)]
1
σ +ω˜
1
σ
(w − cO,t) in t = 0
λ
1
σ[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w in t > 0
cO,t+1 =

1[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w for (λ > 0 or ω 6= 1) and β > 0, in t = 0
1[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w for λ, β > 0 in t > 0
Again note that the debt level and private consumption from period t > 0
onwards do not depend on who decides. The reason is that the old (through
altruism for their children) and the young (directly) share the same interests
from t > 0 onwards as explained above. In contrast, private consumption in
period t=0 reacts differently to inherited debt, because in this period the in-
terests of young and old differ. Furthermore, (provided that β > 0) note that
the demand for bonds is indeterminate in period t = 0, if there is no altruism
(λ = 0) and only the old decide (ω = 1) for reasons already discussed above.
Logically, for subsequent periods the demand for bonds is indeterminate, if
there is no altruism, regardless of the power of the old, ω. One can show
that for a given initial debt level, the consumption of the young in the first
period is bigger the higher the power of the young (see Appendix for a proof).
The commitment solution will now serve as a benchmark of comparison to
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the political equilibrium, where the government cannot commit to an entire
time path of the policy variables, but is reelected every period.
C.2.4 The Political Equilibrium
Following Song et al. (2009) I assume a probabilistic voting model, where
candidates or parties propose a policy platform, characterized by some policy
variables (here: gt, τt and bt+1), but they can differ in some other dimension
unrelated to this policy, e.g. ”ideology”. Voters differ in their valuation of
this other dimension. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) have shown that under
such conditions the political choice is equivalent to maximizing a weighted
objective of the indirect utilities, where the weights represent the fraction of
the population with these particular preferences. Therefore, in this context,
the equilibrium of the probabilistic voting model can be represented as the
choice over time of gt, τt and bt+1 maximizing a political objective function,
which is a weighted average of young and old households, given the state
variable bt. Similar to the commitment case the political objective function
V assigns a weight ω to the old and a weight (1−ω) to the young, such that
if ω = 1 the power is entirely in the hands of the old and if ω = 0 the young
have the power. Again I use a “primal approach” formulating everything in
terms of consumption allocations instead of the policy variables and I take
cO,t = bt as a state variable (bold letters denote sequences starting from the
indicated period):
V (cY,t, cO,t,gt) = (1− ω)UY (cY,t, cO,t+1,gt) + ωUO(cY,t, cO,t,gt)(C.15)
where
UY (cY,t, cO,t+1,gt) = u(cY,t) + θu(gt) + βUO(cY,t+1, cO,t+1,gt+1)
UO(cY,t, cO,t,gt) = u(cO,t) + θu(gt) + λUY (cY,t, cO,t+1,gt)
There is commitment in the sense that the promised policy will always be
taken out by the candidates once in office. The lack of commitment in this
model stems from the fact that the government today cannot commit future
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governments to any specific actions. Each political candidate will maximize
his objective function with respect to the government budget constraint. The
present government cannot commit future governments to any actions, but by
setting the level of government debt the government today can nevertheless
have an important influence on the next government in place by restricting
its budget. This is important because part of the electorate cares about the
actions of the future government as well (the young). Finding the political
equilibrium involves finding the outcome of a dynamic game between gener-
ations of voters. Similarly to Song et al. (2009) I focus on Markov perfect
equilibria of this game. In this case the only payoff-relevant state variable
is consumption of the old (here denoted by cO,t). The following definition
summarizes the properties of such an equilibrium:
DEFINITION C.5. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a 3-tuple of functions
〈CO, CY , G〉, where CO : [0, w] → [0, w] is a function showing the dynamics
of debt (or equivalently consumption of the old), c′O = CO(cO), CY : [0, w]→
[0, w] is a mapping between last period’s debt and private consumption today,
cY = CY (cO), and G : [0, w]→ [0, w] is a mapping between last period’s debt
and government expenditure, g = G(cO), such that:
1. < CO(cO), CY (cO), G(cO) >= argmaxV (cO, cY ,g), s. t. (C.6) and
(C.8),
and V (cO, cY ,g) is defined as in (C.15).
2. The government budget constraint is satisfied:
G(cO) = w − CY (cO)− cO
Intuitively each government determines the current fiscal policy constraint
by the government budget and expecting that governments in the future will
behave according to the equilibrium policy functions, < CO(cO), CY (cO),
G(cO) > defined above. It can be shown that this problem translates to the
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following two stage recursive formulation similar to the one for the commit-
ment case:
〈CO(cO), CY (cO), G(cO)〉 = arg max
c′O,cY ,g
(1− ω)q(cY , g) + ωv(cY , cO, g)
+ βω˜VO(c
′
O) (C.16)
VO(c
′
O) = v(CY (c
′
O), c
′
O, G(c
′
O) + βλVO(CO(c
′
O))
s.t. G(cO) = w − CY (cO)− cO
where v(.), q(.) and ω˜ are defined as above.
PROPOSITION C.4. Suppose we have a closed OLG economy as described
above with β > 0, λ > 0 and 0 < ω < 1, where the private consumption
of the agents is given by (C.5) and (C.4), the bond market clears and in
each period the government maximizes (C.15) subject to (C.6) and (C.8).
Then there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium characterized by the following
policy functions:
cY,t = CY (cO,t) =
1
1 + ξ
(w − cO,t) (C.17)
gt = G(cO) =
ξ
1 + ξ
(w − cO,t) (C.18)
cO,t+1 = CO(cO,t) =
(1 + ξ)
1−σ
σ
(1 + ξ)
1−σ
σ + [(1 + λ)θξ1−σ + λ]
1
σ
w (C.19)
where ξ =
(
θ(1 + ωλ)
ω˜
) 1
σ
(All proofs are relegated to the Appendix).
In the next section I will discuss the results found in this section more in
detail.
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C.3 Discussion of the Results
The political economy model presented above although simple and stylized
yields some interesting insights regarding the influence of institutions on the
determination of government debt or the reason for differences in govern-
ment debt levels between different countries. In Section C.3.1, I contrast the
commitment equilibrium and the political equilibrium to investigate the im-
plications of each institutional setting for the determination of government
debt. In Section C.3.2, I analyze the comparative statics of the model to see
how differences in preferences can yield different levels of government debt.
Furthermore, in Section C.3.3, I compare the results of this closed economy
model to those of the small open economy model by Song et al. (2009).
C.3.1 Commitment vs. Markov Equilibrium
The choice of an institutional setting such as between a democracy with peri-
odical reelections or a commitment device (for example a constitutional debt
rule) can have an important influence on the determination of public debt
in an economy. In this paper, I focus on comparing those two diametrically
opposed institutional settings: a determination of policies through a gov-
ernment that is reelected every period (Markov or political equilibrium) or
through a rule that is set in the first period by the first generation of voters
(commitment equilibrium). To illustrate the results I choose the following
parameter values: β = 0.98530, λ = 0.6, ω = 0.5, θ = 1.00, w = 1. Figure C.1
shows Markov and Commitment equilibrium policy functions with different
values for the parameter σ (from the second period onwards).
Panel (a) and panel (b) of Figure C.1 show that taxes and public goods are
generally higher under commitment for any given debt level. In the commit-
ment case the first generation that decides does not pay taxes in the future,
but still profits from public goods. Thus the only consideration that pre-
vents them to set the maximum tax rate is the altruism for their children. In
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Figure C.1: Comparison of Markov and Commitment Equilibrium
contrast in the political equilibrium each generation decides themselves how
much taxes they want to set for themselves. Thus they have a direct interest
in setting lower taxes and more moderate public goods rather than indirect
through altruism.
A high debt burden can be financed in both cases either by taxation or
by reducing public goods provision. Starting from an already high level of
taxes and public goods in the commitment case the reaction will therefore
rather go in the direction of reducing public goods. Therefore the policy
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function of taxes is flatter and the policy function for public goods is steeper
in the commitment case compared to the political equilibrium.
To understand the intuition behind those results consider therefore next the
determination of next-period’s debt level in Panel (d) of Figure C.1. The
steady state level of government debt is given at the intersection of the policy
function with the 45-degree-line. A noticeable feature of the policy functions
for debt is that they are flat, i.e. independent of the previous level of govern-
ment debt. As already brought forward in the discussion of the commitment
solution this is a generic feature of this model of closed economy. There is a
intertemporal dichotomy in the model where government debt is only rele-
vant for the next period’s allocation of resources between public and private
consumption and the choice of the tax rate (or equivalently consumption of
the young) is only relevant for this period’s allocation of resources between
public and private consumption. Thus there is no intertemporal link and the
economy jumps to the equilibrium debt level in one period.
The equilibrium debt level is thus determined by intratemporal consider-
ations about how much public and private consumption there should be for
the old generation next period (this period’s young). Those intratempo-
ral considerations apply under commitment and in the political equilibrium.
However, in the political equilibrium there is additionally a ’strategic effect’
of public debt on the next generation of young voters. Young voters tomor-
row react to a higher debt level left by today’s generation by increasing the
taxes they set themselves and reducing their private consumption, as can
be seen from Panel (a) in Figure C.1. The reason is that a higher level of
government debt restrains next period’s budget and lowers the amount of
public goods that can be financed. To avoid too large a loss of public goods
the young are ready to reduce their private consumption (or equivalently tax
themselves more). The young today know about this reaction and can make
use of it by deviating from the level of government debt that solves opti-
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mally the tradeoff between public and private consumption in old age. They
can enforce a level of consumption of the old that is somewhat higher to rip
the young tomorrow off their resources. Under commitment, of course, they
don’t need to deviate from their optimal debt level because they can directly
control consumption of the young in the next period. It is thus enlightening
to compare the first order condition for debt under commitment and in the
political equilibrium, for the simple case when there is no altruism λ = 0:
Commitment: u′(c′O)− θu′(w − c′O − c′Y ) = 0
Political equilibrium: u′(c′O)− θu′(w − c′O − CY (c′O)) [1 + C ′Y (c′O)] = 0
The conditions look very similar except for the fact that in the political equi-
librium the reaction of the policy function of private consumption, CY (.), on
the debt level, c′O = b
′, plays a role. This formally shows the ’strategic effect’
discussed above.
In the light of those considerations one can understand the role of the en-
dogenous interest rate or bond market in the model. Panel (c) of Figure C.1
shows the equilibrium interest rate (or inverse price of bond) for any given
debt level. Remarkably high given debt levels lead to very high interest rates.
This is quite intuitive considering the results above. A high debt level leads
to an increase in taxation and a decrease in public goods provision. The
disposable income of today’s young generation is thus restrained. The gov-
ernment (the planner or the voters) wants to set public debt in a certain way
to solve tomorrow’s tradeoff between public and private consumption. But
the young household’s of today with low disposable income have naturally a
lower demand for bonds. Thus the government through the national bond
market is forced to offer high interest rates to be able to sell enough bonds.
Interestingly, the determination of next-period’s debt level depends on the
elasticity of substitution. A ’knife-edge’ case exists for logarithmic utility:
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PROPOSITION C.5. Under logarithmic utility, i.e. if the elasticity of
substitution goes to 1: 1
σ
= 1, the level of next-period’s government debt is
equal in the political equilibrium and in the commitment equilibrium. For
1
σ
> 1 the level of next-period’s government debt is higher in the political
equilibrium and for 1
σ
< 1 the level of next-period’s government debt is lower
in the political equilibrium.
Note that 1
σ
fulfills a dual role in the model, being at the same time the
elasticity of substitution between public and private goods and the elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution. Given the intertemporal dichotomy of the
model the intertemporal elasticity of substitution doesn’t play any role for
the determination of the level of government debt. For the strength of the
strategic effect, the parameter σ is thus especially important in its function
as a parameter of substitutability between public and private goods.
It is not completely clear in the macroeconomic literature what the elas-
ticity of substitution between public and private goods should be. There are
examples of public goods which would rather be seen as complements to pri-
vate goods (like infrastructure or the legal system) and others which would
rather be seen as substitutes (such as health or education).
Nevertheless there is a large empirical literature estimating the elasticity of
substitution between public and private goods (see also, for example, Bandy-
opadhyay and Esteban, 2007, p.22, for a discussion of this literature). Early
studies analyzing this question defined substitutability by the value of the
cross derivative between public and private consumption. Using this mea-
sure of substitutability Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) for the United
States and Ahmed (1986) for the United Kingdom find evidence that public
and private goods are substitutes. In contrast, Karras (1994) for 30 countries
and Evans and Karras (1996) for 54 countries provide evidence from cross-
country panel regressions that public and private goods are complements. For
Japan Hamori and Asako (1999) find substitutability whereas Okubo (2003)
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finds complementarity or no relationship. Comparing all those results, they
seem disappointingly contradictory. Furthermore it seems that they are not
robust to the exact specification of the utility function, as prominently shown
by Ni (1995).2 This casts doubt on the generality of any empirical estimates
of the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods using the
cross-derivative. Furthermore this way of measuring substitutability is not
the same as in this paper, which considers not the cross-derivative, but the
elasticity of substitution.
Corresponding most closely to the concept of substitutability used in this
paper Amano and Wirjanto (1998) estimate an elasticity of substitution be-
tween public and private goods of around 1.56 in the US (slightly substitutes).
Even if this concept of elasticity seems a little more general than the cross-
derivative, Bouakez and Rebei (2007) find that even those estimates are not
robust to the time-separability of utility.3
How does the elasticity of substitution determine the strength of the strategic
effect? To use government debt strategically the young agents today have to
deviate from the level of government debt that optimally solves their tradeoff
between public and private consumption tomorrow. The higher the elasticity
of substitution the less costly it is to deviate from this optimal tradeoff level.
Note also that under commitment as the future tax rate is generally higher
(it can be set by the first generation), the optimal tradeoff level of govern-
ment debt is higher than in the political equilibrium. It turns out that, if
2More precisely, he finds that estimates change depending on the time-separability
of utility, the measure of the real interest rate and how public and private consumption
enter the utility function (additively separable or not).Under time-separability of the utility
function estimates indicate substitutability. Under time-nonseparability and using the net-
of-tax interest rate there is still substitutability whereas using the pre-tax real interest rate
estimates indicate complementarity. Under a CES-specification (non additively separable
public and private consumption) there is however complementarity with the net-of-tax
real interest rate and substitutability with the pre-tax real interest rate.
3Their estimate of the elasticity of substitution between public and private goods as-
suming a utility function displaying habit-formation is equal to 0.332. Effectively habit-
formation is the form of non-timeseparability considered also by Ni (1995).
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1
σ
= 1 the debt level under commitment (optimal tradeoff level) is exactly
the same as the debt level in the political equilibrium (optimal tradeoff level
plus strategic effect), as shown in Proposition 2. It is thus not necessarily the
case that a commitment device leads to lower debt levels than democratic
voting, even if strategic effects play a role. If public and private goods are
substitutes, government debt is higher in the political equilibrium than under
commitment. In this case a commitment device would make sense to avoid
a too high debt burden. If public and private goods are substitutes, gov-
ernment debt is lower in the political equilibrium than under commitment.
In this situation a commitment device which is put into place by the first
generation of voters, leads to a higher debt level.
A commitment or a voting institution are not the only possible differences
between countries that can have an important influence on the politico-
economic determination of government debt in this model. The next section
analyzes the influence of the underlying preference parameters in a compar-
ative statics analysis.
C.3.2 Comparative Statics
Large differences in public debt between countries, even inside the group of
democratic countries, suggest that the determination of public debt depends,
on top of the form of government, on cultural and institutional characteristics
that differ between countries. Those cultural and institutional characteristics
can be captured in the context of this model by the underlying preference
parameters.
The parameter summarizing the preference for public goods relative to pri-
vate goods, θ, shows the concern of the voters for public goods provision or
their view about how much government activity there should be in the coun-
try. The parameter for altruism, λ, shows the concern of voters for future
generations and the parameter for the power of the old relative to the young,
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ω, shows the political influence of the old generation relative to the young
generation. All those parameters can influence of course the determination
of the level of public debt in a country.
Depending on the strength of the strategic effect, the preference parame-
ters can have differential effects on the determination of government debt.
As shown in Proposition 2 above, the elasticity of substitution between pub-
lic and private goods 1
σ
is decisive for the strength of the strategic effect.
Interesting for the analysis here is the empirical question, if this elasticity
of substitution is equal for different countries. Kwan (2006) provides evi-
dence that this is not the case even within the group of East-Asian countries.
Bandyopadhyay and Esteban (2007) argue that the substitutability between
public and private goods ”depends on the nature of individual preferences
and on the degree of monopoly that the government keeps for itself for some
subset of commodities ...” (Bandyopadhyay and Esteban, 2007, p.22). Using
OECD data they estimate a proxy for the elasticity of substitution in differ-
ent sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary education and health) and show that
there are important differences even within the group of OECD countries.4
Thus I will analyze both cases here, complementarity and substitutability.
Complementary Public and Private Goods
For the case of complementarity ( 1
σ
< 1) the following comparative static
effects on the level of next-period’s government debt in the political equilib-
rium arise (more details in the Appendix):
1. The higher the power of the old, ω, (or equivalently the lower the power
of the young, 1− ω), the higher is next period’s debt.
2. The higher the degree of altruism, λ, the lower next-period’s debt.
3. The effect of the preference for public goods, θ, is ambiguous.
4For example, in the tertiary eduction sector and for health the measure indicates
complementarity in some countries but substitutability in others.
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Those comparative static effects clearly relate to the general intuition about
a ’strategic effect’ discussed in section C.3.1 above.
First, the higher the voting power of the old generation the nearer the debt
level approaches the one under commitment (which is higher). The reason is
that the strategic effect is then less of an issue. The young generation today
do not need to set a high debt level as they can directly vote for higher taxes
tomorrow. Of course, in the extreme case when the old have all the power,
ω = 1, the debt level is the same as under commitment, because they do
not need the strategic effect and can set tax rates themselves. Effectively,
as the power of the old increases the political equilibrium approaches the
commitment solution.
Second, a higher altruism parameter λ leads unambiguously to a lower next-
period’s debt level. Intuitively, under commitment public goods are more
attractive for altruistic parents, as they also profit to their children. Thus
even the desired level of public debt is lower with higher altruism, as parents
want to leave more resources for public goods provision and consumption of
their children. In the political equilibrium, in addition to the fact that the
desired level of debt in the view of the altruistic parents is already lower, a
higher altruism in addition limits the use of the strategic effect to achieve a
higher public goods provision. The more altruistic parents do not want to
rip off their children to the same extent.
Third, a higher preference for public goods, θ, has an ambiguous effect on
the level of public debt next period. Intuitively, under commitment the
young today would unambigously prefer a lower level of private vs. public
consumption tomorrow as their preference for public consumption increases.
However, in the political equilibrium a higher preference for public goods
has also the effect of dampening the strategic effect on the next generation.
Public goods will already be higher, because also young voters tomorrow
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Figure C.2: The Influence of the Preference for Public Goods on the De-
termination of Government Debt (Case of Complementarity)
prefer more public goods. The conjecture is however that as long as there is
altruism, which produces a higher value of the public good as it is shared,
a higher preference for public goods should nevertheless decrease further the
level of public debt. Figure C.2 confirms this intuition. Note however that
for high complementarity the curves are very flat.
Substitutable Public and Private Goods
For the case of substitutability, 1
σ
> 1, one can distinguish the following
comparative static effects on next-period’s debt level:
1. The higher the power of the old, ω, (or equivalently the lower the power
of the young, 1− ω), the lower is next period’s debt.
2. The higher the preference for public goods, θ, the lower is next-period’s
debt.
3. The effect of the degree of altruism, λ, is ambiguous.
First, similar to before the higher the power of the old the more the solution
will resemble the commitment solution. Intuitively, the young generation
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today does not need to make use of the strategic effect, because they can
directly use their voting power tomorrow. Thus the debt level will decrease,
the higher the power of the old.
Second, the effect of a higher preference of public goods is clear now. As
public goods become more attractive not only does the desired level of debt
decrease, but in addition the strategic effect is dampened. Thus the debt
level with decrease unambiguously with a higher preference for public goods
in this case.
Third, the effect of altruism is ambiguous in the case of substitutability.
But given that the effect on the desired level of debt is negative, the con-
jecture is that the effect will also be negative in the political equilibrium for
any reasonable parameter values. Figure C.3 confirms this intuition.
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Figure C.3: The Influence of the Degree of Altruism on the Determination
of Government Debt (Case of Substitutability)
Summarizing, the degree of altruism and the preference for public goods
seem to dampen a potential tendency of high indebtedness according to this
model. One would thus expect to see lower public debt in countries where
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public goods are viewed as being more important or where the concern for
future generations is higher. The effect of political power of old vs. young
agents in the economy depends on the degree of substitutability between
public and private goods. When public and private goods are complements a
higher power of the old generation leads to higher public debt. When public
and private goods are substitutes, the higher the voting power of old voters
the lower the level of public debt.
Besides those underlying preference parameters, another characteristic of
a country is its degree of openness. The next section compares the open
and the closed economy models to understand the role of openness for the
determination of public debt.
C.3.3 A Comparison between the Open and Closed
Economy Models
Although today’s financial markets are supposedly open to the participa-
tion of any country and not confined to national markets, it is a well known
puzzle that in reality still most of the activity stays inside the national mar-
kets of each country. In fact, it is sort of a stylized fact in international
macroeconomics that despite the openness of financial markets the correla-
tion between savings and investment inside a country is still high for a lot
of countries (as first noted by Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). Thus in today’s
economies a change in the supply of bonds can still have an effect on the
interest rate on those bonds, although it is probably not as extreme as if the
economy was completely closed. It thus makes sense to analyze a model with
an endogenous interest rate as well as a small open economy set-up with an
exogenous interest rate and contrast the results, as the reality probably lies
somewhere in between. In this section, I will thus compare the results of the
model presented above to the small open economy model of Song et al. (2009).
The definitions of government debt in the two models are slightly differ-
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Figure C.4: Comparison of Policy Functions for the Closed and Open Econ-
omy
ent. Whereas Song et al. (2009) define debt as debt before interest, I have
chosen to define it as debt after interest, which in the closed economy con-
text is practical as it is equal to consumption of the old. To undertake the
comparison I therefore need a common denominator, which I choose to be
my definition, debt after interest. The illustrative parameters are set like in
Example 1 of Song et al. (2009): β = 0.98530, λ = 0, R = 1.0530 (for the
gross interest rate or equivalently for the price of bondp ≈ 0.23), ω = 0.5,
θ = 1.00, w = 1 and σ = 1 (log-utility). Figure C.4 shows how the policy
functions in terms of debt compare in the two models:
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Panel (a) and (b) show that the policy functions for taxes and public goods
are very similar. In both cases a higher debt burden is financed partly by
a higher tax rate and by a lower level of public goods. However, as shown
in panel (c), the policy function of public debt is very different. Whereas in
the open economy public debt can be used to shift resources from tomorrow
to today, by borrowing on the international financial market, in the closed
economy no resources can be shifted but the resource constraint has to hold,
so that public debt is only relevant for the allocation of different kinds of
consumption tomorrow. Thus public debt is independent of the state of the
economy today as already argued above. Therefore whereas next-period’s
debt is used to finance higher expenditures in the face of a high given debt
burden today in the open economy model, it is independent of the state to-
day in the closed economy model. Of course this translates to very different
dynamics of public debt, shown in panel (d). Whereas public debt is constant
in the closed economy it is increasing over time until it reaches the maximum
in the open economy.
Note also that the upper bound for debt is different in the two economies.
The reason is that the open economy is limited by the present discounted
value of the maximum tax revenue that can be collected:
bopen =
Rτ¯w
(R− 1) ≈ 1.3
where R = 1.0530, w = 1 as specified above. τ¯ , the maximal tax rate is equal
to 100% in the case of inelastic labor supply.
In contrast, in the closed economy debt after interest (or equivalently con-
sumption of the old) is limited by the maximal amount of consumption of
the old that is possible, i.e. the endowment of resources, w:
bclosed = c¯O = w = 1
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Note that this debt limit is tighter than the one of the open economy. In-
tuitively there is more room for issuing debt in an open economy because
the government can borrow from an international capital market with deep
pockets, whereas in the closed economy a high borrowing necessarily involves
distorting the consumption allocations of the agents in the economy.
Concluding one can say that the analysis of this section clearly predicts
a lower long run level of government debt in closed vs. open (democratic)
economies in the case of no distortive taxation. This result can be easily
seen to hold for the wide range of sensible parameter values.5 This finding
suggests a potential explanation for why debt levels increased so much in
a lot of today’s developed economies during the last decades. It might be
related to financial globalization which makes borrowing abroad much easier
than if the bonds have to be sold inside the country. However one must add
the caveat that, as shown by Song et al. (2009), for the case of distortive
taxation also the open economy model reaches an interior steady state which
is much lower than the maximum. Therefore the above argument would only
make sense as an explanation for countries where tax distortions are absent
or very small. Otherwise the simple fact of financial openness should not
push to high long run debt.
To illuminate the role of tax distortions for the determination of public debt
further I will thus analyze in the next section an extension of the model
where labor supply is elastic and thus tax distortions can arise.
5In fact, even for the extreme case of θ = 0 where only private goods are consumed and
thus in the closed economy the maximum debt level of w is reached, it would in addition
take a negative interest rate (or a gross interest rate R < 1) to reach a smaller debt level
in the open economy in the long run.
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C.4 An Extension: A Model with Elastic La-
bor Supply
In the baseline model it was assumed that labor supply is inelastic. This
assumption allows me to solve the model analytically using a primal approach
as shown above. However this is of course a crude simplification of reality. In
the real world we observe that economic agents react to higher taxes on the
labor supply to some extent by working less. The distortions arising from
this endogenous reaction of labor supply could change the way a policy is
chosen. It is therefore important to check if the results of the model still hold
when labor supply is somewhat elastic.
C.4.1 Household Production
The way I introduce an elastic labor supply is inspired by Song et al. (2009).
For this approach it is assumed that the household can either work in the
market production sector and subsequently buy goods in the goods market
from the wage income earned, w, or produce goods directly via home pro-
duction using the technology yH = F (h) = X(1 − h1+ξ)/(1 + ξ), where h is
hours worked in the market production, ξ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity, X is a constant defining the value of leisure. There is a linear tax
τ ∈ [0, 1] on wages. It is thus implicitly assumed that the government cannot
tax home production. Therefore a high tax distorts the time agents work in
the market production sector. The agents choose their allocation of time so
as to maximize total after-tax income:
A(τ) ≡ max
h∈[0,1]
{(1− τ)wh+ F (h)}
This maximization problem yields labor supply as a function of the tax rate:
h(τt) =
(
(1− τt)w
X
) 1
ξ
168
C.4 An Extension: A Model with Elastic Labor Supply
The solutions to the private optimization problem are exactly the same as
before, but using the new definition of after tax income A(τt). For simplic-
ity I assume log-utility (σ = 1). In this case the solutions of the private
optimization problem are simply given by:
cY,t =
1
1 + β
A(τt) (C.20)
cO,t+1 =
1
pt
β
1 + β
A(τt) = bt+1 (C.21)
C.4.2 The Government Constraints
The budget constraint of the government now involves the reaction of hours
to the tax rate:
ptb
s
t+1 = gt + bt − τtwh(τt) (C.22)
Again we can transform the government budget constraint into a resource
constraint. Output (or resources) in the economy however now involves both
home and market production:
Y (τt) = wh(τt) +X(1− h(τt)1+ξ)/(1 + ξ)
= A(τ) + τtwh(τt)
Output is a function of the tax rate, because a higher tax rate influences
output through the hours allocation between the market and home produc-
tion sectors. The second part of the equation shows that output can also be
written in terms of after tax income and tax revenues (by simply adding and
subtracting tax revenues). Assuming bond market clearing bst+1 = b
d
t+1 and
using the first order conditions in equation (C.20) and (C.21) one can elim-
inate the price of bond in equation (C.22) and obtain a formulation similar
to a resource constraint:
gt = Y (τt)− 1
1 + β
A(τt)− bt
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In this extended model there is a new debt limit which is stricter than simply
the maximum amount of resources. The reason is that home production
cannot be used to fulfill debt liabilities as it is not taxable. Therefore from
the requirement of positive public goods g > 0 follows that a new debt limit
is now given by the maximum amount of tax revenues that can be achieved:
b¯new = τ¯wh(τ¯) (C.23)
where τ¯ in this model denotes the top of the Laffer curve.
C.4.3 The Commitment Problem
In this economy with tax distortions the “primal approach” is not practicable
because one would have to solve for the tax rate in terms of allocations, but
it is only implicitely given. The commitment problem thus has to be cast in
terms of policy variables, like a Ramsey planning problem, by substituting
in the private solutions in equation (C.14) (now formally denoting the state
variable by bt to signal that the Ramsey approach is used):
{τ0, b1, g0} = arg max {(1− ω)qˆ(τ0, g0) + ωvˆ(τ0, b0, g0)
+βω˜V CommO (b1)
}
(C.24)
V CommO (b) = max
τ,b′,g
{
vˆ(τ, b, g) + λβV CommO (b
′)
}
for t > 0
s.t. g = Y (τ)− 1
1 + β
A(τ)− b (C.25)
where vˆ(τ, b, g) = u(b) + (1 + λ)θu(g) + λu(A(τ)), qˆ(τ, g) = u(A(τ)) + θu(g)
and ω˜ = (1−ω+ωλ). Note that the debt limit does not have to be imposed
for the maximization problem, because public goods consumption will be
automatically be chosen to be above zero. However the state variable has to
be defined inside the bounds b ∈ [0, b¯new] otherwise feasibility is not given.
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C.4.4 The Political Equilibrium
Also for the political equilibrium the “primal approach” is not possible any-
more. Therefore we again have to substitute in the private solutions and use
a similar two stage recursive approach as in equation (C.16) searching for
the policy functions B(b), T (b) and G(b) now:
< B(b), T (b), G(b) >= arg max
b′,τ,g
(1− ω)qˆ(τ, g) + ωvˆ(τ, b, g) + βω˜VO(b′)
VO(b
′) = vˆ(T (b′), b′, G(b′) + βλVO(B(b′))
s.t. G(b) = Y (T (b))− 1
1 + β
A(T (b))− b
where vˆ(.), qˆ(.) and ω˜ defined as above for the commitment problem.
C.4.5 Benchmark Calibration
The model has to be solved numerically. I use a standard grid search to
find the maximum of the objective functions shown above.6 The calibration
strategy is inspired by Song et al. (2009). One period is set to thirty years
and I assume log-utility. However as I have a closed economy model and debt
is equal to savings of the old, debt will generally be quite high in the political
equilibrium as it constitutes the only savings device. Therefore instead of tar-
geting the US debt-to-GDP ratio I target an annual savings-to-output ratio of
3.3. Then the strategy is to set λ, θ and X to simultaneously target the sav-
ings to output ratio (=government debt here), an average steady state labor
income tax rate of 28% and a market to total ratio of consumption of around
30%. With one period being thirty years, a labor share of output of 0.67 and
a target for the interest rate of 2.5% the after interest steady state level of sav-
ings to labor earnings is equal to cO/wH = (1.025
30)×3.3×0.67/30 = 0.1545.
I assume equal political weights of young and old (ω = 0.5), normalize the
6This method has the advantage to being quite robust and easy to implement but the
precision is not that high compared to projection methods with collocation.
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Target observation Parameter
Savings to labor earnings ratio (=debt) 3.3 λ 0.95
Average tax on labor income 28% θ 0.02
Market to total consumption 30% X 3
Political weight old vs. young equal ω 0.5
Tax rate at the top of the Laffer curve 60% ξ 1.5
Equilibrium interest rate 2.5% β 0.908830
Table C.1: Parameter values and targets for the benchmark calibration
wage to unity (w = 1) and the Frisch elasticity such that the top of the Laffer
curve is τ¯ = ξ
1+ξ
= 0.6. β is set to target an equilibrium interest rate of 2.5%.
Table C.1 shows the parameters and target observations used to determine
them. The parameter values presented here are somewhat different than the
ones for the small open economy model used by Song et al. (2009). The
discount factor, β, is smaller to achieve a high enough interest rate, which
is endogenous in this model in contrast to the small open economy. X is
somewhat higher (3 instead of 2.7) because inducing a higher value of leisure
(and thus more tax distortions) helps to achieve a lower debt level and lower
tax rate. θ is even lower than in the small open economy calibration and λ
even higher. Again the reason is that it is hard to achieve at the same time a
low tax rate and a low enough level of government debt in the model.7 Not
surprisingly with such a low θ the implied ratio of steady-state government
expenditure to private market consumption is much too low as a consequence
(2% instead of 20%).
Figure C.5 shows the equilibrium policy functions for the benchmark cal-
ibration with tax distortions (X = 3), comparing it to an alternative econ-
omy with exactly the same parameter values except for no tax distortions
(X = 0).
7If I had chosen X = 2.7 as in the calibration of Song et al. (2009) even setting the
maximal altruism parameter λ = 1 (which should make government debt rather small)
government debt would still be too high. The downside of X = 3 is that the ratio of
market to total consumption is only 26%, but this constitutes a compromise for matching
better the ratio of savings or government bonds to labor earnings.
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Figure C.5: Comparison of Commitment and Markov Equilibrium for
(Benchmark Calibration)
First note, that the maximum debt limit is much lower in the case with high
tax distortiveness (the red lines thus end earlier than the black lines). Sec-
ond, In both cases, with and without tax distortions, the level of government
debt is the same under commitment and in the political equilibrium. Note
that the equilibrium level of government debt is much higher for X = 0 as
for X = 3. To understand the intuition consider that as the value of home
production, X, increases the value of taxable resources in the economy de-
creases and this part of resources is the only one that the old agents can
access, as they don’t produce themselves and depend entirely on the gov-
ernment (either through bond holdings or through public goods). Therefore
even if the relative tradeoff between public and private goods itself remains
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unchanged, the old agents allocate less resources to those consumption activ-
ities the more taxation is distortive. Consequently the level of government
debt falls with the level of taxable resources. This is also the reason why the
maximum debt limit is much lower in the case with high tax distortiveness
(dotted red line in the figure) than in the case without tax distortions (where
it is equal to the endowment, w = 1).
The policy functions for the tax rate, panel (a), and for the public expendi-
tures, panel (b) of Figure C.5, are qualitatively very similar in both cases.
Similar to the case without tax distortions taxes are generally higher under
commitment than in the political equilibrium. For very low initial debt lev-
els there is a corner solution because even though the number of bonds are
limited by the savings demand, the bond sales provide so much funds that
the tax rate can be set to zero.
Summarizing one can say that the qualitative conclusions of the model re-
garding the policy functions are robust to the inclusion of tax distortions.
The next section compares this extended model to the open economy version
calibrated similarly and analyzed numerically by Song et al. (2009).
C.4.6 Closed and Open Economies with Tax Distor-
tions
Suppose the small open economy model of Song et al. (2009) was the bench-
mark calibration matching features of reality. How would the determination
of debt look like in a closed economy with exactly the same underlying param-
eters? To answer this question, consider an alternative parametrization to
the benchmark with the same parameter values as in the small open economy
model of Song et al. (2009) except the discount factor which is set to target
a reasonable interest rate. Table C.2 shows this alternative parametrization.
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Parameter
λ 0.674
θ 0.092
X 2.7
ω 0.5
ξ 1.5
β 0.915830
Table C.2: Parameter values of alternative parametrization
Figure C.6 shows the equilibrium policy functions for the political equilibrium
and the commitment case. Note that the level of government debt is much
higher in the closed than in the open economy (0.0528 in the open economy
vs. 0.167 in the closed economy). In the open economy government debt is
reduced by the young voters as they fear a cut in public goods provision in
their old age. As the revenues from the bonds accrue mostly to people outside
the country they don’t have to fear necessarily lower private consumption in
old age. If the young agents wanted to save more in the open economy they
could just buy bonds in the international capital market. However in the
closed economy the level of government debt also has this role of ensuring
old age private goods consumption. Therefore the level of government debt
although reduced by the distortiveness of taxation and ensuing reduction of
taxable resources relative to the case of non-distortiveness, is still higher than
in the open economy. The old simply require at least some private savings
in their old age even if it is at the cost of some efficiency losses.
C.5 Conclusions
In this paper I analyzed a dynamic politico-economic overlapping generations
model with young and old voters and an endogenous interest rate. The role
of government debt as a financing instrument is absent. Instead the focus was
8Song et al. (2009) report a steady state level of government debt before interest of
0.026. Given an interest rate of 1.02530 this translates approximately to a debt level after
interest of 0.052.
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Figure C.6: Comparison of Commitment and Markov Equilibrium (Alter-
native Parametrization)
on the role of government debt as a savings instruments for households and
on the strategic use of government debt to influence the decisions of future
governments. Under commitment the level of government debt is used by to-
day’s young generation to obtain an optimal mix between private and public
consumption tomorrow in their old age. In the political equilibrium there is
additionally a strategic effect. Setting a higher debt level than the one that
would satisfy their optimal tradeoff between public and private goods in old
age young agents today can induce a higher taxation next period. In this
way they can rip off resources from young agents tomorrow. The strength
of this effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between public and
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private goods.
Coming back to the question asked in the beginning as to how it can happen
that relatively ”rich” countries exhibit a high government debt, this paper
yields some first hints on the underlying causes. On the one hand govern-
ment debt partly constitutes the savings of the young generation for their
old age, on the other hand in a political conflict between the generations
government debt can also be used as a strategic instrument to influence the
next generation leading to potentially higher government debt (in the case
of high substitutability between public and private goods). Another research
question concerned the influence of institutional mechanisms on government
debt. Here one can conclude from the results in this paper that according
to this closed economy OLG framework a commitment device would lead to
higher (lower) government debt than a voting mechanism in the case of com-
plementarity (substitutability) of public and private goods. A novel aspect is
the role of the elasticity of substitution to evaluate this question. To illumi-
nate effects of different institutional mechanisms further this paper therefore
suggests that it is important to consider this substitutability between pub-
lic and private goods. This finding could also guide future empirical research.
Concerning the characteristics of a country that lead to high indebtedness
in theory this paper has identified besides the elastiticity of substitution and
the institutional mechanism of government several other factors that deter-
mine underlying preferences in a country and have an influence on the level
of government debt: preference for public goods, altruism and the political
power of the old. A higher preference for public goods and a higher altruism,
lead to a lower level of government debt. The influence of voting power de-
pends on the strength of the strategic effect, a higher voting power leading
to a debt level nearer to the commitment level.
Finally the question of the role of financial openness of a country was ana-
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lyzed by comparing the results to the ones of the small open economy set-up
by Song et al. (2009). Without tax distortions, government debt is generally
lower in the political equilibrium of closed economies. With high enough tax
distortions, government debt can be lower in the open economies.
Of course this paper is just a first step in the direction of investigating the
role of politico-economic motives for the determination of government debt
with overlapping generations. Future research has to show the sensitivity
or robustness of those results to possible model extensions such as the in-
clusion of capital accumulation, technology growth, trade, or more than two
generations of voters. Furthermore, a quantitatively more meaningful set-
up (hybrid between open and closed economy, more generations) could be
used to quantitatively assess the importance of different factors to explain
international differences in public debt levels.
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C.6 Appendix to the Paper
C.6.1 The Commitment Solution
More Detailed Statement of the Commitment Problem
The commitment solution is defined as a feasible time path for all variables
that would be chosen if the first generation could commit all future gen-
erations to follow its will. To find an analytical solution I use a ”primal”
approach where the policymaker maximizes the utility of the current gener-
ation of voters with respect to consumption allocations directly taking the
private first order conditions as constraints to the optimization problem.
The optimization problem in the commitment case in period 0 thus looks
as follows:
max
{cO,t}∞
t=1
,{cY,t}∞
t=0
(1− ω)UY,0 + ωUO,0 (C.26)
where UY,0 defined by (C.1) and UO,0 defined by (C.2), where gt for all t was
substituted by using the government bugdet constraint (C.6) and bt−1 = cO,t:
gt = w − cO,t − cY,t
Note that the value of consumption of the old (or the inherited debt level)
in period 0 must be given as an initial value. Later on one can derive the
implied government expenditures by using the government budget constraint
shown above, the level of government debt by using the fact that cO,t+1 = bt
and the tax rate can be derived by using the first order conditions and the
budget constraints of the private optimization. More precisely, first find the
price of bond by using the Euler equation:
pt = β
u′(cO,t+1)
u′(cY,t)
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Then use the budget constraint to find the tax rate:
cY,t + ptcO,t+1 = w(1− τt)
τtw = w − cY,t − βu
′(cO,t+1)
u′(cY,t)
cO,t+1 (C.27)
Only the Old Decide: Recursive Formulation of the Maximization
Problem
In the case where only the old decide (ω = 1) the optimization problem as
defined in (C.26) simplifies to:
max
{cO,t}∞
t=1
,{cY,t}∞
t=0
UO,0
Writing UO,0 out explicitely:
UO,0 = u(cO,0) + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0) + λUY,0
Now we can substitute in subsequently UY,t and UO,t+1 for all t ≥ 0:
UO,0 = u(cO,0) + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0) + λ [u(cY,0 + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0)
+β [u(cO,1) + θu(w − cO,1 − cY,1) + λ [u(cY,1) + θu(w − cO,1 − cY,1) + ...]]]
Grouping the terms per time period we can find the infinite sum representa-
tion:
UO,0 =
∞∑
t=0
(βλ)t (u(cO,t) + θu(w − cO,t − cY,t) + λ (u(cY,t)
+θu(w − cO,t − cY,t)))
Therefore we can write the maximization problem when only the old decide
in the following way:
max
{cO,t}∞
t=1
,{cY,t}∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
(βλ)t (u(cO,t) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − cO,t − cY,t) + λu(cY,t))
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From this equation it is easily seen that there exists a recursive formulation,
where consumption of the old today or the level of government debt, cO, used
as a state variable. It is given by the following Bellman equation:
V CommO (cO) = max
cY ,c
′
O
u(cO) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − cO − cY ) + λ [u(cY )
+βV CommO (c
′
O)
]
(C.28)
Similarly, if I did not substitute for g equation (C.9) would arise.
Only the Old Decide: First Order Conditions and Solutions
The first order conditions of problem (C.28) are given by:
−θ(1 + λ)u′(w − cO − cY ) + λu′(cY ) = 0 (C.29)
λβ
∂V CommO (c
′
O)
∂c′O
= 0 (C.30)
The envelope theorem yields:
λβ
∂V CommO (c
′
O)
∂c′O
= λβ[u′(c′O)− θ(1 + λ)u′(w − c′O − c′Y )] = 0
Suppose we have CES-utility as defined in (C.3). Then equation (C.29) and
(C.30) are given by:
−θ(1 + λ)(w − cO − cY )−σ + λ(cY )−σ = 0 (C.31)
(c′O)
−σ − θ(1 + λ)(w − c′O − c′Y )−σ = 0 for λ, β > 0 (C.32)
where I have used the envelope condition to substitute out
∂V CommO (c
′
O)
∂c′O
.
It is easy to show that solving the equation system consisting of equation
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(C.31) and (C.32) for cY and c
′
O yields the following solutions:
cY =
λ
1
σ(
(θ(1 + λ))
1
σ + λ
1
σ
)(w − cO) (C.33)
c′O = b =
1[
(θ(1 + λ))
1
σ + 1 + λ
1
σ
]wfor λ, β > 0 (C.34)
As we can see from these equations consumption of the old is constant from
period 1 onwards. Consumption of the young depends on the state variable
and thus is constant from period 1 onwards as well, but different in period 0
depending on the initial debt level cO,0:
cY,t =

λ
1
σ(
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +λ
1
σ
)(w − cO,t) in period t = 0
λ
1
σ[
(θ(1+λ))
1
σ +1+λ
1
σ
]w in period t > 0 (C.35)
Only the Young Decide: Recursive Formulation of the Maximiza-
tion Problem
Similarly to the case when only the old decide one can use the infinite sum
representation to write down the maximization problem when only the young
decide:
max
{cO,t}∞
t=1
,{cY,t}∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
(βλ)t (u(cY,t) + θu(w − cO,t − cY,t)+
β (u(cO,t+1) + θu(w − cO,t+1 − cY,t+1)))
It is obvious that from period 1 onwards both maximization problems are
virtually the same as in period 1 the young today are old themselves. The
problem can thus be formulated in two stages using the same definition of
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the value function found in the case of the old:
{cY,0, cO,1} = arg max
{
u(cY,0) + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0) + V CommO (cO,1)
}
V CommO (cO) = max
cY ,c
′
O
u(cO) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − cO − cY ) +
λ
[
u(cY ) + βV
Comm
O (c
′
O)
]
for all t > 0
This problem can be solved by backwards induction. In the second stage the
young maximize their utility in old age choosing a plan for cY and c
′
O for all
t > 0 which is similar to the problem where only the old decide. In the first
stage they maximize their utility from private and public consumption and
the value of their old age utility with respect to cY,0 and cO,1 given the future
plans for cY and c
′
O. The equivalent formulation without substituting for g
is given in equation (C.12).
Only the Young Decide: First Order Conditions and Solutions
The first order conditions of this problem for periods t > 0 were already
derived above (see equation (C.31) and (C.32)). In t = 0 the first order
condition are given by:
u′(cY,0)− θu′(w − cO,0 − cY,0) = 0
∂V CommO (cO,1)
∂cO,1
= 0
The envelope theorem yields:
∂V CommO (cO,1)
∂cO,1
= u′(cO,1)− θ(1 + λ)u′(w − cO,1 − cY,1)
With CES-utility (and making use of the envelope condition):
(cY,0)
−σ − θ(w − cO,0 − cY,0)−σ = 0
(cO,1)
−σ − θ(1 + λ)(w − cO,1 − cY,1)−σ = 0
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Solving this system of equations for cY,0 and cO,1 (also using equation (C.31)
to substitute for cY,1) yields the solutions in terms of the state variable cO,0:
cY,0 =
1(
1 + θ
1
σ
)(w − cO,0)
cO,1 = b =
1[
(θ(1 + λ))
1
σ + 1 + λ
1
σ
]w
For t > 0 the solutions for c′O and cY are of course the same as for the case
where only the old decide (see equation (C.34) for consumption in old age
and equation (C.35) for consumption in youth).
General Commitment Case: Recursive Formulation of the Maxi-
mization Problem
Having found the recursive formulations of the extreme cases (ω = 1 and
ω = 0), we can easily find a recursive formulation for the general commit-
ment case as a combination of those two extreme cases. First transform
the maximization object from the problem defined in equation (C.26) as a
weighted sum of the two infinite sum representations:
(1− ω)UY,0 + ωUO,0
= (1− ω)
∞∑
t=0
(βλ)t (u(cY,t) + θu(w − cO,t − cY,t) + β (u(cO,t+1)
+θu(w − cO,t+1 − cY,t+1)))
+ω
∞∑
t=0
(βλ)t (u(cO,t) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − cO,t − cY,t) + λu(cY,t))
= (1− ω) (u(cY,0) + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0)) + ω (u(cO,0) + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0))
+β(1− ω + ωλ)
∞∑
t=1
(βλ)t−1 (u(cO,t) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − cO,t − cY,t) + λu(cY,t))
One can now express the problem of maximizing this object, analogously as
in the case where only the young decide, as a two stage recursive problem
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with state variable cO:
{cY,0, cO,1} = arg max {(1− ω)q(cY,0, cO,0) + ωv(cY,0, cO,0)
+βω˜V CommO (cO,1)
}
V CommO (cO) = max
cY ,c
′
O
v(cY , cO) + λβV
Comm
O (c
′
O) for all t > 0
where q(.), v(.) and ω˜ are defined as follows to make the equation more
readable:
q(cY,0, cO,0) = u(cY,0) + θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0)
v(cY,0, cO,0) = u(cO,0) + (1 + λ)θu(w − cO,0 − cY,0) + λu(cY,0)
ω˜ = (1− ω + ωλ)
Similar as in the case where only the young decide, the problem can be
solved by backwards induction. First one has to solve the second stage prob-
lem (equivalent to case where only the old decide) and then the first stage
given results from the second stage. The equivalent formulation without
substituting for g is given in equation (C.14).
General Commitment Case: First Order Conditions and Solutions
Given the two distinct stages first order conditions in period 0 will differ
from subsequent first order conditions. Obviously in subsequent periods the
first order conditions will be equal to the ones of the case where only the old
decide (see equation (C.31) and (C.32)). In period 0 the first order conditions
are given by:
ω˜u′(cY,0)− θ (1 + ωλ)u′(w − cO,0 − cY,0) = 0
βω˜
∂V CommO (cO,1)
∂cO,1
= 0
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The envelope theorem yields:
∂V CommO (cO,1)
∂cO,1
= u′(cO,1)− θ(1 + λ)u′(w − cO,1 − cY,1)
With CES-utility (and making use of the envelope condition):
ω˜(cY,0)
−σ − θ (1 + ωλ) (w − cO,0 − cY,0)−σ = 0
βω˜[(cO,1)
−σ − θ(1 + λ)(w − cO,1 − cY,1)−σ] = 0
Solving this system of equations for cY,0 and cO,1:
cY,0 =
ω˜
1
σ
[θ(1 + ωλ)]
1
σ + ω˜
1
σ
(w − cO,0) (C.36)
cO,1 =
1[
(θ(1 + λ))
1
σ + 1 + λ
1
σ
]w for β > 0, ω˜ > 0
Note that:
β > 0 ∩ ω˜ > 0⇐⇒ β > 0 ∩ (ω < 1 ∪ λ > 0)
This condition captures the fact that the demand for bonds in period t = 0
is only determined if either the young have some decision power or there is
some altruism. Of course the solutions for periods t > 0 are again equal to
the case where only the old decide (see equation (C.34) for consumption in
old age and equation (C.35) for consumption in youth).
Proof: Private Consumption in Period 0 is Higher the Higher the
Power of the Young
To show this I calculate the partial derivative of the solution for consumption
of the young in period 0 with respect to the power of the old ω and show that
it is negative. As (1−ω) is the power of the young, it must then be the case
that the partial derivative with respect to this parameter is positive. First
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write cY,0 as a combination of two functions of ω (and other parameters):
cY,0(f(ω, λ), h(ω, λ, θ)) =
f(ω, λ)
1
σ
h(ω, λ, θ)
1
σ + f(ω, λ)
1
σ
(w − cO,0)
=
(1− ω + ωλ) 1σ
[θ(1 + ωλ)]
1
σ + (1− ω + ωλ) 1σ
(w − cO,0)
Then calculate the partial derivative with respect to ω (omitting functional
arguments for simplicity):
∂cY,0(f, h)
∂ω
=
1
σ
f
1
σ
−1 ∂f
∂ω
[
h
1
σ + f
1
σ
]
− f 1σ
[
1
σ
h
1
σ
−1 ∂h
∂ω
+ 1
σ
f
1
σ
−1 ∂f
∂ω
]
[
h
1
σ + f
1
σ
]2 (w − cO,0)
=
1
σ
f
1
σh
1
σ
[
∂f
∂ω
f−1 − ∂h
∂ω
h−1
][
h
1
σ + f
1
σ
]2 (w − cO,0)
As w is the maximum debt level (as discussed above) it follows that w−cO,0 ≥
0. The square in the denominator of the other factor must be positive, so
that I can concentrate on the numerator. It is clear that because of σ, θ > 0,
0 < λ < 1 and 0 < ω < 1 it must hold that f > 0, h > 0 and thus
1
σ
> 0,f
1
σ > 0 and h
1
σ > 0. I thus concentrate on the square bracket in the
numerator:
∂f
∂ω
f−1 − ∂h
∂ω
h−1 = −(1− λ)
f
− θλ
h
< 0

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C.6.2 The Political Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting for the government budget constraint in each period the maxi-
mization problem defined in Definition C.5 can be written out as:
maxcY ,c′O (1− ω)UY (cY , cO) + ωUO(cY , cO)
where UY (cY , cO) = u(cY ) + θu(w − cY − cO) + βUO(c′Y , c′O)
UO(cY , cO) = u(cO) + θu(w − cY − cO) + λUY (c′Y , c′O)
Now let Cni=O,Y (cO) denote the n-th period reaction after the state variable
cO has occurred, such that for example C
0
O(cO) = cO, C
1
O(cO) = CO(cO) =
c′O, C
2
O(cO) = CO(CO(cO)), etc. Using this notation we can rewrite the
optimization problem defined in Definition C.5 as follows:
maxcY ,c′O (1− ω) {u(cY ) + θu(w − cY − cO) + β [u(c′O)
+θ(1 + λ)u(w − CY (c′O)− c′O) + λu(CY (c′O))
+
∞∑
i=1
βiλi−1
[
u(CiO(c
′
O)) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − Ci+1Y (c′O)− CiO(c′O))
+λu(Ci+1Y (c
′
O))
]]}
+ω {u(cO) + θ(1 + λ)u(w − cY − cO) + λu(cY ) + λβ [u(c′O)
+θ(1 + λ)u(w − CY (c′O)− c′O) + λu(CY (c′O))
+
∞∑
i=1
βiλi−1
[
u(CiO(c
′
O))
+θ(1 + λ)u(w − Ci+1Y (c′O)− CiO(c′O)) + λu(Ci+1Y (c′O))
]]}
Realizing that similar to the commitment case, the old and the young have
virtually the same preferences from the second period onwards, the expression
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can be simplified to:
maxcY ,c′O (1− ω)q(cY , cO) + ωv(cY , cO) + βω˜ [u(c′O)
+θ(1 + λ)u(w − CY (c′O)− c′O)
+λu(CY (c
′
O)) +
∞∑
i=1
βiλi−1
[
u(CiO(c
′
O))
+θ(1 + λ)u(w − Ci+1Y (c′O)− CiO(c′O))
+λu(Ci+1Y (c
′
O))
]]
Similarly as for the commitment case it is now possible to find a ”two-stage”
recursive formulation:
< CO(cO), CY (cO) >= arg max
cY ,c
′
O
(1− ω)q(cY , cO) + ωv(cY , cO) + βω˜VO(c′O)
VO(c
′
O) = v(CY (c
′
O), c
′
O) + βλVO(CO(c
′
O))
where v(.), q(.) and ω˜ are defined as above. However note that the problem
does not have two stages in the usual sense. Each generation only solves
one singular maximization problem given the actions of future generations.
Therefore there is no maximization operator in the definition of VO. However
as each generation is symmetric given the state variable, it is clear that policy
functions are the same for each generation given the state variable. One
can use this fact and the system of equations arising from the first order
conditions to find the Markov Perfect Equilibrium. First calculate the first
order conditions for some generation:
(1− ω)∂q(cY , cO)
∂cY
+ ω
∂v(cY , cO)
∂cY
= 0 (C.37)
βω˜
∂VO(c
′
O)
∂c′O
= 0 (C.38)
Note that equation (C.37) can directly be solved to yield cY = CY (cO) as it
only depends on contemporaneous values. Suppose CES-utility, then equa-
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tion (C.37) is given by:
(1− ω)∂q(cY , cO)
∂cY
+ ω
∂v(cY , cO)
∂cY
= 0
⇐⇒ (1− ω) [u′(cY )− θu′(w − cO − cY )] + ω [−(1 + λ)θu′(w − cO − cY )
+λu′(cY )] = 0
⇐⇒ (1− ω + ωλ)u′(cY )− (1 + ωλ)θu′(w − cO − cY ) = 0
⇐⇒ (1− ω + ωλ)(cY )−σ − (1 + ωλ)θ(w − cO − cY )−σ = 0
Solving this equation for cY yields:
cY = CY (cO) =
1
1 + ξ
(w − cO) (C.39)
where ξ =
(
[θ(1 + ωλ)]
ω˜
) 1
σ
To find the solution for government debt first calculate the partial derivative
∂VO(c
′
O)
∂c′O
using the definition of VO (omitting functional arguments of reaction
functions for simplicity):
∂VO(c
′
O)
∂c′O
=
∂v (CY , c
′
O)
∂c′O
+
∂v (CY , c
′
O)
∂CY
∂CY
∂c′O
+ βλ
∂VO(CO)
∂CO
∂CO
c′O
(C.40)
Iterating forward by one period the first order condition for consumption of
the old, equation (C.38), leads to an envelope condition:
∂VO(c
′′
O)
∂c′′O
=
∂VO(CO)
∂CO
= 0 for β, ω˜ > 0
Now use this envelope condition and equation (C.40):
βω˜
∂VO(c
′
O)
∂c′O
= βω˜
[
∂v (CY , c
′
O)
∂c′O
+
∂v (CY , c
′
O)
∂CY
∂CY
∂c′O
]
= βω˜ [u′(c′O)− (1 + λ)θu′(w − c′O − CY ) [1 + C ′Y ]
+λu′(CY )C ′Y ] = 0
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Now suppose again CES-utility. Conveniently, the policy function CY (c
′
O)
and its derivative C ′Y (c
′
O) are already known (using equation (C.39)) so that
they can be substituted in directly:
βω˜
[
c′−σO − (1 + λ)θ(w − c′O)−σ
[
1− 1
1 + ξ
]1−σ
−λ(w − c′O)−σ
(
1
1 + ξ
)1−σ]
= 0
Solving this equation for c′O yields:
c′O =
(1 + ξ)
1−σ
σ
(1 + ξ)
1−σ
σ + [(1 + λ)θξ1−σ + λ]
1
σ
w for β, ω˜ > 0 (C.41)
Analogously as for the commitment case, the new government debt issues are
not always determined. As shown above β > 0∩ ω˜ > 0 implies β > 0∩ (ω <
1∪λ > 0), which captures the fact that government debt is only determined
if either the young have some decision power or there is some altruism. The
reason is as was already discussed that the old do not care directly how much
government debt there is.
The policy function for the public good can be calculated using the gov-
ernment budget constraint:
G(cO) = w − CY (cO)− cO
=
ξ
1 + ξ
(w − cO)

Policy Function for the Tax Rate
The implied policy function for the tax rate (denote it by T (cO)) can be
calculated by inserting the policy functions for consumption into equation
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(C.27):
T (cO)w = w − CY (cO)− βu
′(CO(cO))
u′(CY (cO))
CO(cO)
= w − 1
1 + ξ
(w − cO)− β
[
(1+ξ)
1−σ
σ
(1+ξ)
1−σ
σ +[(1+λ)θξ1−σ+λ]
1
σ
w
]1−σ
[
1
1+ξ
(w − cO)
]−σ
⇐⇒ T (cO) = 1− 1
1 + ξ
(w − cO)
w
− β
[
(1 + ξ)
1−σ
σ
(1 + ξ)
1−σ
σ + [(1 + λ)θξ1−σ + λ]
1
σ
]1−σ
[
1
1 + ξ
(w − cO)
w
]σ
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the following formulation for the level of government debt in the
political equilibrium (PE) and under commitment (Comm):
c′CommO =
1(
θ(1+λ)ξˆ1−σ+λ
(1+ξˆ)1−σ
) 1
σ
+ 1
c′PEO =
1(
θ(1+λ)ξ1−σ+λ
(1+ξ)1−σ
) 1
σ
+ 1
where ξˆ =
(
(1+λ)θ
λ
) 1
σ
. Note that now the two debt levels look very similar,
which has been achieved by setting ξˆ in a certain way. In fact, we can set
ω = 1 in the political equilibrium to turn it into the commitment solution.
This would transform ξ directly into ξˆ. Now define the following function
f(x):
f(x) =
(
θ(1 + λ)x1−σ + λ
(1 + x)1−σ
) 1
σ
Note that one can write the debt levels in terms of this function f at different
realizations for the function argument: x = ξ for the political equilibrium
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and x = ξˆ for the commitment case:
c′CommO =
1
f(ξˆ) + 1
c′PEO =
1
f(ξ) + 1
The proof now consists of two parts. First, it can be shown that f ′(x) < 0
for 1
σ
< 1 and f ′(x) > 0 for 1
σ
> 1. Simply differentiate the function f(.)
with respect to its argument:
df(x)
dx
=
(
1
σ
− 1
)(
θ(1 + λ)x1−σ + λ
(1 + x)1−σ
) 1
σ
−1
θ(1 + λ)x−σ + [θ(1 + λ)x1−σ + λ](1 + x)−1
(1 + x)1−σ
It is clear that the sign of this derivative is negative in the case of 1
σ
< 1 and
positive in the case of 1
σ
> 1 for all 0 < ω < 1, θ, λ > 0. For the knife-edge
case of 1
σ
= 1 the derivative is zero. This means that in this case the value of x
is irrelevant as f(x) is constant in x (which can also be seen by introspection).
Thus for 1
σ
= 1 the commitment solution is equal to the political equilibrium.
Second, it can be shown that ξˆ > ξ for ω < 1 and λ ≤ 1:
ξˆ =
(
(1 + λ)θ
λ
) 1
σ
>
(
(1 + ωλ)θ
(1− ω + ωλ
) 1
σ
= ξ
⇔ 1 + λ
λ
>
1 + ωλ
1− ω + ωλ
⇔ (1 + λ)(1− ω + ωλ) > λ(1 + ωλ)
⇔ ((1 + λ) > (1 + ωλ)) ∩ ((1− ω) + ωλ ≥ λ = (1− ω)λ+ ωλ)
Of course it is easy to see that for ω = 1 ξˆ = ξ for all λ, θ.
Thus it has been shown that for all interesting parameter constellations ξˆ > ξ.
Combined with the previous finding that f ′(x) < 0 for 1
σ
< 1 and f ′(x) > 0
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for 1
σ
> 1, it is easy to see that the following must hold:
c′CommO =
1
f(ξˆ) + 1
< c′PEO =
1
f(ξ) + 1
for
1
σ
> 1
c′CommO =
1
f(ξˆ) + 1
> c′PEO =
1
f(ξ) + 1
for
1
σ
< 1
This completes the proof.
Comparative Statics: The Effect of the Political Power of Young
and Old
Define a function h(.) as follows:
c′PEO =
1
h(ξ(θ, ω, λ), θ, λ) + 1
where ξ(θ, ω, λ) =
(
(1+ωλ)θ
(1−ω+ωλ
) 1
σ
and h(ξ(θ, ω, λ), θ, λ) =
(
θ(1+λ)ξ(.)1−σ+λ
(1+ξ(.))1−σ
) 1
σ
.
This function h(.) is similar to the function f(.) defined in the proof of
Proposition 2 except that it takes the parameters explicitely as arguments.
Differentiating h(.) with respect to ω:
dh(.)
dω
=
∂h(.)
∂ξ
∂ξ(.)
∂ω
It is easy to show that ∂ξ(.)
∂ω
> 0 must always hold:
∂ξ(.)
∂ω
=
1
σ
(
θ(1 + ωλ)
1− ω + ωλ
) 1
σ
−1
θ
(1− ω + ωλ)2 > 0
For 1
σ
< 1 we know from Proposition 2 that ∂h(.)
ξ
< 0 and for 1
σ
> 1 ∂h(.)
ξ
> 0.
From introspection it can be seen that
∂c′PEO
∂h
< 0. Thus the comparative
statics effect of ω is given by:
dc′PEO
dω
=
∂c′PEO
∂h
∂h(.)
∂ξ
∂ξ(.)
∂ω
{
> 0 for 1
σ
< 1
< 0 for 1
σ
> 1
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Comparative Statics: The Effect of the Preference for Public Goods
Define the functions h(.) and ξ(.) as above. Differentiating h(.) partially with
respect to θ yields:
∂h(.)
∂θ
=
1
σ
(
(1 + λ)θξ1−σ + λ
(1 + ξ)1−σ
) 1
σ
−1
(1 + λ)ξ1−σ
(1 + ξ)1−σ
> 0
The partial derivative of ξ(.) with respect to θ is given by:
∂ξ(.)
∂θ
=
1
σ
(
θ(1 + ωλ)
1− ω + ωλ
) 1
ω
−1
1 + ωλ
(1− ω + ωλ) > 0
The total comparative statics effect of θ can thus be stated as follows:
dc′PEO
dθ
=
∂c′PEO
∂h
(
∂h(.)
∂ξ
∂ξ(.)
∂θ
+
∂h(.)
∂θ
){
ambiguous for 1
σ
< 1
< 0 for 1
σ
> 1
Comparative Statics: The Effect of Altruism
Define again the functions h(.) and ξ(.) as above. Differentiating h(.) par-
tially with respect to λ yields:
∂h(.)
∂λ
=
1
σ
(
(1 + λ)θξ1−σ + λ
(1 + ξ)1−σ
) 1
σ
−1
θξ1−σ + 1
(1 + ξ)1−σ
> 0
The partial derivative of ξ(.) with respect to θ is given by:
∂ξ(.)
∂λ
=
1
σ
(
θ(1 + ωλ)
1− ω + ωλ
) 1
ω
−1 −θω2
(1− ω + ωλ)2 < 0
The total comparative statics effect of θ can thus be stated as follows:
dc′PEO
dλ
=
∂c′PEO
∂h
(
∂h(.)
∂ξ
∂ξ(.)
∂λ
+
∂h(.)
∂λ
){
< 0 for 1
σ
< 1
ambiguous for 1
σ
> 1
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